Evaluation of the United Nations Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund

2020 GYPI COHORT

Evaluation Report

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Acronyms

ASFC	Avocats Sans Frontières Canada
CA	Conflict Analysis
CAC	Christian Aid Colombia
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCJ	Youth Consultative Committee
CD	Colombia Diversa
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CVJR	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
CVR	Community Violence Reduction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DM&E	Design, Monitoring and Evaluation
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GPI	Gender Promotion Initiative
GYPI	Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
HRDs	Human Rights Defenders
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Inception Report
IRF	Immediate Response Facility
JAP	Youth peacebuilders ("Jeunes Acteurs de Paix")
JEP	Special Justice for Peace
KII	Key Informant Interview
LA	Local Authority
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean

LGBTQI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, & Intersex Life
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINUSMA	The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MJSAC	Ministry of Youth, Sport and Civic Action (Haiti)
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MSC	Most Significant Change
MTR	Mid Term Review
NCE	No Cost Extension
NUNO	Non-UN Organizations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Human Rights Office
OPC	Office for the Protection of Citizens (Haiti Ombudsman)
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PO	Project Officer
PUS-BF	Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso
QA	Quality Assurance
RC	Resident Coordinator
RGA	Revenue Generating Activities
RNM	Red Nacional de Mujeres (Colombia)
RUNO	Recipient UN Organizations
SC	Steering Committee
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
TJ	Transitional Justice
TL	Team Leader
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UN PBF	United Nations Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
VE	Violent Extremism
WHO	World Health Organization
WHRD	Women Human Rights Defender(s)
WPHF	United Nations Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
YPI	Youth Promotion Initiative
YPS	Youth, Peace and Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) commissioned KonTerra to conduct this cohort evaluation of its 29 Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) projects approved in 2020. All these projects had budgets of 1.5 million USD or less and focused on one of the two themes of the GYPI 2020 Call: a) supporting Women and Youth Leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements; or b) Promoting Human Rights (HR) and protection of women and young peacebuilders and human rights defenders (HRDs).

Objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation assessed the performance and peacebuilding results of the GYPI 2020 cohort projects and identified common trends and key lessons across projects for UN PBF and Fund Recipients. It included a light-touch evaluation of four projects[1] selected from the cohort. It also investigated strategic aspects of the GYPI including support to local CSOs/partnerships and the mainstreaming of human rights and gender equality. The evaluation findings may be used to inform future UN PBF programming and evaluation policy. It is timely considering increasing UN PBF funding for its priority window on promoting gender equality and fostering inclusion through women's and youth empowerment and participation and considering changes to its evaluation policy that exempt these smaller budget projects from independent end-of-project evaluations.

Methodology

The evaluation followed United Nations ethical and quality standards and applied a HR and gender-sensitive approach. It was guided by the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria,[2] additional criteria of conflict sensitivity, catalytic effect and innovation were included based on relevance for UN PBF. The Evaluation Team (ET) utilized mixed methods for the collection, with a particular emphasis on qualitative methods. The light-touch project evaluations complemented the documentary review and allowed for a more in-depth enquiry and insights into peacebuilding processes, challenges and results.

Limitations: Timely availability and quality of projects documents limited the ET ability to systematically triangulate data, especially for projects with no evaluations and not covered by the light-touch project evaluations conducted under this exercise. This also impacted the assessment of trends as not all information streams were available for all projects, notably in areas of strategic importance for UN PBF, such as local partner feedback on partnership experiences, funding levels for CSO partners, and information on synergies with other projects. The low response rate (especially CSOs) limited the usefulness of the online surveys.

Main cohort evaluation findings

Relevance: Projects were generally inclusive and relevant for the needs of the targeted groups and the contexts of implementation, having identified and included appropriate thematic and specific target groups-based foci. However, the Conflict Analyses (CA) and Theories of Change (ToC) did not consistently address conflict and peace factors to the quality and depth as would be expected based on UN PBF guidance documents, nor were target groups always directly involved in proposal design, particularly when project locations were not determined at the project design stage. This exclusion, and rapidly evolving contexts, negatively impacted the relevance of projects in a few cases.

Nearly all projects had to adapt somewhat to various external factors, notably the effects of COVID-19, elections, social unrest, political instability, insecurity. Projects that could capitalize on real-time monitoring and prompt, localized feedback through monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems and/or partners in localities were more successful in ensuring timely adaptation.

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[1] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Colombia IRF 400, Haiti IRF 407, Mali IRF 408.
[2] Relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and ownership, coherence and coordination.

Efficiency: Utilization of resources within the 18 months period for GYPI project implementation was a consistent challenge . Over half of projects requested No-Cost Extensions (NCEs), most frequently connected to the external context, especially COVID-19, security concerns and changes in government/elections disrupting partnerships. Despite initial delays, implementation rates were generally high (above 80%) by the end of the projects.

Funding to civil society organizations (CSOs) often did not meet the GYPI target of 40 percent; there was no justification of why this target was missed. Formalization of partnerships faced challenges and delays often related to elections and coups, as well as the need to re-socialize project objectives and implementation modalities following these events. Strong CSO partnership/involvement in project development and management and existing relationships with fund recipients supported efficient partner formalization.

Effectiveness: Most outcome indicators were reported as achieved and targets often exceeded, and in most cases confirmed by triangulated sources, where available. Measuring and evidencing peacebuilding outcomes remains challenging given the nature of the changes promoted. The quality of indicators and M&E systems meant that clear and reliable data was not always available. Notwithstanding these challenges, it is plausible that projects contributed to address some drivers of conflict and improved youth and women roles for peace and social cohesion. In a few cases, outcomes can be directly attributed to project activities concerning improved and institutionalized interactions between the State/Local Authorities (LAs) and youth/women CSOs.

Peacebuilding results centered mainly on contributions to Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agendas. Projects contributed to increased inclusivity and women and youth empowerment as peace actors, notably through capacity development of these target groups, and interactions between civil society (CS) and with institutional stakeholders. Unintended outcomes, mostly positive, were frequently reported. These were mainly in terms of contributions to HR, Justice and protection systems; social cohesion and prevention of violence; networking among CSOs; and more structured dialogues/consultations between CS groups and authorities that were fostering more open attitudes and cooperation between them.

The factors most frequently identified as positively impacting peacebuilding results were the quality of partnerships, including local capacities; comprehensive and inclusive approaches to women and youth empowerment and protection; spaces for interactions; local stakeholder ownership; and culturally sensitive, context-specific and phased approaches to sensitive issues like human rights and gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) in very traditional communities. The absence or weakness of these factors hindered effectiveness. Additional factors that conditioned or limited projects achievements commonly related to the external context (beyond the control of projects), project duration and gender barriers.

Sustainability and Ownership: Most projects gave some consideration to sustainability in the project design and implementation but fell short of developing a formal exit strategy. Sustainability strategies relied mainly on a combination of (i) the involvement of CS and institutional stakeholders throughout project planning and implementation; (ii) capacity development of the key stakeholders; and (iii) institutional anchoring and policy alignment of project activities.

There is some evidence of sustained results and potential for continuity of processes. Sustained results were largely attributed to the ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors. In contrast, lack of continued funding, limited project duration and the external context frequently challenged sustainability. Concrete evidence (and monitoring) of lasting effects is limited; there are few verification sources of sustained change in the absence of ex-post project monitoring.

Coherence and Coordination: While continuity of support and generating synergies between GYPI projects and other peacebuilding initiatives (both UN PBF and non-UN PBF funded) was well articulated in project documents (ProDocs), indicating close attention to this aspect, reporting on this dimension was largely absent in Final Reports and Evaluations. There were some good examples of leveraging UN PBF funded initiative and results and a few good examples of coordination. However, most projects only demonstrated alignment without concrete collaboration or sustained coordination with international and civil society actors. It is unclear whether this is mainly the result of limited reporting on effective synergies and coordination.

Conflict Sensitivity: Conflict-sensitivity and Do No Harm were mainstreamed in project design and implementation primarily through considerations of inclusivity and cultural sensitivities, enhancing protection,

and the identification of risks and accompanying mitigation measures. These elements were integrated to a variable degree into projects, even if the word "conflict-sensitivity" was rarely mentioned.

Some gaps and weaknesses in mainstreaming these elements were also identified. These often related to the lack of local specificity of the conflict analysis included in ProDocs and the fact that nearly half of projects' risk assessments did not give consideration of the potential impact of the project activities on the context/conflict dynamics. Safety measures were implemented in some insecure contexts, yet risks persisted, leading to serious incidents in few cases. Some opportunities for peace/social cohesion were harnessed by projects, stemming mainly from strengthened capacities of peacebuilding actors.

Catalytic effect: Despite improvements in guidance and requirements in UN PBF reporting template, it is unclear to what extent tracking, measuring and reporting catalytic effect is systematically done. Based on available documentation, financial investments catalyzed by GYPI projects are far below the ambitious annual targets set by PBF; less than half of projects reported financial catalytic effects. On the other hand, the ET identified several examples of non-financial catalytic effects, like projects boosting CSO networks and platforms of peacebuilding actors, including women HRDs specifically, even if financial investment was not always specified. The sustainability of some activities past project closure demonstrates this catalytic effect.

Innovation: Specific project elements or approaches were sometimes new to the country or to the specific locations, and therefore 'innovative' in that context (even if a 'normal' activity when viewed more globally). The specific thematic and target group focus of the GYPI is considered 'innovative' in some operational contexts.

Across the cohort, the driver for 'innovation' was to find effective ways to support women and youth participation in peacebuilding and human rights work. Projects approached this objective in a wide variety of ways ranging from setting up new, informal mechanisms to 'interrupt' violence (like the "violence interrupters" in Honduras or the Youth Consultative Committee in Haiti) to formalizing established, traditional mechanisms to increase access to the justice system (like formalizing informal dispute resolution mechanisms in Solomon Islands). Localization is at the core of 'innovations' with local civil society actors essential in supporting and implementing these approaches.

Local partnerships

CSOs played a crucial role in every project of this cohort, supporting PBF efforts for localization of peacebuilding, in line with GYPI strategic orientations in this regard. While implementation and reach relied heavily on these local partnerships, involvement at more strategic levels was less consistent. CSO partners with long-standing partnerships with Fund recipients were more likely to be involved as of project design stage, but it is sometimes unclear to what extent they have shaped the definition of the projects' objectives, approach and activities.

In general, Fund recipients highly valued CSO partnerships under this cohort for the local knowledge and networks, access to remote locations, timely responses, and their flexibility to adapt and ensure continuity of activities in volatile contexts. There were also some challenges in local partnerships, linked mostly to poor management and financial capacity, weaker thematic expertise, conflict of interests and, occasionally, potential reputational risks to Fund recipients. For the local CSOs, these partnerships strengthened their capacities and expertise, ensured funding and operational continuity of their activities, provided opportunities for networking (between CSOs and with institutional and external actors) and enhanced their visibility within the community and with other actors.

UN PBF and its in-country Secretariats role in supporting these partnerships is recognized and appreciated. However, this cohort illustrates the significant challenges for the UN PBF to provide direct funding to local CSO and find ways to support smaller CSOs and more localized community based organizations (CBOs). Only two (of 29) projects in the cohort were implemented by national or regional CSOs. Stricter eligibility requirements are increasingly limiting local CSO access to direct UN PBF funding. Its potential role in widening local partnerships and supporting more localized peacebuilding is hampered by the limited understanding of CSO capacities and expertise beyond the frequent partners of UN agencies and INGOs.

Good Practices and Learning

Project implementation good practices and learning identified by the evaluation are briefly summarized below.

Good Practices	Lessons
Holistic/comprehensive approaches applied to support women and youth (in leadership and HR themes) combining capacity development; professional training/economic empowerment; access to medical, psycho-social and legal assistance to victims; and advocacy and dialogues with authorities.	Evaluation findings reinforce the **validity of a more comprehensive approach** to protection and leadership for peacebuilding. These more holistic approaches have been successful when working with both women and youth.
Specific **measures to account for women/girl participants' needs** and their families/community concerns over safety in contexts affected by conflict and insecurity.	**Budgeting for unplanned security needs and safety measures** can be critical in volatile conflict-affected contexts. Specific stakeholders' **needs can be better anticipated** to ensure more accurate planning.
Context specific and phased approaches to culturally sensitive issues like HR, GEWE and supporting LGBTQI+ people.	These are **critical especially in more conservative and rural areas and traditional/religious communities**, and when HR and GEWE are perceived to be promoted by actors external to the community. Addressing the rights of **LGBTQI+ people under a broader approach and wider alliances** to Human Rights issues and marginalized groups proved effective.
Intergenerational dialogues, networking and spaces for interaction among peers and with authorities.	These dialogue spaces **created important opportunities** for sharing experience, transfer knowledge, changing perceptions, understanding each other's roles, and learning to cooperate.
The use of **small grants and cascading funds** to CSO/CBOs	Small grants and cascading funds have helped to **increase the outreach, participation and capacities** of local women and youth beneficiaries/CSO, providing more relevant support to meet needs of the target groups within each local context.
Sensitization and involvement of **local authorities and traditional and religious leaders**.	Early engagement of these local actors **promoted an enabling environment** for the intended change and were an important factor for sustaining processes and results.
Continuity in peacebuilding efforts by UN PBF and other international peacebuilding support.	Continuity of peacebuilding support has helped **overcome challenges of short funding windows** in UN PBF funding

In addition, the cohort evaluation provided **lessons for UN PBF evaluation policy and future cohort evaluations**:

- Importance of mapping and making available all relevant project documentation on time for the evaluation;
- UN PBF reporting template presented some gaps and limitations compared to requirements in GYPI calls and in ProDoc forms, notably on aspects of strategic importance to GYPI which could be addressed in future reviews of reporting templates (e.g. funding to partner CSOs; CSOs feedback on local partnerships; synergies/complementarity with other projects);
- Investment in primary data collection (e.g. baselines, endlines) is especially important as fewer GYPI projects will have project evaluations in the future;
- The absence of project monitoring several months after projects have ended limits understanding what worked and why. Project evaluations or a country portfolio review 6-12 months after projects have ended could help in identifying catalytic effects and sustainability of UN PBF support.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Overall, GYPI projects have contributed to WPS and YPS agendas and supported peacebuilding in the countries of implementation The following table presents some (non-exhaustive) conclusions and recommendations put forward for UN PBF and Fund recipients consideration when planning future interventions or reviewing policy.

Conclusions	Recommendations

Relevance: while generally responsive to context and peacebuilding needs of target groups, projects at times lacked specific local knowledge to adapt to the evolving local peace and conflict dynamics in a timely manner.	A more systematic effort to include target groups and key local stakeholders in project design could improve localized knowledge for more adapted project design. UN PBF Secretariats in-country could possibly support selected concept notes with targeted consultations and specific conflict analysis.
Relevance/Effectiveness: The articulation between projects thematic focus and peacebuilding objectives was at times superficial.	PBSO/UN PBF Secretariats in-country could organize trainings/workshops for Fund Recipients, partner CSOs and institutional partners to socialize them with key concepts for peacebuilding work, UN PBF guidance and accompany its operationalization (e.g. the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach). This should improve articulation of peacebuilding objectives and thematic focus.
Efficiency/Local partnerships: UN PBF flexibility, NCEs and partners' ability to adapt were critical for the projects' high implementation rate. Budgetary adjustments to meet unforeseen costs due to security needs or other context-related changes have at times impacted on activities and outreach. Learning is limited by the absence of explanation for why two-thirds of projects did not meet GYPI requirement to transfer 40% of project funds to CSO partners.	UN PBF and Fund recipients could consider including a budget line for unforeseen costs in projects or an 'emergency reserve' at UN PBF or GYPI window level. Review UN PBF reporting templates to ensure appropriate levels of accountability and learning, particularly on strategic aspects such as local partnerships, including information on the selection of partners and their role in the project; a joint SWOT assessment of Fund Recipients and CSOs partnership; and why the 40% target for local CSO funding was not met (when that is the case). Identify potential spaces for CSO partners to provide direct feedback to UN PBF, besides monitoring visits and technical coordination meetings.
Effectiveness/Sustainability/Catalytic: Quality of partnerships, local capacities, integrated and inclusive approaches, spaces for interactions, and ownership of local stakeholders were often key factors for achieving intended results. Projects generally contributed to peacebuilding results, though direct attribution seems plausible in a few cases. Besides the inherent challenges of measuring peacebuilding and the volatile contexts, M&E weaknesses limited assessment of what works and why. Evidence of/potential for sustained results is limited. Furthermore, peacebuilding outcomes may not be perceptible or expected within a project funding cycle.	Conduct joint capitalization exercises of different UN PBF projects for cross learning. As smaller budget projects may no longer have independent evaluations, PBF should require that at least baselines and endlines are systematically conducted. Post-project monitoring 6-18 months after the project end should be promoted.
Sustainability and Ownership: Most projects lack an exit strategy. While projects' sustainability strategies stress local ownership, partners are not systematically involved in project design and decision-making. Still, ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors have sustained some results.	UN PBF Secretariats in-country should scrutinize (and support, when possible) the quality of participatory processes as these are important steps to ensure ownership.
Coherence and Coordination: Although identified at design stage, other project documents and evaluations provided little or no information on whether the identified synergies and complementarities were achieved or what facilitated or hindered collaborations with other projects.	UN PBF Secretariats in-country could hold preparatory meetings involving peacebuilding (local and international) and other relevant local actors for country portfolio coherence and complementarity. PBF could integrate a request for details on coordination with other projects identified in the ProDoc for synergies and complementarity in the reporting template.
Local partnerships/Innovation/Relevance: Eligibility requirements make it harder for national CSOs (let alone smaller local ones) to be able to apply and compete for UN PBF funding with INGO and RUNOs, and GYPI level of funding is too high for more localized CSOs/CBOs that do not have the absorption or management capacities. These challenges question whether GYPI is a fit-for-purpose tool for supporting local partnerships. Project partnerships are often based on longstanding relations with few, larger CSO partners, which has	UN PBF could consider issuing country specific GYPI Calls exclusively for national/local CSOs, with a lower funding ceiling and with lesser/more adapted eligibility requirements, and/or integrate a criterion in GYPI Calls (and possibly other UN PBF support) for diversification of CSO partners. Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) Colombia or UN Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) modalities for supporting local CSOs provide insights and learning for UN PBF to explore options for more targeted and localized

advantages but also limits the opportunities to widen UN PBF support and strengthen local level CSOs.

support, with due considerations of each country context and existing capacities and limitations.

1   INTRODUCTION

1.   The United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) is the financial instrument of first resort to support conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts in situations of crises, conflict and post-conflict. The UN PBF aims to provide timely, risk-tolerant and flexible funding to critical areas for building and sustaining peace. It supports integrated United Nations responses to fill critical funding gaps, respond quickly to/seize peacebuilding opportunities and catalyze national and international processes and resources for peace.

2.   The UN PBF includes a priority window on promoting gender equality and fostering inclusion through women's and youth empowerment and participation.[3] Over the years, the Fund has substantially increased funding for this priority; it has allocated US$265 million for 206 peacebuilding projects in over 30 countries between 2011 and 2022.[4] Under the current UN PBF Strategy, funding for women and youth empowerment is expected to represent about 25 percent of the overall Fund investment, which is expected to rise to $1.5 billion between 2020 and 2024 in approximately 40 countries worldwide.[5] Funding for this priority was channeled mainly through the UN PBF Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) annual competitive call for proposals.[6] Projects funded under the 2020 GYPI Call are the subject of this evaluation.

3.   Under the new UN PBF Evaluation Policy 2022-2024, projects with budgets of $1.5 million or less (mainly GYPI projects) are exempt from independent, end-of-project evaluations.[7] Instead, UN PBF committed to conducting an annual Cohort Evaluation of those projects. This evaluation report is the first UN PBF Cohort Evaluation.

1.1   Scope and objectives of the evaluation

4.   The cohort evaluation did a meta-review of all 29 GYPI projects approved in 2020 and implemented between 2021 and 2023, all with a maximum budget of $1.5 million. In addition, it conducted light-touch individual evaluations of a sample of 4 projects (out of the 29), selected jointly with UN PBF based on defined criteria (presented in Annex 3).

5.   The objectives of the evaluation are:

- To assess the performance and peacebuilding results of all 29 projects in the portfolio;
- To identify common trends across projects;
- To provide key lessons and recommendations for future UN PBF programming and for the Fund recipients.

6.   Human rights (HR) and gender equality considerations are mainstreamed within all the aforementioned objectives through the inclusion of dedicated sub-questions.

1.2   Thematic focus of the evaluation

7.   The evaluation covers the themes of the 2020 GYPI Call and assessed strategic aspects of the GYPI such as the support to local CSOs and partnerships. However, this evaluation is not a thematic evaluation; other UN

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[3] Other UN PBF priority windows are: (i) supporting cross border and regional approaches, and (ii) facilitating transitions.

[4] A total of $137 million in 109 GPI projects and over $128 million in 97 YPI projects in about 30 countries:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2023_call_for_proposals_-_eng.pdf
[5] UN PBF 2020-2024 Strategy, p. 5.

[6] The first call for proposals under the GPI and the YPI, in 2011 and 2016 respectively, amounted together to $9.1 million. In 2020, UN PBF funding for 29 GYPI projects amounted to a total of 36.6 million. In 2021, 38 projects and a total funding of 51.5 million were approved. In 2022, it allocated over $23 million to each GPI and YPI for a total of $46.7 million for 27 projects in 21 countries.
[7]This change was due to the low quality of some evaluations, especially of projects with smaller budgets, and the increased volume and number of GYPI projects. Evaluation policy at: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/UN PBF_evaluation_policy_2022-2024.pdf.

PBF dedicated reviews have covered these themes and strategic area in greater depth.[8] Findings on these GYPI 2020 themes and strategic areas are integrated in this report alongside findings on the evaluation criteria

1.2.1   Themes of the 2020 GYPI Call

8.   The 2020 GYPI Call focused on two specific thematic areas that are in line with the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agendas:

- **Supporting Women and Youth Leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements**. Under this theme, GYPI funded actions aimed at promoting and supporting women and youth representation and meaningful participation in formal and informal peace processes, negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms, and national and local decision-making. These actions sought to respond to challenges and structural barriers that continue to limit women and youth participation and capacity to influence decision-making, hindering inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding efforts. Barriers include: (i) persistent gender inequalities (e.g. social and cultural norms, discrimination, patriarchal structures) that limit women's access to education, resources and opportunities; (ii) underrepresentation, marginalization, as well as stereotypes and biases about women and youth capabilities and roles, and about already marginalized areas or specific ethnic, gender and religious groups; and (iii) insufficient access to financial resources,[9] capacity building/mentorship and/or networking opportunities restricting their chances to learn and a meaningful engagement and leadership in peacebuilding.
- **Promoting Human Rights and protection of women and young peacebuilders and human rights defenders.** 2020 GYPI projects under this theme include upholding and promoting the rights of women and youth peacebuilders and human rights' defenders, notably through appropriate legal frameworks and policies, awareness raising campaigns, and supporting their capacities. This thematic foci is in recognition of the foundational role of human rights for preventing conflict, addressing roots causes and sustaining peace.[10] Human rights violations can simultaneously be a cause, trigger and consequence of violence and conflict. Focusing on human rights can help address social tensions and other conflict or violence triggers within communities and in States, empower vulnerable groups, and provide windows for political dialogue and civic space engagement in transition processes or in fragmented and polarized societies. A Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) can support conflict-sensitive peacebuilding approaches through strengthening analysis of the context and of root causes of conflict, identifying sources of exclusion, and highlighting the impact of conflict on people and/or specific groups. These assumptions are reflected in projects funded under the 2020 GYPI Call.

9.   **Intersectionality of the 2020 GYPI themes.** While the two 2020 GYPI thematic areas are specific and independent of each other, the approaches share similar goals, principles and values. One's gender and age often condition how individuals experience leadership and human rights. Women and gender diverse individuals have historically faced discrimination and violations of their rights. Women and youth are frequently confronted with bias and discrimination when trying to assume leadership positions or constrained by societal norms or stereotypes. The Human Rights (HR) thematic focus recognizes these challenges, including the specific vulnerabilities and increasing violence suffered by women and youth peacebuilders and human rights defenders in crisis- and conflict-affected contexts and their essential role in civil society (CS) and in political and peacebuilding processes. These actors enable access to especially vulnerable individuals/groups and support self-reliance solutions. They can also help bridge the State and communities, transform gender norms and advance social change. Their actions contribute to more responsive, accountable and inclusive institutions, notably when exposing human rights violations and promoting access to justice and adequate support for victims. The 2020 GYPI projects reflect this intersectionality of themes, notably in activities regarding transitional

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[8] See namely the 2021 "Thematic Review on Gender-Responsive Peacebuilding" by Christof Kurz; the 2022 "Thematic Review on Local Peacebuilding" by Katharina Merkel; and the more recent (ongoing at the time of the evaluation) "Thematic Review on Human Rights and Peacebuilding" by Erica Gaston et al. from the United Nations University.

[9] According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), less than 0.5% of funding targeting gender equality and women's empowerment went to local women's organizations (2021 OECD Stats- 15170 code of the Creditor Reporting System).

[10] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) thematic paper for the 2020 Review of the United Nations (UN) peacebuilding architecture: "*The contribution of Human Rights to peacebuilding and sustaining peace*".

justice in post-conflict contexts; promotion of inclusive peacebuilding mechanisms, processes and relevant policies; youth and women's rights, including accountability for violence against women and youth (e.g. sexual and gender-based violence, forced displacement, recruitment into armed groups) and advocating for the protection of these groups, including through the development and implementation of adequate policies and legal frameworks.

1.2.2   Partnerships' promotion

10.   **GYPI promotion of partnerships with CSOs.** Joint UN-Civil Society Organization (CSO) proposals were opened for the first time in 2020. In line with relevant UN resolutions and recommendations,[11] CSO partnerships enable UN PBF to enhance its engagement with CSOs and provide direct funding to these organizations in-country as part of its policy to promote inclusive and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding. Notwithstanding, most CSO funding under GYPI still goes to International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) – only two local/regional Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were direct Fund Recipients under the 2020 GYPI Call. The UN PBF 2020-2024 Strategy stresses, as one of the key objectives of the gender equality and women and youth empowerment strategy window, the need to "expand partnerships with civil society organizations and explore new avenues to make funding available for community-based organizations".[12] When funding INGOs or Recipient UN Organizations (RUNOs), GYPI requires applicants to demonstrate strong partnerships with national or local CSOs, in particular women- and youth-led organizations and networks, and allocate at least 40 percent of the funding received from UN PBF to these organizations as grants for their capacity development and for implementation of activities. This is a higher requirement compared to the support UN PBF is providing under its regular portfolio, whereby about 30 percent of funds are channeled to national/local CSOs sub-contracted by Fund recipients. The UN PBF reporting templates were changed in 2022 to require projects to report on the amounts allocated to implementing partners, including CSOs, while providing information on their engagement.

11.   **Supporting coherent and integrated UN approaches.** GYPI, like the UN PBF in general, prioritizes joint projects with two or three recipients, facilitating and promoting partnerships across the UN system, and between the UN system and civil society, based on comparative advantages and complementarity. Competition for funding between UN agencies can, however, be fierce. The aim is to support UN coherence and integrated approaches, empowering the Resident Coordinator (RC) to use the UN PBF/GYPI as a funding tool to fill peacebuilding gaps, respond to peacebuilding opportunities and pilot new approaches as relevant to the specific in-country context within the GYPI objectives. The RC also has a role in ensuring interventions are consistent and coherent with the UN Country Team (UNCT) strategy in-country. In the piloting of the new Gender Promotion Initiative (GPI) 2.0 that started in 2022, the RC decides which specific themes to prioritize for the in-country GPI as per the specific peacebuilding needs of the country context at the time of proposal submission.

1.3   Overview of the evaluation portfolio

12.   The UN PBF/GYPI portfolio in 2020 provided a total of US$36.6 million for 29 projects in 20 countries. The Africa region received the most support in terms of the number of projects and overall budget, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and then Asia-Pacific (see Figure 1). There were slightly more youth projects funded (16) than gender (13). However, the total budget allocated for youth projects was significantly higher, with the youth portfolio receiving 60 percent of the overall GYPI funding in 2020[13] while gender received the remaining 40 percent.[14]

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[11] UN Resolutions on sustaining peace (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 (2016)), the Secretary-General's report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2018) and most recently, the UN system-wide Community-Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2020).

[12] UN PBF 2020-2024 Strategy, p.7

[13] US $22,131,602

[14] US $14,480,617

FIGURE 1 2020 GYPI PORTFOLIO SUMMARY

	AFRICA		LAC		ASIA/PACIFIC	
GENDER	8,883,617	9	2,597,000	2	3,000,000	2
YOUTH	13,131,602	10	7,500,000	5	1,500,000	1

13. Thematically, most projects (23) fall under the Youth/Women Leadership theme. The remaining six are under the Human Rights theme.

14. In terms of implementing partners, the 2020 GYPI cohort was quite balanced, with a similar number of projects implemented by UN entities (10), CSOs (11: 9 by INGOs and 2 by regional/national CSOs); and a mix of RUNOs and Non-UN Organizations (NUNOs) (8). The total budget was allocated relatively equally among these three types of partnerships (Figure 2)

FIGURE 2 GYPI BUDGET SUMMARY

1.3.1 Sample projects

15. The following four projects from the overall portfolio were selected for light-touch individual evaluations:

- **Burkina Faso,** IRF 386 project "*Appui à la promotion, à la protection des jeunes consolidateurs de la paix et des défenseurs des droits des personnes dans les régions du Sahel, du Nord et de l'Est (JDDP)*". This YPI Human Rights project worked mainly with youth Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and the institutions charged with protecting and creating an enabling environment for the youth actors to operate, while paying special attention to the specific challenges faced by women/girl HRDs. Its objectives were to: (i) reinforce existing mechanisms for the protection of young HRDs, girls and boys; (ii) strengthen their capacities and skills (including economic empowerment) so that they can carry out their missions safely/in a favorable environment; and (iii) promote their effective integration and of young peacebuilders in local mechanisms for protection, conflict prevention and management.

- **Colombia**, IRF 400 project "*Allanando el camino: Women and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, & Intersex Life (LGBTQI) people paving a path from justice and memory toward sustaining peace in Colombia*". This GPI Human Rights project aimed at strengthening the leadership and agency of LGBTQI+ people, Afro-Colombian and indigenous women in decision-making for social cohesion, development and justice in conflict-affected departments of Colombia, bolstering implementation of the Final Peace Agreement. The project supported transitional justice, memory and collective emotional reparations, addressing barriers of discrimination, exclusion and violence that undermine and limit the targeted groups' participation in local and national peacebuilding.

- **Mali**, IRF 408 project "*Les jeunes engagés pour une paix durable : Appui à la participation des jeunes aux processus de réconciliation au Mali (PROPAJER)*". This YPI Leadership project supported the participation and consideration of the voices of youth (women and men aged 15-30) in the transitional justice process foreseen in the 2015 agreement. The project's main objectives were to promote: (i) the involvement and voice of young women and men in Mali in the country's transitional justice processes provided for in the peace agreement; and (ii) the active participation of young women and men in the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and in the dissemination of its results to enable young people in Mali to take greater ownership of this process.

- **Haiti**, IRF 407 project "*Semences de paix*". This YPI Leadership project aimed at reducing the incidence of gang-related violence in the targeted Port-au Prince neighborhoods of Cité Soleil, Bel Air and St.

Martin. Its main objectives were to: (i) build positive, non-violent leadership among young women and men; and (ii) strengthen links in the community and between youth. The project sought to: create opportunities for youth (economic, social and identity-related) outside affiliation to armed groups, reducing their influence/attraction over youth; promote social cohesion (by bringing together youth from different neighborhoods), supporting young people civic engagement and dialogue with local actors for improved access/provision of basic services, as well as the role of youth in mediation with armed groups for youth and community protection.

16.	Besides being all eligible to PBF funding, the contexts of the countries of these selected projects share similarities like the high levels of violence, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV); impunity; the eroding trust between civil society and the State; the large youth populations with limited or no voice or participation in local governance and peacebuilding processes; and the vulnerability of youth to armed groups. **Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.** summarizes these similarities as well as key specific elements of each context, which are further elaborated in the project evaluations summary notes in Annex 4.

FIGURE 3 KEY CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INDIVIDUAL PROJECT EVALUATION COUNTRIES

Haiti/IRF 407 - YPI/Leadership
- High political instability and levels of violence, including SGBV, impunity, and collusion of economic, political & security spheres
- Power vacuum and escalation of violence following assassination of President Moïse (July 2021)
- State mostly absent; corruption and poor capacity to provide basic social services and protection
- No trust of the Haitians in the State/institutions
- Armed gangs control two-thirds of the country
- High poverty, displacement, natural disasters
- Youth are the majority of the population, but no voice or opportunities. Recruited by gangs, they are both perpetrators and victims of violence
- UN Peacekeeping mission approved (Oct. 2023)

Burkina Faso/IRF 386 - YPI/HR
- Political instability; two military coups in 2022; temporary suspension of UN cooperation in 2022
- Deteriorating security due to inter-communal conflicts and violence by jihadist and military forces/pro-government militias. Nearly 2 million displaced
- Limited State access/provision of basic services to approximately 40% of territory under the control/blockade of armed groups/jihadists
- High poverty exacerbated by natural disasters
- Shrinking civic space in context of fear and intimidation due to violence and limitations imposed by the transitional military government
- Young population (79% is under 35), few socio-economic opportunities, sense of marginalization, and limited space/voice in local processes especially for women and

Country Contexts

Colombia/IRF 400 - GPI/HR
- Incomplete implementation of 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian State and the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), including of its truth and justice provisions and FARC demobilisation
- High levels of violence. FARC dissidences and other guerrilla groups, paramilitary gangs, organized crime, criminal gangs linked to illicit economies
- Social unrest. 2021 nation-wide citizen protests against increased taxes, corruption, health care reforms and State violent repression
- Descrimination and structural violence against women (especially afro-descendants and indigeneous) and LGBTQ+ people
- Election of a new President in June 2022 renewed hopes for the implementation of the peace agreement and its gender equality and justice provisions

Mali/IRF 408 - YPI/Leadership
- Political turmoil, jihadist and ethnic-based violence, extra-judicial military killings, organized crime. Growing instability and insecurity since 2012. Military coups in 2020 and 2021.
- Peace agreement in 2015, between Government and the Azawad rebel alliance. Limited application of Transitional Justice (TJ) provisions.
- Extreme poverty, very high demographic pressure, environmentally fragile and food insecure.
- Youth are the majority of population. Although actors in in the conflict (e.g. informers, fighters, logisticians, but also victims), their participation in the peace process is limited.
- Very high gender-based inequalities and widespread gender-based violence
- UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was scheduled to leave by end of 2023.

# 2	EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, PROCESS AND LIMITATIONS

## 2.1	Evaluation questions

17.	The evaluation was framed around 8 main evaluation questions listed in Table 1 and 20 sub-questions. An additional 16 sub-questions applied to the light-touch project evaluations. The evaluation questions cover the evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and ownership and coherence and

coordination defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). [15] Additional criteria of conflict sensitivity, catalytic effect and innovation have been included in line with the Terms of Reference (ToR).[16] The data collection methods were guided by the evaluation criteria and questions (presented in the evaluation matrix in Annex 2). Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) considerations are mainstreamed into the evaluation criteria through the inclusion of dedicated sub-questions.

TABLE 1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Relevance	EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis (CA), remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?
Efficiency	EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives?
Effectiveness	EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?
Sustainability and Ownership	EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?
Coherence And Coordination	EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?
Conflict Sensitivity	EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?
Catalytic	EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?
Innovation	EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

2.2 Evaluation methods and process

18.   The Evaluation Team (ET) used a mixed methods approach employing quantitative and qualitative methods for the collection and analysis of primary and secondary data, with a particular focus on qualitative methods. A summary of data collection methods and their purpose is provided in Table 2. Additional details on the evaluation methodology are provided in Annex 3. Data collection tools are described in Annex 8.

TABLE 2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND PURPOSE

Data collection method	Purpose	Coverage
Meta-review	The main basis for the analysis of the projects' performance and results, and for the preparation of the remote and in-country light-touch evaluations of the four sample projects.	All 29 projects
Online surveys	Two online surveys were conducted, one for direct Fund recipients (RUNOs/NUNOs) and another for the CSOs/implementing partners.	The survey was sent to all fund recipients who were responsible for sending to their implementing partners (IPs). Responses did not provide full coverage.
Key informant interviews (KII)	Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)/UN PBF former and current staff involved in the GYPI 2020 Call, including GYPI coordinators, thematic advisers, Project Officers (POs) for the countries of implementation of the projects selected.	All 29 projects

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[15] https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

[16] See Annex 1

	Main stakeholders of the four sample projects selected for individual evaluations, mainly: the UN PBF Secretariat in-country, Fund recipients, partner CSOs and State institutions, project beneficiaries (including gender diverse individuals in Colombia) and other relevant stakeholders identified for each sample project.	Individual project evaluations
FGDs/small group interviews	Small group interviews (up to five participants), online, with youth beneficiaries (girls and boys) in Haiti and Mali, from different locations covered by the projects. Discussions focused on the participants' experience with the project and its effects on them and their communities; the projects relevance in relation to the context and youth needs; projects' contribution to perceived changes; most significant change; eventual risks and catalytic effects.	Individual project evaluations (remote and in-country)

19. The **inception** phase included a select review of general UN PBF and GYPI documentation and remote semi-structured interviews with PBSO/UN PBF former and current staff, including POs covering the countries of implementation of the GYPI 2020 projects.

20. The **data collection** phase included a meta-review of the available documentation for all projects in the portfolio. A full list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex 10. Specification of sampling by stakeholder is available in Annex 11.

21. Additional data was collected on the four projects selected for light-touch evaluations (IRF 400/Colombia, IRF 408/Mali, IRF 386/Burkina Faso, IRF 407/Haiti), notably through remote and in-country consultations with key project stakeholders. This enabled a more in-depth enquiry within the time and resource limitations of the evaluation; provided insights on peacebuilding processes and challenges, and lessons for future GYPI/peacebuilding support. In total, 98 persons, including 58 project stakeholders, were interviewed throughout the evaluation process (see Table 3).

TABLE 3 PERSONS INTERVIEWED BY STAKEHOLDER CATEGORY

Category	Number of persons Interviewed
UN PBF Headquarters and in-country	22
Fund Recipients	18 (9 RUNOs, 9 NUNOs)
Partner CSOs	25
Government actors/partners	5
Beneficiaries/local CSO/ CBOs	20
Other (other UN actors, etc.)	8
Total	**98**

22. Data collection was complemented by two **online surveys** prepared by the ET: one targeting the direct Fund recipients (RUNOs/NUNOs) and the other targeting the CSOs/implementing partners that received indirect support through the Fund recipients of the 2020 GYPI Call.[17] Survey results are provided in Annex 5. Unfortunately, there was a limited response rates for surveys, particularly among CSOs where only eight responded. This was despite expanding the timeline for data collection and multiple emails from the UN PBF Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E) team encouraging participation.

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[17] The survey was hosted through the SurveyMonkey platform: surveymonkey.com. SurveyMonkey is compliant with the European Union General Data Protection Requirement and the International Organization for Standardization 27001 on Information Security Management. Surveys were available in English, French and Spanish taking approximately 30 minutes to complete. The UN PBF DM&E sent the survey link via email explaining the purpose, use and access to respondent data.

23. **Rights based approach, gender mainstreaming and ethical considerations** were applied throughout the evaluation process. The evaluation team was guided by the UNEG Norms and Standards[18] and Ethical Guidelines,[19] ensuring integrity, accountability, inclusivity and respect for the dignity and diversity of all involved stakeholders and followed the 2014 United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Guidelines on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations and took a gender- and youth-sensitive approach. It also considered existing UN PBF technical guidance (e.g., on Gender, Youth and Peacebuilding, Theories of Change, as relevant).[20] All aspects of data protection and management in the evaluation were governed by the Personal Data Protection and Privacy Principles adopted by the UN High-Level Committee on Management.

24. **Data analysis and triangulation:** Data triangulation enabled the ET to compare findings on critical areas of inquiry, ensuring the impartiality of analysis and reducing the risk of bias. This included triangulation of data collected from the project's documentary sources and from diverse interviewed stakeholder sources. Data triangulation was more limited in the meta-review for those projects with no evaluations and not covered by the individual project evaluation conducted under this Cohort Evaluation.

2.3   Limitations to the evaluation

25. Important limitations impacted the evaluation. While the ET sought to overcome these challenges, there were evaluability challenges for most criteria and specifically for assessing effectiveness, sustainability and catalytic effect of projects (see Table 4). Impacts on specific areas of inquiry are noted in the findings section.

TABLE 4 EVALUATION LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Limitation	Mitigation measure and impact on evaluation
Key documents were not consistently available[21] and available documentation was not in consistent formats.	The DM&E team supported contacting POs directly for documentation but challenges remained. This impacted on the team's ability to assess trends in a more holistic way as not all information streams were available for all projects. Some areas of enquiry, particularly on details of implementation and sequencing, faced more substantial evaluability challenges.
Project reports generally focused on activities/products rather than outcomes, and in some cases did not report on specific challenges. Evaluations were of variable quality.	KIIs and the online survey sought to fill information gaps. The light-touch project evaluations also provided specific insights. The ET added additional, unanticipated workshops at the request of the DM&E team with stakeholders to fill information gaps/validate findings. However, some areas of strategic importance for UN PBF, such as local partner feedback on partnership experiences, funding levels for CSO partners, and information on synergies could not be explored as systematically as anticipated.
Online surveys were of limited value, especially for CSO respondents which were the main intended respondent (only 8 responses).	Response to the survey for the Fund recipients was more reasonable (18 responses, about 40% of projects). However, open-ended questions were often skipped or superficially addressed. The ET presents survey findings as triangulation to more robust evidence streams or for illustrative purposes only.

3   COHORT FINDINGS

26. Evaluation findings are organized by evaluation criteria and presented following the sub-questions and judgement criteria identified in the evaluation matrix. Main findings are highlighted and summarized in a text box under each evaluation question. Given GYPI's specific requirements regarding support to national CSOs, information on local partnerships' experiences has been consolidated into a dedicated section to highlight these

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[18] http://www.uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp

[19] http://www.unevaluation.org/ethicalguidelines

[20] All frameworks consulted are included within the bibliography in Annex 10

[21] Two projects (in Haiti and Sri Lanka) were still ongoing at the start of the desk phase. Of the 29 projects, 6 had neither a final report nor a final evaluation. These projects were therefore only partially assessed by the meta-review. Of the 29 projects, 10 were missing final reports and 7 were missing final evaluations.

findings. Findings from the individual project evaluations are included to provide illuminative detail which may contradict or triangulate with the patterns identified under each criterion. Full findings for each of the four light touch project evaluations are included within Annex 4.

3.1 RELEVANCE

EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **All projects sought to identify and include appropriate thematic and specific target groups-based foci, and were generally inclusive of the diverse groups and needs. However, the Conflict Analyses and Theories of Change did not consistently address conflict and peace factors to the quality and depth as would be expected based on UN PBF guidance documents, nor were target groups always directly involved in proposal design, particularly when project locations were not determined at the project design stage. This has, in a few cases, put the relevance of projects in question, requiring adaptations.**
>
> **During implementation, nearly all projects had to make adaptations, although not all were able to make these adaptations in a timely manner. Projects that could capitalize on real-time monitoring and prompt, localized feedback through monitoring and evaluation systems and/or localized partners were more successful in ensuring timely adaptation.**

27.   To assess the relevance of GYPI project designs, the ET examined the quality and comprehensiveness of three key elements of the initial project design, primarily through project design documents (ProDocs):

- Responsiveness to identified peace and conflict factors in the Conflict Analysis (CA);
- Relevance of targeting to respond to peacebuilding needs and priorities;
- Articulation of a clear Theory of Change (ToC)

28.   In addition, the ET assessed project's adaptability to context changes as reported through progress reports and triangulated through other available sources (e.g. evaluations; KIIs for the light-touch project evaluations).

3.1.1   Responsiveness to conflict and peace factors identified in the conflict analysis

29.   The ET examined how well projects' objectives and design (including outcomes) responded to conflict and peace-factors identified in the CA presented in ProDocs. Articulation was assessed against three indicators:

- Articulation of themes and peacebuilding needs in CA
- Presence of an up-to-date CA integrating gender and youth perspectives
- Whether project's intended outcomes address conflict and peace factors identified in the CA

30.   **There was a dominant-but not exclusive-focus on either Youth or Women, and Leadership or Human Rights, reflecting the intersectionality of the 2020 GYPI themes and target groups' related situation and needs identified in each context of intervention.** While several GPI projects were more specifically focused on women (and girls) in their design and implementation,[22] most other projects included both women and youth leadership in their activities, while keeping their primary focus on the targeted group (men and women youth in YPI projects; women, girls and in some projects LGBTQI people in GPI projects), responding to needs/gaps identified in the context and stakeholders analysis included in the ProDocs. Projects that had a thematic focus on HR generally

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[22] Sri Lanka IRF 385: *Protecting the Rights Space to foster peace in Sri Lanka*. Solomon Islands IRF 383: *Gender Responsive Peacebuilding in Extractive Industries in Solomon Islands Isabel Province.* Central African Republic IRF 413: *Défenseuses des droits humains, actrices de la consolidation de la paix*. Chad IRF 388: *Projet de prévention de la féminisation des modes opératoires des groupes extrémistes au Tchad*. DRC IRF 404: *Promouvoir la participation des femmes à la consolidation de la paix grâce aux paillottes de paix*. Sudan IRF 409 : *Strengthening the Political and Peacebuilding Role of Women in Sudan's Transition*. Cameroon IRF 387: *Renforcement de la participation des mécanismes communautaires et du rôle des défenseures des droits humains au processus de consolidation de la paix dans les Régions du Nord-ouest et du Sud-ouest Cameroun*. Mauritania IRF 389: *Prévention de l'extrémisme violent à travers le renforcement du leadership des femmes à Nouakchott et dans les zones frontalières à risque (Trarza, Hodh El Gharbi, Hodh El Chargui et Guidimakha)*..

integrated youth/women leadership in design and implementation. There was no evidence that this intersectionality or overlap has hindered or limited in any way the projects' relevance or responsiveness.

31. **The quality of CAs in ProDocs varied across projects, with varying analysis of overall peace and conflict background and dynamics.** The CA in several ProDocs was quite general but covered aspects identified in UN PBF specific guidance,[23] was supported by relatively recent primary and secondary data,[24] and its analysis validated by some of the final evaluations. However, the CA in other ProDocs only partially covered the aspects identified in relevant UN PBF guidance, used only secondary data that was often two to three years old, or did not include an analysis of the specificities of the project locations.[25] Occasionally, primary data collection and joint analysis by key stakeholders at the more local level was noted, but results were not described.

32. **In a few cases, outdated analysis may have hindered projects' responsiveness to peacebuilding needs in the specific context.** The final evaluations of a few projects noted that the CA was no longer valid by the time the project rolled-out, or the main purpose of the project was already a phenomenon in decline as noted in the project baseline study on armed groups' recruitment methods.[26]

33. **Intended outcomes addressed at least some factors identified in the conflict analysis that especially affect the target groups. However, these are not always the main factors driving peace and conflict in that context.** Generally, projects address target groups' vulnerability and exclusion, which undermine social cohesion and is, in some contexts, a contributing factor to conflict and violence. However, projects are not necessarily addressing key root causes or driving factors of peace or conflict; rather, they often address the consequences or effects of the context on the target groups that can feed tensions.[27] This is the case for instance with GYPI projects in Central America and the Caribbean dealing with gang violence.[28] While this may be viewed as a limitation of the projects, it is also important to reflect the realism of focusing on lower level results that can support other peacebuilding efforts given the limited duration and resources to realistically address complex peace and conflict factors.

3.1.2 Relevance of targeting to respond to peacebuilding needs and priorities

34. The ET included three judgement criteria to assess whether project designs responded to the peacebuilding needs and priorities of diverse women and youth. These criteria were whether projects:

- Targeted areas and groups in clear need of support and were representative of their diversity;
- Involved youth/women in project design (e.g. identifying priorities, refining the project approach);
- Intended outcomes responded to the needs of targeted women and youth groups

35. **Project design and intended outcomes were generally found to be relevant to the needs of the target groups identified**, as confirmed by triangulated documentary and other sources (e.g. ProDocs, project reports, evaluations and KIIs where available or conducted). CSO survey respondents also felt project activities were relevant for their intended beneficiary groups.

36. **While projects generally targeted geographic areas with higher stress factors (e.g. conflict/post-conflict, violence, displacement) and diverse groups, some projects missed areas most in need/vulnerable or could have been more inclusive.** Limited access or capability to operate in certain areas, as well as the ability to connect with specific groups, hindered certain projects from ensuring equal inclusion of other groups or sub-groups that are equally in need, at risk, marginalized, or possess weaker coping capacities. For example:

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[23] The ET assessed CA quality against the questions specified for inclusion in CA in UN PBF's Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitivity i.e. whether the background/history of peace and conflict has been described; identification of key factors affecting peace and conflict; identification of key stakeholders; identification of the most vulnerable and what mitigation measures are required to respond to their vulnerability; identification of relationships among stakeholders; identification of key dynamics in the context; identification of work of other actors.

[24] Guinea IRF 380: *Action concertée des jeunes (femmes et hommes) leaders communautaires pour le renforcement de la cohésion sociale et la consolidation de la paix en Guinée Forestière*. Mauritania IRF 389. Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403. Haiti IRF 407. Honduras IRF 410: *Comunidades constructoras de paz e igualdad (CONPAZ)*. Liberia IRF 411: *Protection and Support of Enabling Environment for Women Human Rights Defenders and LGBTQI Rights Defenders in Liberia*. Liberia IRF 412: *Sustainable and inclusive peace in Liberia through promoting women leadership and participation in civic and political life and their strengthened role in conflict resolution.*

[25] Some Prodocs presented only very light CA that did not really dived into peace and conflict factors. Some examples include Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, El Salvador IRF 414, Cameroon IRF 387, DRC IRF 404.

[26] Respectively, Solomon Islands IRF 383; and Chad IRF 388.

[27] e.g. SGBV, youth and women economic and social marginalization, or youth instrumentalization by political/violent groups

[28] Namely the case with the Honduras IRF 418, El Salvador IRF 381, Colombia IRF 400, Haiti IRF 407.

- Honduras IRF 410 did not include youth from indigenous/afro-descendance groups, possibly because it had no partners working with these groups.
- Cameroon IRF 387: shifted its geographic focus from conflict areas to displacement areas at the request of the government. Consequently, the primary focus was on displaced populations, with only a small subset of local residents who could travel from conflict zones included in the project.
- Chad IRF 388: the evaluation report questioned the relevance of the project targeting given the many donors and activities with a similar focus on understanding and preventing recruitment by armed groups;
- Solomon Islands IRF 383: targeting was based on proximity to stress factors (mining operations) based on outdated mapping without due consideration to effective need.

37.   **While projects' design was informed by consultations with relevant local actors, targeted groups were not systematically provide direct input into the design of the projects or identification of priorities.** Design processes were generally informed by prior studies, previous work of the Fund recipient and/or partners in the same project regions or with similar groups, or the needs and interests of women and youth were identified by 'proxy' (represented by national youth/women CSOs or organizations who 'knew' or worked with youth/women).[29] In some projects, it was not clear whether referenced opinions were from stakeholders from the specific geographic area of implementation.[30] Only one project[31] noted explicitly in the ProDoc that they did not involve local stakeholders; the design was partly based on previous work so this could be a case of representation by proxy.[32] Confirmation of localized stakeholder involvement in development was compromised by the fact that, in some cases, projects had identified the broader region, province or districts, but not yet the specific communities; project locations were changed or not accessible by the time activities started; or population displacement required the project to adapt.

38.   **Some projects did, however, involve stakeholders more systematically throughout the entire design process.** For example:

- Cote d'Ivoire IRF 403: all stakeholders working within the project's specific area of implementation[33] were consulted from the concept note stage through to the final drafting of the project proposal, and subsequently involved in its implementation and monitoring. Additionally, this project undertook Action Research which was then used to further inform the work of the project. This process was also validated in the evaluation report.
- Sudan IRF 409: held simultaneous project design workshops in three different locations with local potential partners to enable comprehensive participation given the geographic spread of the project and diversity in needs.

39.   **Validation exercises and baselines studies helped support the relevance of some project designs and implementation when local stakeholders were not identified at the proposal stage.** While some projects used ongoing Fund recipient or partners' work in project locations to conduct consultations in the targeted locations, others lacked the funding to do so prior with to the projects' approval. Some projects that did not involve local communities or stakeholders at the project design stage had good processes to have local stakeholders validate the design and ensure active involvement in implementation.[34]

40.   **Projects have either focused on inclusivity and GEWE, or have mainstreamed these aspects, including protection and sensitization on SGBV, across GYPI projects and themes.** YPI projects included specific attention to the additional challenges and needs faced by women/girls; some have included gender-sensitive analysis or

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[29] Colombia IRF 401: *Young and female peacebuilders in northern Cauca. Tradition meets innovation in community-led approaches.* DRC IRF 404. DRC IRF 405: *Renforcer la justice, la cohésion sociale et la réinsertion socioéconomique pour et par les jeunes femmes et hommes déplacés, rapatriés et de la communauté hôte au Grand Kasaï.* Liberia IRF 412. El Salvador IRF 414: *Juventudes salvadoreñas construyendo paz y resiliencia: Derecho a ciudadanía participativa e incidencia en los municipios de Jiquilisco y Tecoluca.* Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402: *Initiative des Jeunes Leaders (Hommes et Femmes) Engagés pour la Consolidation de la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire.*

[30] Colombia IRF 401, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Liberia IRF 411 and Solomon Islands IRF 383

[31] Guinea-Bissau IRF 406: "*No Ianda Djuntu-Drawing the pathway together: new leadership for meaningful participation, peace and stability*"

[32] Guinea-Bissau IRF 406

[33] Students' unions, teachers' unions, university governors, teachers, administrative staff, students, etc.

[34] Mauritania IRF 389; Honduras IRF 410; Honduras IRF 418: *Juventudes desplazadas por la violencia en Honduras: protagonistas resilientes hacia nuevos paradigmas de desarrollo sostenible desde la diversidad y el territorio*; Sri Lanka IRF 384: *Engaging Young Leaders to Promote Healthy Settings for building Cohesive Communities in Post-COVID Sri Lanka*; Cameroon IRF 387.

research in project design/implementation. In a few cases, project planning failed to take women's needs or more fundamental priorities into account, subsequently limiting their participation in activities. For example, in Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, activities took place during the harvest period when women were unavailable to participate.[35]

3.1.3 Articulation of theory of change

41.   The ET assessed the quality of each project's theory of change against key indicators identified in the evaluation matrix and based on UN PBF's Guidance note on how to develop a theory of change. ToCs were assessed for:

- Presence of explicit assumptions underlying the ToC
- Clear explanation of how thematic areas relate to local peacebuilding needs within the context and among the target population
- Presence of explicit causal pathways in the ToC from interventions towards outcomes
- Alignment of project interventions with the ToC logical pathways and appropriateness of activity sequencing

42.   **Overall, the quality of project's ToC was mixed, emerging as an aspect of project design that would require further support from UN PBF.** While all projects included some element of a theory of change, per the requirements of the ProDoc template, not all met the quality expectations of UN PBF. The quality of the ToCs varied, ranging from a very light ToC with no assumptions and lacking a description of project components to a detailed descriptions with clear assumptions and supporting evidence. Several fund recipients used the recommended table provided in the UN PBF guidance note.[36]

43.   ProDocs of ten projects were able to specify how the ToC relates to the peacebuilding needs and is relevant to the needs of targeted groups.[37] The other projects only did this partially; these projects did not clearly articulate how the ToC related to the peacebuilding context and/or how it was relevant to the groups identified. In very few cases, some groups were missed.

44.   **Most projects attempted to describe the causal pathways between interventions and outcomes, though many ToCs were very broad as presented in documentation.** The quality of the ToCs was validated by some evaluations, but very few evaluations provided an analysis of the ToC – most only re-presented the project ToC without analysis. The remainder had some gaps: interventions did not fully contribute to outcomes, pathways were not fully or clearly articulated, and/or ToCs had weak causality. A few ToCs were found to have too ambitious a design for the context, and time and money available.[38]

3.1.4 Adaptability to context changes

45.   **Most projects had to adapt to an evolving context, and were able to do so in a timely manner.** Common external factors impacting project implementation included COVID-19, elections, strikes, political instability, violence and natural disasters. The need to adapt was also reflected in the online survey where most fund recipient survey respondents (74%, n=14) reported a need to adapt programming. Of those that needed to adjust activities, respondents were positive about adaptation capacity with all reporting an ability to adapt at least 'somewhat'.[39]

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[35] Guinea-Bissau IRF 406

[36] The UN PBF Guidance Note on how to develop a theory of change provides some simple examples in peacebuilding and emphasises the importance of presenting evidence of assumptions and including processes to test those assumptions throughout implementation. It suggests using multiple ToCs (given the complexity of the change being sought in peacebuilding) and explains the limitations of 'if-then' statements, suggesting some alternatives (e.g. a table listing out main assumptions, sub-assumptions and including 'evidence' of assumptions). The note came out after the approvals of the 2020 GYPI Call and may not have informed project design of this cohort.

[37] Sri Lanka IRF 385, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Sudan IRF 409, Honduras IRF 410, Liberia IRF 411, Liberia IRF 412, Central African Republic IRF 413, Madagascar IRF 415: *Renforcer la participation des femmes aux processus politiques et à la consolidation de la paix pour promouvoir une résolution pacifique et inclusive des conflits à Madagascar*, Sierra Leone IRF 417: *Inclusive peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone*.

[38] Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Honduras IRF 418, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Sri Lanka IRF 385, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Liberia IRF 412, Guinea IRF 380. The ET is unable to assess the Honduras IRF 418 and El Salvador IRF 381: *MOVEO-Jóvenes en acción: hacia la diversidad sin violencia forjando alianzas para la construcción de paz y justicia en El Salvador*, as the description of the project components is missing.

[39] 'somewhat' (14%) or 'very well' (86%).

46.   **Prompt, localized feedback through M&E systems or partners was instrumental in adaptation.** Factors contributing to 'timely' adaptation (to the extent this could be assessed)[40] were regular data collection and feedback systems in place, frequent communication and coordination between partners (monthly in some cases), very localized partners (CSO/CBOs) who were 'on the ground' and could respond accordingly, or otherwise very localized M&E plans, with local partners, beneficiaries' networks or community members playing an important role in the monitoring of the context. Examples of when projects adapted well to new information include:

- Use of mid-term reviews that indicated what needed to change to improve performance[41]
- Revision of planned activities after feedback from participants/resource person, piloting activities or pre/post surveys[42]
- Identification of challenges requiring new solutions to enable the participation of young people and women, such as the provision of transport, childcare, internet connectivity and coordination with local security institutions[43]

> *"The project team is also monitoring and documenting the shrinking operational space, human rights violations and policy changes affecting the civil society and women peacebuilders in particular - these include incidents, structural and operational barriers preventing these CSOs, women organizations and HRDs to conduct their regular activities, support their communities, meet, travel, communicate and operate."-2021 semi-annual report Sri Lanka IRF 385*

47.   Conversely, factors that contributed to less successful and/or timely adaptation included:

- Lengthier RUNO procedures;
- Weak monitoring systems, sometimes with inadequate indicators and processes for data collection;[44]
- Challenges in internal project communication and participants feedback, which in some instances impacted the project's ability to respond to security challenges and to socio-cultural factors constraining implementation, including understanding fears and perceptions of participants, which limited their initial willingness to participate in the project[45];
- Poor planning of activities (e.g. not aligned with events impacting implementation, for example university exams, vacations or the harvest period).[46]

3.1.5   Insights from the individual project evaluations

48.   Reflecting the cohort trends, the CA and ToC for these projects were of varied quality. While there were no specific issues in the quality of the CA and ToC in Mali IRF 408 or Haiti IRF 407, the ToC developed for Burkina Faso IRF 386 did not make assumptions explicit not did it factor in some of the main barriers to the level of change intended. In Colombia IRF 400, the ProDoc did not align the articulation of the ToC with the structural factors identified in the 2016 peace accords.

49.   **Haiti IRF 407 was one of the few projects where local stakeholders provided input directly at proposal stage, compared to representation by proxy in Burkina Faso IRF 386, Colombia IRF 400 and Mali IRF 408.** In Haiti IRF 407, specific consultations with groups of boys and girls (organized by different age groups), CBOs and community KIIs were conducted to inform the project preparation in at least one location. During implementation, consultations with young people (Young Agents of Peace, CBOs, youth groups and other community leaders) were regularly conducted to gather feedback and identify barriers and opportunities for peace. **This systematic involvement of the target groups in Haiti IRF 407 was critical to overcome and adapt to challenges of mobilizing youth** in an environment where violence and insecurity erected invisible barriers between communities and groups.

50.   **Potential issues in the validity of representation by proxy are highlighted in the Mali IRF 408 project.** According to the ProDoc, partner CSOs were closely involved in the identification and the various phases of developing and implementing the project. However, KIIs revealed that youth CSOs lacked a comprehensive

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[40] There were limits to ET ascertainment of 'timeliness' based on available project reporting or assessments of timeliness in evaluations.

[41] Madagascar IRF 415, Sierra Leone IRF 417

[42] Sri Lanka IRF 384, El Salvador IRF 381, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Haiti IRF 407.

[43] El Salvador IRF 414, Haiti IRF 407, Burkina Faso IRF 386

[44] Liberia IRF 411, Guienea-Bissau IRF 380, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Cameroon IRF 387, Chad 388.

[45] Guinea IRF 380, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Cameroon IRF 387.

[46] Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403.

understanding of the project beyond their specific region. They became aware of other CSOs involved in the project only at a later stage, raising concerns about the extent of their effective involvement in the project design. Furthermore, the endline study questions the representativity of the organizations involved in the consultation framework.

51.   **At the design stage, only Haiti IRF 407 provided a localized, differentiated conflict analysis for areas of implementation. Despite the localized knowledge, the volatile political and security context required a review of the conflict assessment to consider unfolding conflict dynamics.** In Colombia IRF 400 and Burkina Faso IRF 386, there was no differentiation between the different areas of intervention. In contrast, the CA for Haiti details the specific situation in the three neighborhoods targeted by the project to some extent, identifying the typologies of violence that affect these areas and the key actors in these conflicts. It contextualizes the situation of youth in the project areas and risk factors that drive violence in their communities. As political events in Haiti unfolded and violence spiked, power dynamics had to be reassessed and activities adapted as needed.

52.   **Additional localized information was incorporated after proposal submission, enabling refinement of implementation in Burkina Faso IRF 386 and Colombia IRF 400.** In Burkina Faso, the project conducted mapping studies in the regions that provided a specific needs assessment and analysis of local youth and HR CSO/CBOs informing the selection of beneficiaries and the fine tuning of the project planning. In Colombia, while local organizations and participants themselves did not seem to be part of the assessment or design of the project, the microgrants component allowed them to propose and organize their own strategies and activities aimed at making gender-based violence visible.

53.   **All projects required adaptation; Haiti IRF 407 provides a good example of localized feedback and M&E to improve adaptability.** The close involvement of stakeholders and beneficiaries in the project planning, implementation and monitoring of the context, alongside the implementing partners agility and UN PBF flexibility, allowed the project to constantly adapt as the situation evolved. The project closely monitored the context through the youth and community participants (Young Agents of Peace, Youth Consultative Committee, CBOs, community leaders) and the implementing partners' staff and network of contacts in the communities. These local groups provided a quasi-permanent assessment of context challenges and risks and feedback on activities, which enabled the project to adapt as the context evolved and respond to interests and recommendations of the targeted groups. During implementation, project activities and budget were adapted accordingly.

3.2   Efficiency

EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives?

Summary of key findings:

Overall, GYPI projects' timely utilization of available resources is mixed. Over half of the projects requested NCEs most frequently connected to context challenges (e.g. COVID-19, security concerns). Despite initial delays, implementation rates were high (above 80%) by the end of the projects.

Funding to CSOs often did not meet the 40% target; there was generally no justification of why this target was missed.

Formalization of partnerships faced challenges. These delays often related to elections and coups, as well as the need to resocialize project objectives and implementation modalities following these events. Strong CSO partnership/involvement in project development and management and existing relationships with fund recipients supported efficient partner formalization.

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54.   The ET assessed efficiency through a review of project's ability to utilize resources against planning. As the ET did not have access to detailed workplans, this assessment is based primarily on a review of the number of projects that required No Cost Extensions (NCEs) and of how many met the target of 40 percent of funds transferred to CSO implementing partners. Given the GYPI window's emphasis on the importance of partnership strategies, the ET also investigated the extent to which partnerships were formalized in an efficient manner and the factors which primarily impacted this. Further details on partnerships are included in section 3.9.

3.2.1   Time and Resources available as planned

55.   **Utilization of resources within the 18 months period for GYPI project implementation was a consistent challenge, suggesting this timeframe was often unrealistic when working in conflict and post-conflict contexts.** Over half (16) of the projects requested at least one NCE with four projects requesting more than one NCE.[47] Of all the NCE requests, only one was denied.[48] Thematically, most of the HR projects required NCE(s) while half of the leadership projects required at least one NCE. A higher proportion of YPI projects required an NCE compared to GPI (see Figure 4 below).

FIGURE 4 PERCENT OF PROJECTS THAT REQUIRED AT LEAST ONE NCE

56.   The main reasons for NCE requests were COVID-19 related delays,[49] deteriorating security,[50] change in government/elections disrupting partnerships,[51] and IPs internal processes such as delays in hiring and lengthy administrative procedures.[52] The 'mismatch' of timelines for UN processes and the UN PBF project duration was also raised by a fund recipient participating in the online survey, noting that the limited duration of projects did not allow recipients to 'establish a solid base' for interventions, creating issues in efficient implementation of project activities. Coups during project implementation required partners to change their partnerships in response to new sanctions against the incoming leadership in Burkina Faso IRF 386, Sudan IRF 409 and Mali IRF 408.

57.   **Within contexts of deteriorating security, the need to take additional measures to ensure the safety of participants often impacted the project budget.** While there was flexibility to adapt the budget and shift funds across budget lines, this sometimes came at the expense of some activities such as reducing the frequency of activities to avoid limiting the total number of beneficiaries included.[53]

58.   **Despite delays, implementation rates were generally high by the end of the project (over 80 percent).** Of the 24 projects with data available, only four had implementation rates below 80 percent.[54] In Honduras IRF 418, the project had to return unspent funds following rejection of the NCE.. The main factors affecting project implementation are detailed in 3.3 of Effectiveness (see page 22).

3.2.2   Availability of funding for CSOs

59.   **Funding did not consistently reach the 40 percent target of funding to CSOs as defined by the GYPI call.** GYPI does not seem to do better in this regard than the regular UN PBF portfolio which transfers about 30 percent of funding to CSO partners, according to UN PBF sources interviewed. Based on available documentation, only 9 projects funded CSOs at or above the 40 percent target.[55] Of these projects, seven were under the

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[47] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Chad IRF 388: Projet de prévention de la féminisation des modes opératoires des groupes extrémistes au Tchad, Colombia IRF 400, Colombia IRF 401, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, El Salvador IRF 381, Haïti IRF 407, Honduras IRF 418, Madagascar IRF 382: Soutien à la Protection des Jeunes Défenseurs des Droits de l'Homme et Consolidateurs de la Paix, Gage de la paix sociale et de la cohésion communautaire, Madagascar IRF 416: OBS-MADA: Observatoire des jeunes citoyens engagés pour une gouvernance plus inclusive, efficace et apaisé, Mali IRF 408, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Sri Lanka IRF 385, Sudan IRF 409.

[48] At the time of reporting drafting Sri Lanka IRF 384 had requested a third NCE that had yet to be approved.

[49] Honduras IRF 418, El Salvador IRF 381, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Sri Lanka IRF 384, 395, Colombia IRF 401, Chad IRF 388, Madagascar IRF 382, Mali IRF 408

[50] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Sri Lanka IRF 385, Colombia IRF 401, Sudan IRF 409, Haiti IRF 407, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Chad IRF 388, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Mali IRF 408

[51] Honduras IRF 418, El Salvador IRF 381, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Colombia IRF 401, Sudan IRF 409, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Chad IRF 388, Colombia IRF 400

[52] Sri Lanka IRF 385, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Madagascar IRF 382, Madagascar IRF 416, Colombia IRF 400

[53] Haiti IRF 407.

[54] Five projects did not have final reports available to confirm the final implementation rate

[55] Colombia IRF 400, Colombia IRF 401, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, El Salvador IRF 414, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Haiti IRF 407, Liberia IRF 411, Liberia IRF 412, Madagascar IRF 415. The ET manually calculated these figures where the categorization of funded agencies and amount funded in

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leadership theme, with two in the HR theme. They were a mix of GPI (3) and YPI (6) projects. In five cases, funding was above 50 percent of the budget.[56]

60. **RUNOs and INGOs stricter financial management requirements and avoidance of reputational risks may explain why projects often fail to meet the GYPI requirement on CSO funding.** According to KIs interviewed, major reasons relate to RUNOs and INGOs stricter financial management requirements, and reputational risks if not able to justify the use of the funds because of partner CSOs weaker budget management capacities. Project documentation does not generally provide an explanation on why this CSO funding requirement is not met. The new UN PBF report template enables a clearer tracking of funds to the different categories of local partners. Some UN PBF Secretariats have also put in place effective monitoring systems for keeping track of the role of CSO partners in projects and of the funding amounts for the activities they implement.[57]

3.2.3   Efficiency of establishing partnerships

61.   Efficiency in terms of establishing partnerships is difficult to assess through the cohort evaluation as the ET did not have access to detailed workplans to compare planned versus actualized schedules to formalize partnerships. Without detailed information, the ET relied on building an understanding of whether key steps (partnership agreements, workplan, board meeting, baselines, hiring) were concluded within the first semester of the project i.e. by the 2021 semi-annual report. Using these criteria, very few projects had established partnership agreements by this time.[58] Development of workplans, convening project boards and hiring project staff also frequently faced delays.

62.   **Strong CSO partnership/involvement in project development and management[59] and existing relationships with the fund recipient were the most frequently reported factors contributing to efficient formalization of partnerships.[60]** Other factors mentioned include a strong governance system for coordination and decision-making,[61] the reputation of the UN[62] and strong staff capacities.[63]

63.   **Changes in governments and government-imposed restrictions challenged partnership formalization.** Four projects cited delays from government in approval of activities and/or workplan as well as intentional interference by government to delay/restrict activities.[64] The potentially restrictive role of government was also highlighted in a KII noting that, while requirements for government signatures on project proposals for increased national ownership of projects is largely positive,[65] it also creates restrictions in working with some CSOs, especially when governments are not willing to recognize certain activities/organizations due to political reasons or disagreement with the topics promoted (such as LGBTI+ rights in countries where these are not legally recognized).

64.   From a more practical standpoint, regardless of overt political interference in partnership agreements, there were frequent delays due to elections requiring project staff to justify and explain partnerships to newly elected officials.[66] This was particularly the case at the more local level (for example in projects working through municipal governments) as well as in countries experiencing coups or political unrest/tension.

65.   **Other challenges in efficient formulation of partnerships related to a lack of decision-making structures and/or issues in convening agency capacity.** The lack of a structured/formalized decision-making body was highlighted as a barrier to efficient partner management in few projects, particularly when coupled

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the final reports was available in UN PBF format. Three projects did not include disaggregated funding figures: Honduras IRF 410, Solomon Islands IRF 383, and Sri Lanka IRF 385

[56] Colombia IRF 400, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Liberia IRF 411, Liberia IRF 412, Madagascar IRF 416

[57] In Haiti, the UN PBF Secretariat keeps track of which activities are implemented by which partner and the funds allocated to each.

[58] El Salvador IRF 414, Colombia IRF 401, DRC IRF 404, Haiti IRF 407, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Cameroon IRF 387, Central African Republic IRF 413, Madagascar IRF 415

[59] Haiti IRF 407, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Madagascar IRF 415

[60] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Central African Republic IRF 413, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Madagascar IRF 415

[61] El Salvador IRF 414

[62] El Salvador IRF 414

[63] El Salvador IRF 414, DRC IRF 404

[64] Sri Lanka IRF 384, Honduras IRF 418

[65] This is a general requirement except in countries with serious extenuating circumstances such as states without internationally recognized or functioning governments, or states under UN imposed sanctions.

[66] Honduras IRF 418, El Salvador IRF 381, Sri Lanka IRF 384

with limited administrative/management capacity at the local level.[67] Finally, issues in convening agency capacity or processes were also identified. In four projects, lengthy UN processes delayed formalization of partnerships[68] while in another two projects triangulated sources identified the absence of a convening agency in-country as a barrier to efficient partnership formalization and coordination.[69]

3.2.4 Partnership contribution to efficient implementation

66. **Generally positive perceptions of local partnerships suggest they contributed to efficient implementation; detail is lacking on implementation modalities for stronger conclusions.** Partnership contribution in terms of cost efficiency is not a clear discussion within project design documents.[70] Based on a review of the strengths and challenges associated with local partnerships, the ET can broadly identify themes of local access, knowledge and flexibility as partners' contributions to efficient implementation. In contrast, limited local capacity, notably in financial and administrative management, was identified as a challenge. The nature and perception of local partnerships is included in further depth in section 3.9.

> *"I believe that in our case the partnership between agencies of the United Nations system and our organization was very important because it allowed some flexibility with the administrative processes that sometimes are very complex or time consuming on the part of the agencies."- Fund recipient survey respondent, (YPI/Leadership)*

3.2.5 Insights from the individual project evaluations

67. Overall, the sample project evaluations confirmed trends observed in the wider cohort and provide illustrative examples of the challenges of engaging in highly volatile political and security environments. Individual projects provided some good practices, such as on the partnerships and funding with local CSOs or with regard to internal coordination processes.

68. **All projects in the individual project evaluations required an NCE**. Haiti IRF 407 required two NCEs. The main factors justifying NCEs were contextual and beyond the control of the projects in Burkina Faso IRF 386, Colombia IRF 400 and Haiti IRF 407. In contrast, the required NCE for Mali IRF 408 was also partially due to internal factors (delay in disbursement that affected certain activities and the departure of the project manager).

69. **Three of the four projects exceeded the 40 percent CSO funding target. T**his target was not reached in Burkina Faso IRF 386. As with the wider cohort findings, there was no justification of why the target was missed.

70. **The implementation rate was generally high** (80 percent or more), with the exception of Mali IRF 408**.** In Mali IRF 408, some activities were linked to the publication of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) report, which did not happen.

71. **Like many other projects, Haiti IRF 407 and Burkina Faso IRF 386 benefitted from established partnerships with partner CSOs.** In Haiti, Concern Worldwide and the partner CSOs (Lakou Lape and Sakala) already had some experience working together. Joint development of the project document facilitated quick formalizing of partnerships. In Burkina Faso, the fact that the RUNOs already had established partnerships with the participating CSO, facilitated their early engagement in the project design and planning, and their quick mobilization when the project had to find alternatives to institutional partners after the suspension of UN cooperation. Partner CSOs experience on some of the themes and type of activities conducted (e.g., community dialogues, trainings on peace, GEWE) also contributed to efficiency and effectiveness.

72. **The coup in Burkina Faso illustrates the difficulty of collaborating with State actors in unstable contexts, underscoring the importance of UN PBF flexibility.** Burkina Faso IRF 386 faced significant challenges and delays stemming from the deteriorating security and political instability that led to a temporary suspension of UN cooperation after the military coups. UN PBF flexibility (the five months NCE and the possibility to adapt activities and targets) and fruitful partnerships with CSOs played a pivotal role in addressing these challenges.

73. **In contrast to many projects in the cohort, Colombia IRF 400, Burkina Faso IRF 386 and Haiti IRF 407 had reliable coordination structures which facilitated implementation and adaptation**. In Colombia IRF 400, a non-hierarchical project management committee allowed the three implementing agencies to deliberate and

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[67] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Honduras IRF 418

[68] Madagascar IRF 416, Mauritania IRF 389, El Salvador IRF 381, El Salvador IRF 414

[69] Honduras IRF 418, Mauritania IRF 389

[70] Only one Fund Recipient respondent highlighted CSO value for money as an advantage, while one fund recipient respondent positively highlighted that their partnership with the UN relieved them of burdensome administrative processes.

make decisions quickly. In Burkina Faso IRF 386, CSOs valued the space for sharing good practices, discussing implementation challenges, and jointly defining solutions to address the changes in context requiring adaptation of project activities or approach. In Haiti IRF 407, there was frequent communication between the three IPs and all decisions were taken jointly with the UN PBF Secretariat kept informed and monitoring implementation on a monthly basis.

3.3 Effectiveness

EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **Overall, it is plausible that projects contributed to address some drivers of conflict and improved youth and women roles for peace and social cohesion. In a few cases, outcomes are a direct result of project activities. Most outcome indicators were reported as achieved and targets often exceeded; qualitative reports are positive about project effectiveness. Measuring and evidencing peacebuilding outcomes remains challenging given the nature of the changes promoted.**
>
> **Peacebuilding results centered on contributions to WPS and YPS agendas, increased inclusivity and women and youth empowerment as peace actors, notably through capacity development of women and youth target groups, and interactions between civil society and with institutional stakeholders.**
>
> **Unintended outcomes, mostly positive, were frequently reported. These were mainly in terms of contributions to Human Rights, Justice and protection systems; social cohesion and prevention of violence; networking among civil society organizations; and more structured dialogues/consultations between civil society groups and authorities.**
>
> **The quality of partnerships, including local capacities; integrated and inclusive project approaches; spaces for interactions; and ownership of local stakeholders are the factors most frequently identified as positively affecting peacebuilding results. The absence or weakness of these factors represented a challenge. Additional factors that conditioned or limited projects achieving intended results commonly related to the external context (beyond the control of projects), project duration and gender barriers.**

74.   The ET assessed effectiveness as GYPI project achievements of the intended peacebuilding results and contribution to WPS and YPS objectives against two indicators:

- Project achievements against outcome indicators' targets;
- Qualitative data on the main peacebuilding outcomes across projects, including on aspects of WPS and YPS agendas, identifying common trends, and unintended outcomes

75.   In assessing achievements, the ET sought to identify recurrent factors that impacted on achieving results as well as any unintended outcomes.

3.3.1 Achievement of outcome indicators

76.   **Most intended outcomes were reported as achieved and targets often exceeded.** About a third of the GYPI projects reported at least some outcomes "achieved with peacebuilding results".[71] Fund recipient survey respondents were all positive on effectiveness of achieving project outcomes with all reporting projects as at least 'somewhat' effective.[72]

77.   There were similar indications of achievement in GPI and YPI projects. A higher proportion of Leadership projects achieved outcome indicators compared to HR, although the projects categorized as human rights were too few (six) to assess significant differences in thematic achievement. This thematic trend was somewhat reflected in the CSO recipient survey with 80 percent of respondents from Leadership projects (n=8) rating projects as 'highly' effective, compared to half of respondents of HR project respondents (n=2). However, effectiveness ratings of Fund Recipient respondents were similarly split by theme (80 percent of GPI respondents felt that projects were 'highly' effective; 70 percent of YPI respondents reported the same).

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[71] These refer to higher-level changes in the conflict or peace factors, i.e., societal or structural level changes, including in attitudes, behaviors, or institutions/institutional practices or policy.
[72] 'highly' (73%, n=11) or 'somewhat' (27%, n=4) effective

78. **In most cases, it is unclear whether peacebuilding results directly result from the project or if they are a cumulative effect to which projects have contributed.** This is because projects have often built on previous interventions or were implemented alongside other actions with similar or complementary objectives in the same areas, sometimes working with the same actors. Most often, it is likely that projects contribute, rather than directly result, in peacebuilding results. Direct attribution is plausible in a few cases concerning improved and institutionalized interactions between the State/Local Authorities (LAs) and youth/women CSOs.[73]

79. **Insufficiently formulated indicators and limited M&E data hinder assessment of outcome indicators for some projects.** Measuring results is made more difficult by inadequate indicators and a lack of baselines and/or endlines in several projects. Evaluations generally confirmed most results, including the light-touch project evaluations conducted by the ET. In rare cases, evaluations detected discrepancies between what CSO partners and Fund recipients reported.[74]

3.3.2 Peacebuilding results

80. Beyond measurement of outcome indicators, the ET reviewed qualitative data on peacebuilding results categorized in three areas as detailed below: (i) inclusivity and GEWE; (ii) improved interactions between stakeholders; (iii) contributions to WPS and YPS agendas. Capacity development was a cornerstone of projects' strategies to achieve the intended outcomes.

81. **Capacity development activities targeting youth and women beneficiaries/CSOs, which underpinned GYPI projects' strategies, were critical for empowering women and youth and helping raise their profile as local peacebuilding actors. In several cases, the potential effects of these capacity development activities is clear, but there is little evidence as to what extent that potential has materialized.** Projects generally included trainings, information/sensitization activities, mentoring/accompaniment of CSOs/beneficiaries, specific services on request, in addition to financial support for implementation of activities. Reported capacity gains frequently involved strengthened organizational and management capacities of CSOs, communication and advocacy skills, improved beneficiary knowledge and understanding on specific themes and related protection and governance mechanisms, which better prepared beneficiaries to engage/advocate with institutional and other local actors for instance on HR legislation and monitoring systems, tools for access to justice, early warning and local conflict prevention/management mechanisms, referral systems for victims' access to support services.

"The project has offered young human rights defenders the opportunity for genuine emancipation, enabling them to fully assume their role as peacebuilders rather than actors in conflict, in a deteriorating security context and in the run-up to elections that are often a source of political tension. Training in entrepreneurship and support for the development of income-generating activities will enable young girls and boys to become autonomous and achieve social and economic fulfilment. In addition, promoting and protecting the rights of young defenders will enable them to more effectively assert their rights and denounce alleged violations."-Fund recipient survey respondent (YPI/HR)

82. Positive accounts of capacity gains in project documentation were supported by the CSO survey responses where all CSO survey respondents reported that their organization had improved as a result of the partnership in the GYPI projects, mentioning the expanded organizational capacity, primarily as a result of increased knowledge and the outreach.[75] Six of seven CSO survey respondents reported that they had received technical support or guidance from the UN PBF main partner during the project;[76] all found the training useful.[77]

83. **Projects support to economic autonomy as part of holistic approaches to youth and women beneficiaries' protection and resilience have also seemingly contributed to their empowerment and socio-economic integration, reducing perceptions and effects of marginalization**. This was especially the case for SGBV victims and marginalized groups or those vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups (e.g. organized crime, violent extremism).[78] The incorporation of activities for economic autonomy is reflected and positively viewed in the online survey where three fund recipient survey respondents mentioned investments through employment opportunities as a significant change enabled by projects.

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[73] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Mauritania IRF 389, El Salvador IRF 414.

[74] Chad IRF 388, Mali IRF 408.

[75] 57%, n=4 reported increased knowledge and 43%, n=3 reported the outreach. The remaining respondent skipped the question (n=1)

[76] The other respondent skipped this question.

[77] Either 'useful' (17%, n=1) or 'highly useful' (83%, n=5).

[78] Sudan IRF 409, Guinea IRF 380, DRC IRF 404, Central African Republic IRF 413, Colombia IRF 401

84. **Sensitizing and capacity development of other actors was critical in fostering an environment conducive to change in terms of enabling women and youth participation; the recurring resistance encountered by projects also highlights the importance of longer-term strategies.** While there is evidence of transformation of traditional gender norms in certain projects, other projects struggled to mobilize or failed to engage relevant stakeholders for change. Transformation of gender norms was supported by GEWE mainstreaming and dialogues and sensitization activities conducted by CSOs, whose capacities were strengthened.[79] These activities have seemingly contributed to behavior changes in beneficiaries and other targeted stakeholders.[80] Other projects met with significant resistance and barriers to the participation of women, youth and LGBTQI+ people; projects were not always able to overcome those socio-cultural boundaries.[81]

85. **"*Learning to work with each other*" – Over half of the projects have contributed to improved interactions between stakeholders, including between youth/women-led groups and local authorities,[82] which in some cases has helped to institutionalize dialogue processes. In others, interaction was not enough to promote a greater role for these groups in local peacebuilding and human rights protection**. More specifically:

- Activities like capacity development, creation of dialogue spaces, psychological support/healing and, to some extent, networking among CSOs were credited with improving relationships within and between youth/women CSOs/beneficiaries and groups spanning different ethnic groups, territories, genders and generations. Information from multiple documentary sources reinforces the conclusion that opportunities for interaction and collaborative activities played a crucial role in altering the perceptions of previously isolated groups. This facilitated their ability to address community issues without resorting to violence, thereby positive influencing social cohesion.[83] Online survey respondents also highlighted improved relationships in open-ended responses.

- In several projects, activities helped improve the image of youth and women groups and their relationship with community leaders, local authorities and with institutional actors/State services. This also enabled enhanced coordination with the government, notably with regard to social protection issues for victims of SGBV and HR abuse in the project locations that have facilitated their access to State services (psycho-social, medical, legal, economic).[84] There are some examples where activities resulted in the institutionalization of local consultation structures,[85] helped connect youth- and women-led CSOs (and project partners) with national level institutional processes and mechanisms for justice and transitional justice as part of the implementation of a peace agreement,[86] or with national level early warning, social cohesion and human rights monitoring systems.[87] Among both CSO and fund recipient respondents, increased agency of these groups was most often related to skills and confidence building of youth/women as well as establishing or strengthening more inclusive peacebuilding spaces.

"Peace huts play a key role in preventing and resolving community conflicts in Kongolo territory. They are considered to be the main socio-security stabilizers and community awakening circles".- Administrator of Kongolo, DRC, IRF 404 (GPI/Leadership)

"Our municipality is one of the most affected by the issue of violence, for a long time we were one of the 10 most violent municipalities in El Salvador, where being young was more difficult, there was persecution and harassment by gangs, now we are living a culture of peace that of course through the MOVEO project will generate conditions for the youth of today to have conditions of leadership and these will move other young

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[79] Haiti IRF 407, Solomon Islands IRF 383.

[80] Like media actors, providers of social services, LAs, community and religious leaders, sector Ministries and decentralized state services, security forces, members of local and/or national governance structures (e.g. municipal councils, parliamentarians), and private sector.

[81] Honduras IRF 418; Burkina Faso IRF 386

[82] Notably in Burkina Faso 386, Colombia IRF 401, Liberia IRF 411 and 412, Sierra Leone 417, DRC IRF 404, Guinea IRF 380, Haiti IRF 407, Honduras IRF 410 and 418, El Salvador IRF 381 and 414, Sri Lanka IRF 384 and 385, Cameroon IRF 387, Central African Republic IRF 413, Chad IRF 388, Cote d'Ivoire IRF 402 and 403, Madagascar IRF 415, Mauritania IRF 389.

[83] For example, DRC IRF 404, Haiti IRF 407, El Salvador IRF 414, Guinea IRF 380.

[84] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Cameroon IRF 387, Guinea IRF 380, Chad IRF 388, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402 and 403, Liberia IRF 411, Central African Republic IRF 413.

[85] Madagascar IRF 415, El Salvador IRF 381.

[86] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Cameroon IRF 387, Colombia IRF 401, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402.

[87] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402 and 403.

people towards that culture of peace that we long for".- Mayor of Colón, El Salvador, IRF 381 (YPI/Leadership), 2022 project annual report

86.   **Projects supported the implementation of WPS and YPS national action plans with mixed results; while some positive effects are evidenced, there are also several accounts of significant challenges to advance WPS and YPS agendas.** Projects contributed to various aspects of these agendas, notably to *youth and women participation in local governance, HR protection and peacebuilding*. As it emerges from the meta-review, KIIs and surveys conducted by the ET, projects promoted space and participation for youth and women to be involved in local discussions and in decision-making processes/mechanisms. When asked to describe the most significant change the project contributed to, nearly all fund recipient and CSO survey respondents who provided an answer emphasized an increased role of youth and women to act as peacebuilding agents.[88] Several projects supported processes of elaboration of community/provincial action plans specifically for that purpose,[89] but available sources often fail to provide concrete evidence of action plan implementation. Some project reports and evaluations include testimonies of beneficiaries' experience and of local/institutional authorities' providing recognition of youth and women' role. Several sources also noted significant challenges to inclusivity and GEWE including (i) the unequal level of participation among targeted beneficiaries; (ii) limited or absent representation of women/girls, LGBTQI+ and ethnic minorities in some mechanisms and dialogue spaces supported by projects; and (iii) the persistence of significant cultural barriers to more inclusive peacebuilding and governance processes.

The project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the ethnic chapter of the Peace Agreement by helping women and youth leaders from the targeted communities [Afro-descendant] to recognize and strengthen their ancestral territorial practices and their capacities to be actors in their own development, also contributing to the promotion of women's participation in spaces of representation, decision making and conflict transformation. – Evaluation Report, Colombia, IRF 401 (YPI/Leaderships)

87.   **Project promotion of a culture of tolerance and dialogue has contributed to social cohesion and a reduction of violence in some cases**. Especially in projects on the Leadership theme, women and youth trained by the projects have seemingly contributed to dialogue and tolerance across previously divided groups (including ethnic, religious and territorial divisions), and to the prevention of violence through a variety of mechanisms including mediation of local disputes, countering radical religious discourses and preventing radicalization/violent extremism (VE).[90] One online survey respondent spoke of youth trained in conflict management and healing that were able to break the cycle of violence in their inner circle:

"The project has mobilized women and young women to get involved in conflict prevention and mediation between communities, and in demobilizing young people from ethnic armed groups. This has helped communities to come closer together and live in peace."- Fund recipients online survey (GPI/Leadership)

3.3.3 Unintended outcomes

88.   **A third of GYPI projects reported unintended peacebuilding outcomes, positive in nearly all cases.** In a few cases, these seem to be the direct result of project interventions, and therefore cases where attribution is plausible.

89.   **Unintended positive outcomes were mainly in terms of contributions to Human Rights, Justice and protection systems; social cohesion and prevention of violence; collaborations between civil society organizations; and more structured dialogues/consultations between civil society groups and authorities**. Nearly all CSO survey respondents indicated similar unintended effects. Specific examples of these unintended outcomes include:

- **Contributions to Protection/Justice/Human Rights systems:** Projects have contributed to the implementation of prevention and protection measures that address the specific risks faced by women and girls, unintentionally attracting increased attention to other issues such as child marriage, SGBV and teen pregnancy.[91] In Mauritania IRF 389, awareness-raising campaigns for prisoners' families (of detainees accused of terrorism) by one of the projects may have contributed to dialogues between the

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[88] 81%, n=13 of Fund Recipients; 75%, n=6 of CSO.

[89] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Liberia IRF 411, Madagascar IRF 415, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Sierra Leone IRF 417, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Cameroon IRF 387.

[90] Colombia IRF 401, Honduras IRF 410, Honduras IRF 418, Liberia IRF 412, DRC IRF 404, Haiti IRF 407, El Salvador IRF 381, Chad IRF 388, Mauritania IRF 389.

[91] Colombia IRF 401, Cameroon IRF 387, Sierra Leone IRF 417.

State and the detainees on a Presidential pardon, which was effectively granted in 2022 to eight prisoners as part of the Government policy to fight VE through dialogue and reintegration into society. In Colombia IRF 401, the project's enhancement of CS ethnic minority organizational capacity led to more effective participation of these groups in implementation of a national peace agreement. This, in turn, facilitated the reinforcement of traditional protection and justice systems.[92]

- **Social cohesion and prevention of conflict/violence:** In at least two cases, positive, unintended peacebuilding effects were reported from protection and HRD focused projects, underlining the interlinkages between these GYPI themes; no concrete evidence is provided to confirm these effects. In one case, peace messaging from women HRDs seems to have contributed to a few rebels putting down arms;[93] in another case, the integration of displaced persons is said to have helped promote peace between IDPs and host communities.[94]

- **Collaboration among CS groups:** In at least two YPI projects, collaborations between youth civil society actors/organizations were reported as an unanticipated positive outcome. In El Salvador (IRF 381) there was unanticipated inter-municipal coordination and exchange of experiences between youth organizations of two municipalities; in Haiti (IRF 407) jointly owned initiatives by youth from across divided communities were reported as unanticipated effects. Fund recipient survey respondents also mentioned unanticipated alliances/support between organizations outside direct support of project activities.

"Some student organizations have finally forged partnerships and created synergies of action for other initiatives outside the UN PBF project."- Fund recipient survey respondent (YPI/Leadership)

- **Interactions between CS-authorities at local and national level:** In El Salvador IRF 414, project teams adapted original plans for youth advocacy groups to instead establish youth roundtables as permanent spaces of articulation with the municipalities as a direct result of project activities. In Mauritania IRF 389, the Government formally recognized the *Mourchidate* network; it is now a partner in the national efforts to countering violent extremism (CVE).

90.   In one case, the project evaluation reported that there were **negative unintended outcomes** as pressure on communities for quick delivery of outputs (after implementation delays) hindered community decisions and consensus, and generated tensions in some communities.[95]

3.3.4   Main factors impacting peacebuilding results

91.   Table 5 below provides an overview of frequently mentioned factors that contributed to or enabled achievement of peacebuilding results (positive factors) and factors that undermined achievement or sustainability of results (challenges/weaknesses). Positive factors and challenges/weaknesses were often, but not always, the inverse of each other (represented on the same row of the table). There was no evidence of distinctive differences between GPI and YPI, Leadership of Human Rights themes in this regard.

TABLE 5 FACTORS IMPACTING POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY ON ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACEBUILDING RESULTS

Positive Factors	Challenges/Weaknesses

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[92] Colombia IRF 401.
[93] Central African Republic IRF 413.
[94] Cameroon IRF 387.
[95] Solomon Islands IRF 383

Partnerships/Localization: partner CSOs and youth/women beneficiary CSO/CBOs presence in local contexts, often embedded in the communities, was essential for most projects to be able to work in the targeted regions, identify the beneficiaries, access local stakeholders, and work in contexts where engaging the State was not an option. As stated by a KI, "partner CSOs often drive the projects". The importance of partnerships/localization was also reported in online surveys where fund recipients highlighted the contextual knowledge, timely responses and access to remote locations as key benefits of partnerships/localization (see section **3.9** for further details).	**Weak capacities of CSO partners for implementation or thematic expertise**. These were the main challenges identified in project documentation, triangulated by the online survey findings.[96] (see section 3.9 for further details).
Multi-track/comprehensive approaches were reportedly helpful to meet needs more holistically. Projects combined a variety of support services/mechanisms for youth/women empowerment and protection. Support often combined psycho-social and legal assistance, medical care to victims of violence, economic empowerment, alongside sensitization of and advocacy with relevant actors (LAs, community leaders, security forces, media), and strengthening their capacities (of beneficiaries and of actors relevant to enact changes in the targeted processes).	**'Light touch' activities spread across too many locations** meant that beneficiaries had too limited contact with the project activities for them to be effective, let alone sustain behavior change, empowerment or dialogues.[97] Limited budget and duration of activities compounded these challenges.
Spaces for interaction among peers, across generations and with authorities was seen as creating opportunities for changing perceptions, sharing experiences, understanding each other's roles, and learning to cooperate.	
Stakeholders' ownership: Involving CSOs and institutional stakeholders (including government structures at political and decentralized administrative levels) was relevant for the responsive design, planning and implementation of projects, which promoted ownership, a key factor for sustainability of processes and results (see also findings on Sustainability in section **3.4**).	**Poor ownership of authorities** hampered creating an enabling environment for the intended change. This challenge was often linked to staff rotation in the institutional partners or failure of the projects to engage LAs and community and religious actors.
Culturally sensitive, context-specific and phased approaches to sensitive issues like human rights and GEWE were credited with facilitating engagement of local stakeholders, and notably the participation of women and girls.	**Gender barriers and absence of gender-sensitive analysis/planning** added to the difficulties in promoting GEWE and LGBTQI+ people's participation in dialogues and local peace mechanisms, especially in rural areas and more traditional/religious communities and/or when HR and GEWE are perceived to be promoted by actors external to the community.[98] One Fund Recipient identified lack of inclusivity within CSOs as a disadvantage/risk of partnership.

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[96] Fund recipient online surveys identified weak implementation capacity as the main disadvantage/risk in partnering with CSOs; lack of thematic expertise was also identified by 5 (31%) respondents.
[97] The case for instance in the Madagascar IRF 415 project.
[98] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Honduras IRF 418, Colombia IRF 401

| | **Deteriorating security situation**, affecting some project's access to the planned locations and to targeted beneficiaries, especially as violence displaced populations.[99] |

3.3.5   Insights from the individual project evaluations

92.   **Among the individual evaluations, all outcome indicators were 'on track' by the latest reporting.** In Mali IRF 408 project, not all indicators had final values as an endline study was not conducted. In Burkina Faso IRF 386, outcome indicators were achieved after reducing the initial targets based on contextual deterioration.

93.   **Qualitative reports universally praised projects effectiveness and contribution to improved youth and women roles for peace and social cohesion, directly attributing outcomes to project activities remains difficult.** According to the IPs in Haiti IRF 407, youth are less attracted to armed groups as a result of project activities enabling access to power, social influence, and economic resources. While this is difficult to measure, interviewed youth and concrete examples provided indicate the project has empowered youth and helped to open dialogue channels between communities divided by the armed groups. This can potentially contribute to protection and social cohesion by keeping channels of communication open between communities, but it has not and cannot alone abate the violence spread by gangs that has continued to increase in 2023 in project locations and other areas.[100]

94.   **Like other projects in the cohort, peacebuilding results of the four sample projects centered on capacity development; increased inclusivity and GEWE; improved interactions between stakeholders; and contributions to WPS and YPS agendas.** In Haiti IRF 407, the most significant change related to the project initiative to bring together youth from across communities in conflict. This holds particular significance in a context where armed groups have isolated and divided communities. The project enabled interactions between youth, fostering mutual understanding, perspective sharing, capacity development in analysis and communication, and collaborative activity planning. Consequently, this experience altered their views about youth from other sectors/neighborhoods, instilled confidence, empowered them to take initiative, and prompted a shift in their outlook on the future. The process demonstrated that the barriers imposed by armed groups were not only physical but also mental, and importantly, it empowered youth to recognize their ability to effect change, thus promoting youth leadership for peace.

95.   **The projects confirm the integral role localization plays in improving effectiveness.** The expertise and ability of local partners to implement within targeted communities was highlighted by the various data sources in all four projects. In Burkina Faso IRF 386, the project's success in operating within targeted regions during the suspension of UN cooperation following the coup hinged on effective partnerships with CSOs and youth organizations with a presence in the targeted regions. The involvement of decentralized government structures in the regions was equally relevant for implementation and sustainability of results. The Regional Directors of line Ministries were especially instrumental in facilitating and adapting project activities and priorities to each regional context. They played a vital role in solving emerging implementation challenges, ensuring synergies with previous interventions; connecting the regional and central levels; and monitoring and accompanying youth beneficiaries/CBOs after project closure.

96.   **The constraining impact of the external context on project effectiveness** is illustrated in Mali IRF 408. While the project contributed to the implementation of transitional justice aspects of the Algiers Agreement, overall implementation of the Agreement still faces major challenges as illustrated by the recent resumption of hostilities between the Azawad coalition and the military authorities.

97.   **Challenges promoting GEWE objectives in a conservative context** were exemplified in Burkina Faso IRF 385. Cultural and religious barriers to GEWE were a serious obstacle to achieving gender parity in the project activities, especially in rural areas. Direct engagement of the project with the communities barely existed, which could have facilitated behavior change – the project managed, nonetheless, to have two-thirds of women/girls' representation in general (and parity in a few activities).

[99] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Cameroon IRF 387, Haiti IRF 407
[100] Human Rights Watch (2023). *"Living a nightmare": Haiti Needs an Urgent Rights-Based Response to Escalating Crisis*, August 2023

3.4 Sustainability and ownership

EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **Most projects gave some consideration to sustainability in the project design and implementation but fell short of developing a formal exit strategy. Sustainability strategies relied mainly on a combination of (i) the involvement of CS and institutional stakeholders throughout project planning and implementation; (ii) capacity development of the key stakeholders; and (iii) institutional anchoring and policy alignment of project activities.**
>
> **There is some evidence of sustained results and potential for continuity of processes. Concrete evidence (and monitoring) of lasting effects sustainability is limited and there are few verification sources in the absence of ex-post project monitoring.**
>
> **Sustained results were largely attributed to the ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors. In contrast, lack of continued funding, limited project duration and the external context frequently challenged sustainability.**

98.   The ET assessed sustainability and ownership based on the degree to which steps were taken to promote ownership and continuity in the design of projects as well as the eventual commitment of state/local institutions to peacebuilding results.

3.4.1   Important elements for sustainability

99.   **Government commitment, local ownership and capacities, favorable context and sustained funding were common elements as important for sustainability** identified by KIIs and documentary review. The online surveys results illustrated in Figure 5 summarize this convergence of views on crucial elements for sustainability. Fund recipients survey respondents highlight government and partners' ownership as the main elements determining future sustainability of results/outcomes; and national/local context as also key to determining sustainability (59%, n=10), while local partner thematic expertise and availability of funding were less emphasized.[101]

FIGURE 5 KEY FACTORS DETERMINING SUSTAINABILITY (FUND RECIPIENT SURVEY)

100.   An appropriate project duration was also frequently mentioned in documentary sources, KIIs and in the online surveys[102] as the sustainability of peacebuilding results often requires longer-term accompaniment, especially concerning behavior/cultural changes and institutionalizing processes.[103]

3.4.2   Sustainability strategies

101.   **Most projects gave some consideration to sustainability in the project design and implementation but fell short of developing a formal exit strategy.** Sustainability strategies relied mainly on: (i) the involvement of CS and institutional stakeholders in the design, management and implementation of the project; (ii) capacity

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[101] 'Other' factors highlighted included the implementation of culturally sensitive approaches, financial capacity of local government and 'commitment of beneficiaries'.
[102] 5 of 15 responses.
[103] UN PBF has already introduced changes to extend funding timelines.

development of the key stakeholders; and (iii) institutional anchoring and policy alignment with the expectation that this would generate ownership of activities, self-sustain and favor continuity and expansion of results. To enhance sustainability, projects often supported existing community structures, networking and spaces for dialogue, and developed tools for inclusivity (e.g. action plans for youth/women participation in local decision making for peace and social cohesion).

"Sustainability is possible if there is government commitment, civil society mobilization, and the implementation of culturally sensitive approaches."--Fund Recipient Survey Respondent (GPI/Leadership)

102.   There were some projects that developed more explicit exit strategies.[104] In addition to the aforementioned sustainability elements, these included continuity plans, through:

- The institutionalization of action plans developed or of structures supported by the project;
- Other funding or via local partners that will continue working with the communities on the same processes/issues; or
- The integration of outputs in institutional trainings, training of trainers or cascading plans.

103.   **Sustainability remains a significant challenge, even with exit strategies.** This was noted in some evaluation reports. The online survey also highlights gaps in expected sustainability. Most Fund Recipient respondents felt that key results would be 'somewhat' sustainable; one respondent specified that activities were not designed to be sustainable.[105]

3.4.3   Sustained results

104.   **Available sources provide some evidence of sustained results and potential for continuity of processes; challenges to sustainability were also noted.** These results largely stem from the ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors. Challenges of ensuring continuity of peacebuilding results much beyond the projects end without continuity of funding was also highlighted.[106] Several partners had secured funding for continuation of activities after the end of the project.[107]

105.   **Local actors have demonstrated capacity to sustain or expand activities outside of project implementation.** This agency and empowerment is demonstrated in the ability of women and youth beneficiaries/CSOs to continue or expand project activities by their own initiative[108] and in the implementation of municipal action plans.[109] Three of seven CSO survey respondents reported that they were able to continue project activities or results of this project even after funding had ended. The ability of actors to continue these activities also confirms the benefits of capacity building activities built into the project.

The Mourchidates network in Mauritania (composed of women volunteers - not remunerated by the project – who are teaching religion or studying Islamic sciences) continue conveying messages about alternatives to violent extremism. Project partners – the local CSO partner…[and Ministry of Islamic Affairs] -continue working with the network on PVE initiatives. The official recognition of the Mourchidates network by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and education has helped to strengthen the network's durability. – Evaluation report, Mauritania, IRF 389 (GPI/Leadership)

106.   **There are also examples of authorities capitalizing on results and capacities to sustain some effects.** Municipal authorities have committed to maintaining infrastructures and spaces for dialogue with youth/CSOs through a variety of mechanisms such as: continuing to accompany/engage with youth beneficiaries; providing financial support for continuity of actors; and/or implementing action plans on HR protection or for the inclusion of youth/women in community decision-making and peace mechanisms.[110] Continued authority ownership was

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[104] El Salvador IRF 381, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Chad IRF 388, Mauritania IRF 389, Honduras IRF 410, Central African Republic IRF 413.

[105] The remaining three respondents felt that results were 'highly' sustainable.

[106] E.g. DRC IRF 405, Honduras IRF 410.

[107] Central African Republic IRF 413, El Salvador IRF 414. See also section 3.7 on Catalytic Effects.

[108] El Salvador IRF 381, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Mauritania IRF 389, Central African Republic IRF 413, Haiti IRF 407, Liberia IRF 411, Madagascar IRF 415, Honduras IRF 410, Sierra Leone IRF 417.

[109] Sri Lanka IRF 384, El Salvador IRF 414, Madagascar IRF 415, Burkina Faso IRF 386.

[110] El Salvador IRF 414, Haiti IRF 407, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Cameroon IRF 387, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Sierra Leone IRF 417.

not evidenced in all projects, as illustrated by CSO survey where results were split evenly between 'no support at all, 'very little' or 'a lot' or support from state or local authorities.[111]

> *"Youth and municipalities have changed their approach to each other, have built bridges of trust, have identified each other as allies. This contributes to the sustainability of youth involvement and their actions to strengthen their leadership and their capacities to design and implement long-lasting actions."-Fund recipient Survey Respondent (YPI/HR)*

107.   **Projects showed evidence that GEWE results may endure after the project ends.**[112] Some GEWE results could be expected to endure based on a wide variety of factors related to increased visibility and capacity of women and youth leaders. Specific examples in reports include:

- Women role models are inspiring other women to present themselves for administrative or political positions and some are being elected;[113]
- More women and youth are organizing themselves in groups and taking up leadership roles;[114]
- HRDs, victims of SGBV and minority groups have, in some cases, continued to collaborate after the project ended;[115]
- Reporting on SGBV seems to have increased as a result of awareness raising activities, although there is often data lacking to evidence this increase and assess whether authorities have been responsive.[116]

108.   There are also examples of institutional actors mainstreaming gender and youth responsiveness:

- Sri Lanka IRF 384: the National Parliament decided to integrate modules of project trainings into their own trainings and has requested assistance from the project to help with preparing a National Youth Policy;
- Mauritania IRF 389: A gender audit was launched at the Ministry of Justice to take stock of and analyze the institutionalization of gender. The *Mourchidates* network set up by the project received official recognition and is partnering with by the line Ministry.

109.   **There is a lack of concrete evidence of sustained effects.** There is no systematic post-project monitoring. The uneven quality of M&E work and challenges in measuring peacebuilding outcomes and identifying project contribution to these changes limits knowledge management and learning on peacebuilding results. UN PBF Secretariats in-country seem to do some post-project monitoring during monitoring visits to locations common to several projects, but it is not clear what systems are used to channel that information.

3.4.4   Insights from the individual project evaluations

110.   **All individual projects evaluated showed some evidence of sustained results and potential for continuity of processes. As with the broader cohort, sustained results were largely attributed to the ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors.** In all four projects, at least some activities continued without additional funding always being specified. For example:

- Burkina Faso IRF 386: There are indications of youth beneficiaries training other youth, using the communication skills acquired through the project trainings and tools, facilitating information sessions, and conducting sensitization in the communities on their own volition. There is no concrete evidence of what the contents of these sessions were. Interviews with KIs provided some indications that beneficiary youth/youth-led organizations and platforms continue to be active and are being mobilized for other projects.
- Colombia IRF 400: Three local organizations reported raising additional money enabling them to continue some of the work started within the microgrants. The participants also noted that activities in which they interacted with participants of other local organizations helped them create networks of contacts and possible collaborations to pursue activities or plan other types of actions in their territories.

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[111] Two responses for each answer option. The remaining respondents specified 'don't know/prefer not to answer' (n=1) or skipped the question (n=1).

[112] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Central African Republic IRF 413, Cameroon IRF 387.

[113] Liberia IRF 412Liberia IRF Liberia IRF 412, Madagascar IRF 415.

[114] Central African Republic IRF 413.

[115] Cameroon IRF 387, Colombia IRF 400.

[116] Cameroon IRF 387, Solomon Islands IRF 383:

- Mali IRF 408: Youth continue to engage in transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms after the project; the legal clinics in the University and the modules on TJ supported by the project are being used. Youth CSO partners and beneficiaries are now better equipped to sustain their participation in subsequent stages of the TJ process. At the time of writing, the youth CSOs that benefited from the project were being invited to meetings with the management authority for reparations to victims of the Malian crises – the authority that replaced the CVJR –which is headed by the same officials who lead the CVJR.
- Haiti IRF 407: Towards the end of the project, CBO meetings always involved all the three project locations, meaning that bridges between communities were sustaining. The IPs will continue accompanying networks (of CBOs, community leaders) who remain engaged in the targeted locations and should continue to provide space for youth to exchange and be involved in community development and peacebuilding. For instance, Sakala, who was able to extend its activities into other neighborhoods in conflict with Haut Cité-Soleil thanks to the project, will continue promoting social cohesion between these sectors of Cite Soleil after the end of the project. In mid-July 2023. A truce between the two main gang coalitions in the areas of Cite Soleil has given some space for residents to go about their lives and cross between sectors, which may help the youth/CBOs trained by the project to continue with activities on their own.

111.   **The production of evidence through the projects in Burkina Faso IRF 386 and Colombia IRF 400 provides opportunities to capitalize on results in future projects.** In Colombia, IRF 400 successfully contributed to shaping policy and influential advocacy initiatives, specifically to CONEPS 4080 (the public policy on gender equity for women); the Truth Commission report; and the Special Justice for Peace (JEP) case investigating macro-criminality of gender-based violence. According to Christian Aid, this Truth Commission, distinguished as the first in the world to commission a study with specialized recognition of the differential violence experienced by LGBT people during armed conflict, was influenced by the project's ability to mobilize civil society. This mobilization contributed significantly to raising awareness about an issue previously not well-known thereby making a sustainable impact on reconciliation and healing. In Burkina Faso, the results of the project study on the specific situation of women HRDs, which highlighted the double challenges faced by these HR actors, is likely to inform other RUNOs and CSOs interventions, as well as government attention to gender issues – it was frequently referred to by interviewed stakeholders as an 'eye opener'.

3.5   Coherence and Coordination

EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **While continuity of support and generating synergies between GYPI projects and other peacebuilding initiatives (both UN PBF and non-UN PBF funded) was well articulated in ProDocs, indicating close attention to this aspect, reporting on this dimension was largely absent in Final Reports and Evaluations.**
>
> **There were some good examples of leveraging UN PBF funded initiative and results and a few good examples of coordination. However, most projects only demonstrated alignment without concrete collaboration nor sustained coordination with various international and civil society actors. It is unclear whether this is mainly the result of limited reporting on effective synergies and coordination.**

112.   Coherence and coordination in peacebuilding are strategic priorities for UN PBF.[117] The Fund aims to ensure its investments build-on, complement or leverage other peace-building investments in every country it supports to maximize peace-building investments, particularly considering the ongoing gaps and volatility of aid in fragile contexts identified in the UN PBF Strategic Plan 2020 -2024. Coordination is supported through its in-country joint coordination structures that bring together all UN PBF projects in-country where UN PBF has a secretariat (in 21 countries) and through focal points (in 30 others), with the support of its team in New York.

113.   To assess the coherence and coordination in the cohort, the ET examined three key elements:

- How well projects built on previous UN PBF investments;

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[117] This strategic importance is marked in UN PBF Performance Framework outcome 3 on Systemic coherence: UN PBF investments enable the United Nations system and partners to implement more coherent and integrated approaches to peacebuilding in a timely manner (Last updated: 26 July 2022, page 4).

- How well projects complemented or aligned with current UN PBF investments; and
- How well projects aligned with current UN peacebuilding approaches in the country and overall complementarity to various peacebuilding initiatives.

3.5.1 Complementarity with peacebuilding support by UN PBF, other UN and international donors

114. **Most projects built on previously funded UN PBF projects,[118] sought complementarity with on-going UN PBF actions in-country,[119] and noted alignment with other UN and international peacebuilding support in-country, including to WPS/YPS agendas. However, there were few cases where project documentary sources provide clear information and concrete examples of effective coordination and complementarity.** Some of these examples are provided in Table 6.

TABLE 6 COORDINATION AND COMPLEMENTARITY OF COHORT PROJECTS WITH OTHER ACTIONS

With previous or on-going UN PBF projects
- Cote d'Ivoire IRF 403: continued the work with Peace Clubs from a previous (UN PBF-funded) project and built on the mechanisms and tools already developed in the university environment to ensure student mobilization for the project.   - Solomon Islands IRF 383: used training resources developed by the implementing partner in a previously funded UN PBF project.   - Mauritania IRF 389: UN PBF-funded partners shared studies, allowing subsequent data collection to fill knowledge gaps.   - Chad IRF 388: identified 13 other peacebuilding projects in the state/area, both UN PBF and non-UN PBF funded, for synergies or complimentary efforts including aligning aspects of the WPS/YPS agendas. Examples of verified collaboration resulting from this identification include working with management committees established by previous UN PBF funding to support activities, also drawing on learning from their experiences with economic empowerment of women.   - Madagascar IRF 415: conducted joint activities with other projects, specifically an exploratory mission and baseline study (with two other UN PBF-funded projects), and a joint conflict analysis with one UN PBF funded partner.
With other UN/international peacebuilding efforts
- Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402: Youth from various peacebuilding initiatives worked together across platforms to gain a stronger voice in a consultation framework of political actors that had been set up by another project.   - Sri Lanka IRF 384 & 385: Project teams coordinated with the YPS coalition during the design and during implementation at the district level.   - Guinea IRF 380: Alignment and collaboration with other UN-funded peacebuilding initiatives encouraged collaborations and communication amongst the targeted youth groups, strengthening results by using similar approaches based on previous lessons learned and contributing to synergies. For example, the various projects have systematically accounted for gender inequalities and human rights aspects in design and implementation.[120]

3.5.2 Insights from the individual project evaluations

115. **Like the broader cohort, all project ProDocs identified opportunities for synergies and complementarity with other peacebuilding initiatives (both UN PBF and non-UN PBF funded) and the broader UN strategic and thematic priorities in country. Interviews conducted for the evaluation of Haiti IRF 407 highlight that some practical measures for coordination may not be reported on.** Although reports refer to coordination with other projects in the same project areas with the aim of exploring synergies and economies of scale in shared activities like the baseline, other detail is not provided. In Haiti, interviewed sources confirmed there was an initial effort to coordinate Community Violence Reduction (CVR) approaches and learn with each other, especially between this project and the UNOPS, UNDP and UNFPA project in Martissant and La Saline that started a few months before the GYPI project. A Conflict Analysis was done by the same person and one of the

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[118] 55%, 16 projects
[119] 58%, 17 projects
[120] Evaluation report.

CSO partners was also part of some activities in the other CVR project. Meetings were held between the two projects at the beginning, but the timing and locations of the projects was different, and there were differences in the approach.

116. **Even with UN PBF's support for practical coordination measures, agency-level competition and differing procedures can hamper UN PBF requirements for more joint implementation efforts.** This was exemplified in Burkina Faso IRF 386 where the UN PBF Secretariat in-country played a critical role in facilitating coordination, particularly within the broader *Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso* (PUS-BF). Decentralized State structures successfully prevented duplication and ensured complementarities with other activities. Nonetheless, within the project, varying procedures, competition among RUNOs for funding and visibility continued to impede joined-up implementation. However, RUNOs recognize that UN PBF requirements contribute to enhanced cooperation among UN agencies, showcasing their respective expertise and added value.

117. **Coordination with institutional actors can be challenging.** This was the case in Mali IRF 408 where the project Steering Committee (SC), which involved stakeholders at political level, never met. Instead, coordination was done mainly at the technical committee level. While there was good collaboration with the CVJR, there was limited ownership by the Ministry for peace and national reconciliation, possibly due to leadership changes within the Ministry.

3.6   Conflict sensitivity

EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **Conflict-sensitivity and Do No Harm were mainstreamed in project design and implementation primarily through considerations of inclusivity and cultural sensitivities, enhancing protection, and the identification of risks and accompanying mitigation measures. These elements were integrated to a variable degree into projects, even if the word "conflict-sensitivity" was rarely mentioned.**
>
> **Some gaps and weaknesses in mainstreaming these elements were also identified. These often related to the lack of local specificity of the conflict analysis included in ProDocs and the fact that nearly half of projects' risk assessments did not give consideration of the potential impact of the project activities on the context/conflict dynamics. Safety measures were implemented in some insecure contexts, yet risks persisted, leading to serious incidents in few cases.**
>
> **Some opportunities for peace/social cohesion were harnessed by projects, stemming mainly from strengthened capacities of peacebuilding actors.**

118.   This criterion focused on the extent to which conflict sensitivity was mainstreamed in the design and implementation of GYPI projects, and to what extent projects leveraged opportunities for peace as a result of targeted groups enhanced capacities and/or changes in context that opened new windows to address peace and conflict factors.

3.6.1   Mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity elements

119.   Mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity elements broadly converged around a few, key patterns:

- **Inclusivity**: Some project documents explicitly indicated that the choice of direct beneficiaries was informed by conflict dynamics. Projects took measures to avoid stigmatization of beneficiaries, ensure inclusivity and prevent discrimination that could risk exacerbating perceptions of marginalization or deepening social inequalities.[121]
- **Protection**: Typically, HR projects have included good practices for self-protection in trainings for HRDs, journalists, preeminent CS actors and CSOs operating in restrictive environments.[122] Burkina Faso IRF 386 included trainings on data management and gender sensitive data protection.
- **Mitigating security and political risks**: Several projects have taken measures to ensure the safety of project stakeholders like changing project/activity locations, transporting participants to activities to

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[121] Central African Republic IRF 413, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Chad IRF 388
[122] Colombia IRF 400, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Sri Lanka IRF 385.

avoid unsafe routes, providing security escorts or taking steps to create a safer environment such as women leaders conducting activities in groups or accompanied by local leaders.[123] In one project, the ProDoc explicitly discussed not engaging with political actors that could use the project as a political platform.[124]

120. **Despite efforts, participants and project stakeholders were at times exposed to risks.** In two projects participants have died as a result of violence. Participants interviewed by the ET confirmed their awareness of possible risks. Different sources stressed the need for greater attention to the security risks incurred by participants and for additional resources to cover for those potential risks.[125]

121. Other gaps and weaknesses in the mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity in projects included:

- Except in a few cases, [126] identified risks were not sufficiently localized. This may be due to the fact that CAs in ProDocs were not always detailed at project location level.
- The risk assessments in most projects focused mainly on the potential impact of context changes on the project; approximately half of ProDocs provided some consideration to the potential impact of project activities on the context/conflict dynamics.
- There was insufficient attention to the security of platforms for sharing monitoring data of HR violations and to the potential risks for contributors to HR monitoring or early warning systems.[127]

Conflict-Sensitivity in practice

The project approach was based on: (i) the understanding of the context dynamics of peace and conflict, and of the motivations and interests of the main players; (ii) an assessment of the impact of project interventions on the dynamics of peace, conflict and gender equality, and examined risks and opportunities; (iii) interventions were tailored to minimize harm and maximize opportunities to build peace and stability, and to adapt to changing conflict dynamics. Inclusive dialogues, for instance, were animated by locals (trained by the project), without the external presence of the Fund Recipient, given community/target groups' fears of retaliation if issues were exposed beyond the community setting. This led to greater involvement of community members, especially women.- Evaluation Report, Madagascar, IRF 415 (GPI/Leadership)

3.6.2   Leveraging opportunities for peace

122. **Several projects helped leverage opportunities for peace/social cohesion as a result of women and youth beneficiaries/CSOs strengthened capacities.** These include accounts of successful mediation and peaceful resolution of conflicts or tensions that could have otherwise developed into conflict.[128] Another example is the advocacy efforts by CSO beneficiaries in Honduras IRF 418 that reportedly contributed to the adoption of national legislation advancing the rights of vulnerable groups (e.g. displaced).[129]

123. **The ET found little information or evidence of projects that seized opportunities for advancing peacebuilding work as a result of changes in context.**

3.6.3   Insights from the individual project evaluations

124. **With the exception of Haiti IRF 407, projects shared a common weakness of not localizing the CAs included in the ProDoC.** As discussed under Relevance, implementation was tailored to local specificities at a later stage in Burkina Faso IRF 386 and Colombia IRF 400. In Mali IRF 408, the project seems to have relied on local CSO partners knowledge and presence in the areas to ensure local sensitivities were considered. In Haiti IRF 407, the fact that all IPs (INGO and partners CSOs) had their offices and well-established connections with the communities in the project locations was a major strength for the project.

125. **Three of the four projects included consideration of the potential impact of project activities on the context/conflict dynamics in project design.** In Haiti IRF 407 and Colombia IRF 400, the ProDocs identified

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[123] Mali IRF 408, Cameroon IRF 387, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Haiti IRF 407, Mauritania IRF 389.

[124] Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403.

[125] El Salvador IRF 381, Burkina Faso IRF 386, Haiti IRF 407.

[126] For example, IRF. Haiti IRF 407, Chad IRF 388.

[127] Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Burkina Faso IRF 386.

[128] DRC IRF 404, Guinea IRF 380, Honduras IRF 410, Madagascar IRF 415.

[129] According to the project Final Report.

potential risks to participants and accompanying mitigation strategies. In Mali IRF 408 and Haiti IRF 407, the risk assessments had identified potential frustration among un-selected participants as a risk.

126.   **Centralized and decentralized actors have played an important role in monitoring volatile security contexts, ensuring projects stayed informed and safety measures could be adjusted as necessary.** For example, in Mali IRF 408, the project monitored the evolution of the security context and benefited from security measures by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and state partners; during implementation, the project stakeholders were regularly informed of the risks to adapt the project accordingly. Similarly, in Haiti IRF 407, as per the project design and throughout implementation, the project involved youth participants, CBOs, and community leaders in the monitoring of the context, the analysis of the conflict, in the identification of risks to youth (and notably women/girls) participation, and subsequent decisions on mitigation measures and activity adaptations. The project communicated with leaders of armed groups to prevent incidents and ensure safe movement of participants and the protection of women/girls across neighborhoods.

127.   **Despite measures to mitigate risks, serious incidents still happened.** In all four projects**,** despite the measures taken by IPs, participants still incurred risks due to the volatile security situation. In Haiti IRF 407 there were accounts of serious violence between two youth participants during project activities; in a separate incident, two community members were killed in the exchange of fire between armed groups.

3.7   Catalytic effect

EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **Despite improvements in guidance and requirements in the UN PBF reporting template, it is unclear to what extent tracking, measuring and reporting catalytic effect is systematically done. From the available data, financial investments catalyzed by GYPI projects are far below annual targets; less than half of projects reported financial catalytic effects.**
>
> **The ET was able to identify several examples of non-financial catalytic effects, like projects boosting CSO networks and platforms of peacebuilding actors, including women HRDs specifically. The sustainability of some activities past project closure demonstrates this catalytic effect.**

128.   To assess the catalytic effect of the 2020 cohort, the ET examined both the financial and the non-financial leverage of the cohort in terms of the extent to which the UN PBF investments generated additional funding and greater interests in peacebuilding, women's and youth empowerment and human rights.

> The UN PBF Strategy 2020 – 2024 defines catalytic effect as: "UN PBF investments catalyse more investments in peacebuilding at country level, help unblock critical processes, and enable innovative approaches for peacebuilding and prevention", with an annual target of 10 to 1, i.e. for every $1 UN PBF invests it anticipates an additional $10 of direct or indirect investment into peacebuilding.

129.   **Despite improvements in guidance,[130] it is unclear to what extent fund recipients systematically track, measure and report catalytic effect; the UN PBF reporting systems do provide some margin for longer-term tracking.** While UN PBF requests fund-recipients to report on direct and indirect catalytic effects, confusion remains as to what should be included, and tracking remains unsystematic. Tracking has been enhanced following the recommendation for greater investments in M&E.[131] There is not a clear and measurable approach to exit strategies and sustainability despite Mid-term Review (MTR) recommendations to develop a mobilization strategy.[132] Finally, catalytic effects may not be realized in time for final reporting, especially when these effects do not occur during or in the immediate aftermath of projects' end (final reports are normally delivered three to six months after the end of the project). Financial catalytic effects may, however, still be tracked and reported at the financial closure of projects that can take place up to 18 months after the end of the project.

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[130] Scharbatke-Church et al., Catalytic Programming and the Peacebuilding Fund: A Concept Note for the UN PBF Advisory Group: Final Draft, September 2010.

[131] Mid-Term Review of the UN PBF Strategy 2020 -2024 (February 2023).

[132] The MTR recommended UN PBF further identify context-specific opportunities at the country portfolio level for investment in part through a clear strategy to mobilize actors and resources aligned with the SRF strategy and continue to better define and validate catalytic effect.

3.7.1   Financial investments

130.   **Less than half of projects reported any financial catalytic effect.[133]** Limited financial catalytic effect was also noted in the online survey where, only three of the fund recipients reported financial catalytic effects;[134] CSO survey responses also indicate insufficient financial catalytic effect with four of seven CSO respondents reporting to be unable to continue activities or results of the project as they did not receive new funding.

131.   **The total financial catalytic value reported was $23.550M.[135]** The majority of this total comes from Irish Aid which provided $18.4M to Christian Aid for a program replicating and building on the approach adopted in Colombia IRF 400 (see the project insights section 3.7.3 below). In Central African Republic IRF 413, Fund recipients mobilized at least US$2.5M for new projects that are expected to reinforce women's access to justice, strengthen and support the women human rights defenders' networks that had been set up by the UN PBF project.

132.   Other projects reported additional funding, but no amounts were indicated. For example, in Liberia IRF 411, new investments to strengthen HRD networks were reported; in Sri Lanka IRF 385, the project has reportedly resulted in such great demand for services that at least one UN member expanded operations with new donors and diplomatic missions to bring more funding and partners to underserved areas; Solomon Islands IRF 383 generated donor interest regarding "logging industry impacts at the community level, women's leadership, peacebuilding, conflict resolution initiatives, SGBV and referral mechanisms."[136]

3.7.2   Non-financial investments

133.   There were several examples of the GYPI investment boosting platforms and creating more interest, even if financial investment was not always specified. Fund recipients also emphasized non-financial investment in the online survey where most Fund recipient survey respondents who specified that projects had at least 'some' catalytic effect[137] focused on the additional attention raised through capacity building/empowerment of youth and women as peacebuilders. Non-financial catalytic effect was also apparent among the CSO survey respondents where three respondents specified that they were able to carry on at least some activities without new funding.

"The strengthening of the young people's capacities allowed them to develop an interest in disseminating not only the context of their territory, but also their culture and traditional knowledge, motivating them to seek articulation with other key actors, such as the Ministry of Culture, in order to continue with training processes."---Fund recipient survey response (YPI/Leadership)

134.   Highlights of non-financial investments from the cohort evaluation include:

- **Formalized or expanded networks of women HRDs** were reported in multiple projects.[138] In Cameroon IRF 387, the evaluation report specified that local Women Human Rights Defender (WHRD) CSOs from the project area continued organizing their own awareness-raising and reporting days, denouncing cases of rights violations; supporting the voluntary collection of information on incidents against WHRDs that fed the monitoring report on the situation of WHRDs, all of which may contribute to longer term positive effects.
- **Formalized or expanded networks of CSO more broadly** were reported in Sri Lanka IRF 385. The project developed a large, online CSO network that is reportedly contributing to greater and safer means for civil society organizations and women peacebuilders to operate in-country.

"The establishment of a common platform for CSOs has enabled renewed dialogues - both regional and thematic - cooperation and even joint programmatic actions/operations on issues such as psychosocial assistance, land rights and gender-based violence. Institutionally, the roll out of dedicated spaces and services to expand their skills and knowledge in areas such as project management, risk management and protection is contributing to

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[133] 13 of 29 projects.
[134] To note that the remaining did not specify whether any financial investment was leveraged or not.
[135] Of the thirteen projects that reported any financial catalytic effect, ten reported an estimated financial value. Not all projects reported financial catalytic effects in USD.
[136] Final evaluation report. There was no project final report available.
[137] Most respondents reporting 'some' (53%, n=9) or 'significant' (35%, n=6) project influence or leverage for additional attention or funding to the issue it focused on.
[138] Liberia IRF 411, Central African Republic IRF 413, Guinea IRF 380, Cameroon IRF 387

- **Sustained activities past project closure** also demonstrates catalytic effect (see the sustainability criteria, page 26 for more details). For example, in Sierra Leone IRF 417, actors from the project and surrounding communities including local authorities reportedly began implementing some of the UN PBF-funded project interventions after that project closed as they found value in the conflict mediation.

3.7.3 Insights from the individual project evaluations

135. **The individual project valuations exhibit the variety in reported financial catalytic effect, ranging from significant (reached/above annual targets in Colombia IRF 400 and Mali IRF 408) to limited (Burkina Faso IRF 386).** Following the Colombia IRF 400 project, Christian Aid worked with Irish Aid to obtain a 5-year, 6-country peacebuilding program (including Colombia) that built on the approach and lessons of this project. In Mali IRF 408, at least one Fund Recipient continues the work on peace and reconciliation with additional Canadian funding (US$14 million); two youth CSOs also received funding from an African foundation for improving citizen participation in the transitional justice process, thanks to the activities they carried out as part of this project. In Haiti IRF 407, Concern Worldwide secured 425,500 USD from Irish Aid for a 5-year project that will integrate elements of this project; additional funding from UN PBF also seemed likely.

136. **Non-financial catalytic effects related to increased autonomy of formalized or expanded networks of peacebuilding actors resulting from capacity building and/or increased interactions from project activities.** For instance, in Colombia IRF 400, the project facilitated new partnerships, expanded the work with LGBTQI populations and created new linkages with women's groups and increased collaboration between the Red Nacional de Mujeres (RNM) and Colombia Diversa (CD). Their agendas are aligned in the objectives of enhancing political participation of marginalized groups and the visibility of gender-based violence, based on the intersectionality between feminist and LGBTIQ+ work. As mentioned under the Sustainability criterion, at least some activities were sustained past project closure, demonstrating non-financial catalytic effect.

3.8 Innovation

EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

> *Summary of key findings:*
>
> **Within the global peacebuilding context, projects approaches were rarely 'novel' or 'experimental'. Specific elements of the project or its approach were sometimes new to the country or to the specific locations, and therefore 'innovative' in that context (even if a 'normal' activity when viewed more globally). The specific thematic and target group focus of the GYPI is considered 'innovative' in some operational contexts.**
>
> **Across the cohort, the driver for 'innovation' was to find effective ways to support women and youth participation in peacebuilding and human rights work. Projects approached this objective in a wide variety of ways ranging from setting up new, informal mechanisms to 'interrupt' violence to formalizing established, traditional mechanisms to increase access to the justice system. Localization is at the core of 'innovations' with local civil society actors essential in supporting and implementing these approaches.**

137. This criterion focused on the extent to which projects identified/experimented with novel approaches or initiatives. Discussion on good practices/learning from these approaches is included within section 4.1.

138. **Overall, there were few truly 'novel' or 'experimental' approaches in the 2020 GYPI projects.** Frequently, projects followed similar approaches and continued good practices from previous projects, occasionally introducing some new elements. However, in several cases, specific elements of the project or approach followed was said to be new to the country or to the specific locations, and therefore 'innovative' in that context (even if a 'normal' activity when viewed more globally). Sometimes, the novelty was more in the terminology than in the approach.

139. **The GYPI thematic and target group-specific focus is considered 'innovative' in some operational contexts.** For example:

- **The promotion of women's role in preventing violent extremism** was new in Mauritania (IRF 389). The *Mourchidates* network used religion to counter radical extremist discourses and strengthen the resilience of communities, empowering women from different communities in the process. The

approach was new to the country context, where the Government policy on CVE took little or no account of the role of women. It was seemingly also new to the region other G5 Sahel group of States were taking up the approach.

- **The focus on specific youth groups, such as the young HRDs, or on "more sustainable concepts of youth leadership and empowerment"** was new in several of the contexts. The population and thematic-specific foci of the projects was also mentioned as an added value by Fund recipients in the online survey where 88 percent of respondents specified the project's specific targeting of youth/women as the added value of GYPI funding over other sources; 47 percent referred to the thematic focus (see Figure 6).

FIGURE 6 ADDED VALUE OF FUNDING THROUGH **GYPI** OVER OTHER SOURCES

140. **Across the cohort, the driver for "innovation" was to find effective ways to support women and youth participation in peacebuilding and human rights work.** Projects aimed to build or enhance tools for stakeholders to be resilient and assume responsibilities/leadership roles in their communities/environment. The following examples illustrate the variety of ways in which projects sought to empower different stakeholders as peacebuilding actors:

- **The empowerment of community members to actively mediate or 'interrupt' violence** was demonstrated in Honduras IRF 410 where the "violence interrupters"[139] methodology that GYPI piloted in urban settings of northern Honduras seems novel and promising to reduce SGBV in gang-controlled areas. Haiti IRF 407 also used community leaders as "mediators/brokers" to negotiate for the agency and protection of youth in gang-controlled areas, coordinating their actions between community leaders across divided neighborhoods.
- **Building a support platform to provide different services for civil society actors**[140] was described in Sri Lanka IRF 385 as innovative in-country because UN actors would be the ones implementing services "dedicated to and for the civil society actors -as opposed to the traditional schema of the civil society implementing for the UN" (ProDoc).
- **Formalizing informal dispute resolution mechanisms** was pursued in Solomon Islands IRF 383 to enhance transparency and accountability in community level conflict resolution and justice structures and facilitate peacebuilding. The final evaluation report concurs that activities developing Standard Operating Procedures for traditional justice systems have been promoted in other countries but were innovative in this specific context.[141]

141. **Localization is at the core of implementing "innovation"**. In these examples and from the sample project evaluations, local civil society are the key actors for supporting and implementing 'innovative'

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[139] In Honduras IRF 410, community leaders, local religious leaders and in some cases women CSO leaders that have the legitimacy and access to the communities/groups intervene and act as "violence interrupters".

[140] Target populations included including women grassroots organizations, human rights defenders, artists, journalists, NGOs, and other activists

[141] According to the project evaluation report, there was no evidence that these SOPs were being applied, possibly because the Province Council of Chiefs still had to approve them.

approaches. However, it is not always clear what role local actors or CSOs had in developing these 'innovative' approaches.

3.8.1 Insights from the individual project evaluations

142. **Like the broader cohort, the individual projects evaluated reflected strategies that were "new" in the context or incorporated some more innovative elements, even if more standard globally.** For example, in Haiti IRF 407, the project focus on community peacebuilding and CVR emerges from a long history of similar interventions in-country. In fact, CVR was developed in Haiti in the mid-2000s. Some sources questioned, however, to what extent the project can be labelled as CVR given its strong focus on individual change processes, rather than community. On the other hand, the inclusion of the CCJ, a youth committee acting as a sounding board for projects targeting youth and increasing the participation and visibility of youth in peacebuilding mechanisms, is more 'novel'.

143. **There were novel elements in the groups targeted in some countries, while engaging with these groups was more regular practice in others.** For example, in Burkina Faso IRF 386, the project seems to be the first to focus on Youth and Women HRDs/CSOs, which all KIs interviewed considered a clear added value of the project. This specific focus led the Ministry of Human Rights to work with youth HRDs/CSOs for the first time. The focus on youth also enabled youth HRD/CSOs to engage with authorities on matters affecting their role and safety (e.g. radio programmes and community dialogues bringing together youth and community leaders; the dialogues between youth and security forces). Identification of the additional challenges faced by women/girls HRDs, as highlighted in the project's mapping studies, was also highly valued.

144. In Colombia IRF 400, the articulation of the HR and justice agendas of gender and LGBTIQ+ groups/CSOs led to the configuration of a new intersectionality not previously explored, as women's groups reportedly used to be wary of LGBTIQ+ people and vice versa before the project experience showed them that working together is possible. 'New' voices (youth, women, LGBTIQ+) have thus been integrated into the peacebuilding strategies.

3.9 Main findings on local partnerships

145. Though not identified as a standalone criterion in the ToR, given the importance of local partnerships for the GYPI strategy, this section was included to provide an overview of local partnerships in the cohort. It identifies the main advantages or strengths and some risks or challenges as reported by Fund recipients and CSO partners from their experience in the GYPI projects. Information is also provided concerning the perceived value of partnerships with UN PBF.

146. **Support to and engagement with CSOs is a core element of the GYPI, yet only two projects in the cohort had CSOs as direct Fund recipients (one national NGO, and one African NGO).** Stricter eligibility requirements linked to changes to the Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (HACT) micro-assessments introduced since the 2020 GYPI Call are making it even more difficult for CSOs to qualify as Fund recipients. As mentioned by KIs, previously eligible CSOs are no longer qualified after the introduction of these changes, despite trainings by UN PBF Secretariats on the new requirements.

147. **Diversification to support smaller CSOs and more localized CBOs is an additional and even bigger challenge for UN PBF**. For smaller organizations, even the lowest amounts of GYPI funding are too high for their absorption and management capacities. UN PBF is exploring alternative ways of channeling support to local CSOs/CBOs, notably through cascading systems. The case of the UN MPTF Office in Colombia (see example in 4.1) or of The United Nations Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) show this system is possible.

3.9.1 Overview

148. Partnerships with CSOs are a requirement of GYPI Calls. Projects had between one and eight CSO 'partners' though not all ProDocs clearly distinguish between implementing CSO partners and targeted/beneficiary CSOs. In some cases, CSO partners identified in the ProDoc changed or the choice of partners was later refined. The nature of local IPs, as well as changes to partnerships, is rarely discussed. The ambiguity in core details of the partnership selection and implementation strategy is in line with findings from the UN PBF Thematic Review from 2022 on Local Peacebuilding.[142]

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[142] The review found: "while most UN PBF-funded projects do involve local CSOs or other local peacebuilding partners in the implementation of project activities, most proposals typically lack information on the nature of local implementing partners, how those partners were selected and whether or how they have contributed to proposal design."

149.   **At the project design stage, most ProDocs describe involving local CSO partners and other local actors in 'consultations' but lack specificity on the depth and breadth of how these consultations impacted proposal design.** In a few cases, projects were described as a co-creation of Fund Recipients and CSO partners. This was mainly the case when Fund recipients partnered with CSOs they have experience working with (see section 3.1 on the Relevance criterion). Based on the Fund recipient survey, CSO partners were not consistently involved at the concept note/proposal stage with over a third of respondents involving CSO partners only at project design (after the concept note/proposal stage) or at implementation phase. CSO survey responses also support involvement only after the design stage, with all CSO survey respondents reporting involvement after the design stage.[143]

150.   **Leveraging past collaborations for partner selection has advantages but may have limited exploration of new local partnerships.** At least 16 projects had partnership strategies that were based, at least in part, on continuation of previous relationships; some were long-term established partnerships. This provided mutual advantages, reassurances, facilitated collaboration and CSOs engagement at Concept Note development and in the project design. In at least one instance, long-term partnerships also made it easier to quickly find suitable alternatives to the initially planned implementing partners.[144] However, reliance on past partnerships may have limited opportunities to develop or strengthen relationships with non-traditional partners.

151.   **Partnerships specifically with women and youth-led organizations were reported in almost all projects**. At least 21 of 29 projects reported partnerships with women-led organizations while 18 of 29 included partnerships with youth.[145] As expected, where specified, all GPI projects partnered with at least one woman-led organization. YPI project documentation is less consistent in identification of partnerships with youth-led organizations. While partnerships were not always categorized as youth/women-led in annual or final reports, most project documents described organizations as having strong youth/women representation or being focused on youth/women needs.

152.   **Partners were responsible for implementation but not always involved at a more strategic level.[146]** CSO partners who had established partnerships with Fund recipients were more often involved in the development of the project idea and subsequently in the design of the project. In contrast, in several cases, a large number of more local level organizations received grants or support for implementation at community level. In these cases, the localization of partnerships relied on implementing partners which were a large network of local CSO and CBO organizations but who had no/little input at the initial stages of project design.

153.   **From reporting alone, funded partnerships are rarely reported below the national level.[147]** Only six projects transferred funding to partners below the national level; five were on the Leadership theme (three GPI, two YPI) and one (YPI) on Human Rights.[148] In one of these, the Fund recipient (a national NGO) supported several women- and female youth-led local level CSO and CBOs. In another, fund recipients provided in-kind contributions to local CSOs to circumvent the fact that these local organizations lacked formalized records for financial transfers.[149]

154.   **Overall, both Fund Recipients and CSO partners positively assessed the partnerships established with some exceptions.** Based on KIIs, relationships between convening agencies and local NGOs were quite negative in at least one case due to a combination of factors including leadership issues, lack of oversight and a weak convening agency.

155.   While clear advantages were identified, there were also some challenges. The sections below provide detail on both Fund recipient and CSO partner perspectives. Perspectives of CSO partners, and to a lesser extent local/community level CSO/CBOs, come mainly from the light-touch project evaluations. Perspectives of these

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[143] 2 CSO respondents said they were involved only at the implementation stage, the remainder said they were involved at the concept note/proposal stage (n=6).

[144] Colombia IRF 400

[145] In four projects it was unclear from project documentation whether partner organizations were youth/women led.

[146] Solomon Islands IRF 383, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Honduras IRF 410, Madagascar IRF 415, Sierra Leone IRF 417, Sri Lanka IRF 385, Guinea-Bissau IRF 406.

[147] Project documentation does not consistently follow UN PBF updated templates which provide details on localization categorization. The nature of partnerships is not described based on these categorisations for the following projects: Chad IRF 388, Colombia IRF 400, Colombia IRF 401, Haiti IRF 407, Honduras IRF 410, Mali IRF 408, Mauritania IRF 389, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Sudan IRF 409.

[148] Colombia IRF 401, DRC IRF 404, DRC IRF 405, Haiti IRF 407, Honduras IRF 410, Madagascar IRF 415.

[149] Honduras IRF 410 "The community-based organizations did not have formal records, so in-kind donation agreements were signed with FUNADEH-UNICEF for the development of their initiatives."

actors are frequently absent from project reports. The online survey was expected to help fill this gap but had a very low response rate (see Table 4).

3.9.1.1   Fund Recipients perspective

156.   **Most projects would not have been possible to implement or would have had a much more limited reach without the partnerships with CSOs.** Key advantages frequently reported by Fund recipients include the following:

- **Access to remote/insecure locations or more closed communities:** Most projects clearly benefitted from partner CSO presence in the project locations and easier access to restricted areas affected by violence, as well as contextual insight and local networks. In the Fund recipients survey, this advantage was mentioned by 69 percent of respondents.
- **Experience and knowledge of the local context:** Alongside (and in part due to) access to local communities, most CSOs brought experience and in-depth knowledge of the local context. In several cases, CSOs were embedded within communities. CSO local contextual knowledge was a key advantage recognized with all Fund Recipient survey respondents highlighting this advantage in partnering with local CSOs.[150]
- **Timely adaptation/response:** CSO local knowledge and presence in project locations facilitated close monitoring and adaptation or timely responses ensuring that the peacebuilding efforts were relevant to the specific needs of the community and within evolving contexts.
- **Local networks enhancing outreach capacity and inclusive participation:**[151] CSO's local contacts and networks made it easier for the project to identify and mobilize target groups, and to access and engage other local stakeholders.
- **Continuity and flexibility in adverse conditions:** CSOs partnerships ensured continuity of implementation when official channels were disrupted or unavailable in country contexts, as seen in Sudan IRF 409 and Burkina Faso IRF 386.

157.   **Despite consistently noted strengths of CSO partnerships, there were some risks or challenges highlighted by project sources.** These mainly concerned:

- **CSOs lack of capacity/need for capacity building,**[152] notably financial/administrative management capacity.[153] Although trained, in at least one case the project had to bring in another partner to cover for this weakness.[154]
- **Conflict of interests/lack of commitment to promoting peace**[155]
- **Weaker thematic expertise:**[156] This was not an issue in every project, as other actors (e.g. institutional partners) provided the thematic expertise.

158.   Identification of capacity gaps was also reflected in Fund recipient survey respondents where approximately a third identified poor management/financial capacity (38 percent) and lack of thematic expertise (32 percent) as disadvantages/risks of partnerships. Risks related to conflict of interest/lack of commitment were also reflected in the survey with a few respondents identifying politicization (25 percent) as a risk. Other risks identified included dependency on external inputs/resources (38 percent); one Fund Recipient identified lack of inclusivity within CSOs as a disadvantage/risk of partnership.

159.   **Despite due diligence, there were a small number of projects where partnerships created the potential for reputational risks.** Select examples are provided below:

- Colombia IRF 400: a CSO that was initially going to be a partner in the project was dropped before implementation began because of involvement in a judicial process

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[150] N=16, 2 skipped this question.

[151] Such as Madagascar IRF 382, Honduras IRF 418, Sri Lanka IRF 384, Colombia IRF 401. It is unclear in Cameroon IRF 387 whether this type of network was utilized. One CSO network was listed in the ProDoc but not mentioned in the 2022 reports or final evaluation.

[152] Honduras IRF 410, Central African Republic IRF 413, Madagascar IRF 416, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Mauritania IRF 389.

[153] Honduras IRF 410, Honduras IRF 418.

[154] Mauritania IRF 389.

[155] Honduras IRF 418, Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Madagascar IRF 415, Honduras IRF 410, Sri Lanka IRF 385.

[156] Madagascar IRF 415.

- Honduras IRF 418: GYPI support was terminated and a third NCE was rejected because there was a risk of funds being misused with the CSO partner's involvement in national politics.[157] Despite the high reputation of the CSO and the fact that they had gone through UN PBF's capacity assessment, the CSO was not able to execute planned project activities.

3.9.1.2 Partner CSOs perspective

160. **Partner CSOs also positively assess the partnerships with RUNOs/INGOs in the GYPI projects.** From their perspective, main advantages include:

- **Strengthening capacities and expertise:** Activities to develop CSO capacity were a common feature in the cohort. Several sources, including the online surveys, confirmed that projects strengthened the thematic and operational capacities and expertise of partner CSOs and youth/women CBOs (see Effectiveness criteria, page 19 for more details).
- **Funding for continuity:** UN PBF served as a source of both direct and indirect funding, enabling CSOs to sustain their work (notably during COVID-19) and engage in critical areas. Within the contexts where UN PBF implements, most CSOs generally operate on short-term project-based budgets and are dependent on external funding. Partnerships under GYPI provided a short but nonetheless essential financial lifeline for many.
- **Networking and visibility with other CSOs and international partners:** Partnerships expanded networking opportunities in-country and for collaborations with other CSOs and international partners. In some cases, projects brought together CSO partners that had not worked together before, but whose specific expertise or embedded work in a targeted location made them strategic partners in the project, facilitating cooperation between CSOs that continued beyond project closure. Partner CSO participation in the project Steering Committee and other coordination structures also gave them enhanced visibility and opportunities to engage directly with Government counterparts, UN agencies, and other donors.
- **Opportunities to mobilize and gain visibility in the community:** For smaller youth/women CBOs, indirect funding or small grants enabled them to gain some visibility and recognition with LAs/community/other stakeholders, connect with other CSOs and learn from others' experience. This was achieved through mobilizing youth/women, strengthening their capacities (e.g. thematic, management and finances, monitoring and reporting), and organizing and conducting activities in the community.
- **Fostering State-CSO interaction:** A significant outcome of GYPI projects was the promotion of interaction and partnerships between CSOs and the state (see paragraph 85). These collaborations created win-win situations by facilitating CSO's access to central-level institutions and opening new opportunities for the future. In a few cases, the project experience improved the understanding of each other's role and strengths.

161. Some recurrent **challenges** were also identified by partner CSOs, notably:

- Delays in disbursement by Fund recipients;
- Limited opportunity to input into project design and decision-making (especially when they come late into the project);
- Less flexibility and slower adaptation, especially of RUNOs, given their organization's heavier procedures and UN Country Team approval process;
- Some partner CSOs also expressed the need for more regular communication.

162. In the online surveys, when asked about how partnerships could be improved or strengthened in the future, answers varied but generally converged around ideas of: (i) establishing longer partnerships; (ii) improving communication with UN PBF and/or Fund recipients notably 'more interactive and constructive' and 'more transparent' communication; and (iii) providing additional capacity building to CSOs, specifically for

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[157] Based on UN PBF documentation review and inception interviews, Honduras IRF 418.

financial and administrative capacity and conflict prevention/management.[158] There were very few direct references to funding (although these were implicit in the call for long-term partnership).

3.9.2 UN PBF Secretariats support and role in promoting local partnerships

163. **Interviewed partners, Fund recipients and online survey respondents were positive about the engagement with UN PBF and appreciative of the funding.** Some recognized UN PBF support as an opportunity to advance peacebuilding and nexus approaches in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. Beyond financial contributions, CSO online survey respondents highly regarded support from PBSO and UN PBF Secretariat's in-country in the preparation and submission of project proposals, flexibility and support for NCEs, peacebuilding guidance and expertise, and GYPI prioritization of women and youth.[159]

"[the partnership] has been very useful, especially considering the efforts of the UN PBF Secretariat in making their implementing partners more responsive to peace which align with the work our organization is also carrying out."- Fund recipient survey respondent (YPI/Leadership)

164. **UN PBF Secretariats engage with CSO partners in various ways and to different extents, primarily through partnerships formed under UN PBF projects.** In-country Steering Committees include at least some civil society representatives, but it is unclear to what extent they relay the information to all CSOs involved in implementation. Some UN PBF Secretariats have established other means to engage with CSOs (and INGOs) directly, for example:

- Establishing communities of practice that also include national CSOs;
- Organizing forums with CSOs interested in the peacebuilding domain;
- Organizing trainings before GYPI Calls are launched to help civil society organizations (CSOs and INGOs) prepare for the competitive process;
- Conducting consultations with partners (including local ones) for the definition of the project document (after the conceptual note is approved) as a means to promote the inclusion of local perspective into project design.

165. **Overall, there seems to be limited understanding of CSO capacities or expertise in-country beyond the frequent partners of UN agencies and INGOs.** While there is often great CSO interest in the GYPI Calls, UN PBF Secretariats in-country are not involved in the selection process nor informed of which CSOs have submitted concept notes. This knowledge would already provide an indication of which organizations are interested.

4 GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

4.1 Good practices and lessons on project implementation

166. This section presents good practices and some lessons learned identified through the cohort evaluation. Footnotes provide specific, but not exhaustive, examples of where these good practices have been observed. Not all good practices have an associated lesson learned. Most lessons are not specific to the 2020 GYPI themes and GPI or YPI projects, apart from learning on addressing the rights of LGBTQI+ people.

167. Many projects applied **holistic approaches** to support women and youth leadership and/or Human Rights Defenders or victims of violence/GBV.

- **Lesson: The review reinforces the validity of more comprehensive approaches to protection and leadership for peacebuilding,** comprising capacity building; professional training/economic empowerment; access to medical (including psycho-social) and legal support to victims of violence; and advocacy and dialogues with authorities. These more holistic approaches have been successful when

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[158] Total of 8 respondents. Three responses for each main theme. Open ended question.

[159] In the online survey, besides valuing the funding, a few (n=3) fund recipient survey respondents mentioned UN PBF's support as important in achieving quality project outcomes such as 'peacebuilding materials' and their expertise in working with prioritized groups (women and youth). One fund recipient respondent highlighted the less burdensome administrative processes of the partnership with UNUN PBF. Fund Recipient's ability to work through multidisciplinary strategies and form partnerships was also highlighted as a positive aspect of UN PBF funding.

working both with women and youth.[160] Fund Recipients survey respondents also highlighted the validity of these approaches.

168.   Projects took specific measures to help protect participants and promote women/girls' participation in contexts affected by conflict or insecurity such as providing transportation/security escorts[161] and mobilizing trusted leaders/authorities to reassure parents/husbands' and get their approval for their daughters/wives to travel to the locations of activities.[162] In other cases, projects realized they needed to care for particular needs of women participants (e.g. to organize child care for their children during activities).

- **Lesson:** Project planning can better anticipate some costs, specifically childcare and transportation, to ensure more accurate planning from the outset of project development.

169.   Mainstreaming sensitive issues like gender and HR, especially in conservative/traditional communities, through phased and context specific approaches, taking account of cultural sensitivities of the communities, has helped create a more favorable environment for women/girls participation in activities, local dialogues, and addressing GEWE and SGBV.[163] Projects have been more successful when using examples that speak to the reality of the local communities, starting by addressing SBGV in same gender groups to help victims share their experiences within their community, and sensitizing men/boys and traditional and religious leaders.

- **Lesson:** Addressing the rights of LGBTQI+ people under a broader approach to Human Rights issues proved effective to promoting the rights of LGBTQI+ and build alliances with other efforts to address the rights of marginalized groups.[164]

In Liberia, integrating the rights of LGBTQI+ into broader efforts towards promoting the rights and interests of poor, marginalized and discriminated population groups in general has proven an effective strategy to overcome stigmatization and the sensitivity of the issue, presenting LGBTQI+ people just as any other human being, with the same rights.- Evaluation Report, Liberia, IRF 411 (GPI/Leadership)

170.   Involving local authorities and traditional and religious leaders was noted as a critical enabling factor in some projects[165] and a gap in others.[166]

- **Lesson:** Quality engagement with local authorities and community leaders is especially important in projects that seek to introduce new practices into the communities[167] or which promote behavior changes and inclusivity in traditional communities.[168]

171.   Most projects were able to identify previous/current projects to build on or complement. Continuity in efforts helped overcome challenges of short funding windows in UN PBF funding.[169]

- **Lesson:** While UN PBF has already adjusted the timeframe of GYPI projects up to 24 months, agencies will need to continue seeking more strategic alliances as achieving and sustaining peacebuilding objectives may require longer-term accompaniment and upscaling, particularly when trying to change entrenched social norms**.**

172.   **Intergenerational dialogues and networking allowed for more inclusive spaces for dialogue and for transfers of knowledge and experience between generations**. For instance, in the Central African Republic IRF 413, younger women and boy HRDs have benefited from sharing older women HRDs recognized by the community sharing experiences and best practices. This sharing has also helped younger women gain more acceptance among the wider community. Surveyed fund recipients also highlighted that building inclusive strategies through inter-generational dialogue (n=3) and ensuring a primary role for youth/women in building

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[160] Sudan IRF 409, Guinea IRF 380, DRC IRF 404, Central African Republic IRF 413, Colombia IRF 401.
[161] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Cameroon IRF 387, Haiti IRF 407.
[162] Burkina Faso IRF 386
[163] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Madagascar IRF 415, Mali IRF 408
[164] Liberia IRF 411, Colombia IRF 400
[165] Cameroon IRF 387, Chad IRF 388, Honduras IRF 410.
[166] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Solomon Islands IRF 383.
[167] For example, revolving credit in Cameroon IRF 387.
[168] For example, Burkina Faso IRF 386.
[169] Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403, Solomon Islands IRF 383, Mauritania IRF 389, Chad IRF 388, Madagascar IRF 415

peace strategies (n=8) has worked well. The importance of including more formalized legal rights services and/or education was also a more common theme (N=3), though less triangulated through project documentation.

173. **Small grants and cascading funds to CSO/CBOs were used in several projects to increase the outreach, participation and capacities of local women and youth beneficiaries/CSOs,** [170] also enabling activities to be more targeted to each context and group interest.[171]

- **Lesson:** Small grants and cascading funds were a useful tool to mobilize youth and strengthen local CSOs/CBOs management and implementation capacities. They could be further explored and expanded to promote local peacebuilding. The case of the CSO window of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) Colombia (unrelated to the GYPI cohort), presented in the box below, may provide a relevant experience in this regard, bearing in mind the specific conditions and existing capacities in the Colombia context.

The case of the MPTFO Colombia/CSO window[172]

The MPTFO Colombia supports mainly CSOs at community level through an agreement with UNDP, as "Management Agent" that channels small grants and assists in monitoring and strengthening these local organizations. At least 40% of funding in Colombia is channeled through the CSO window. It financed 144 local organizations over the last five years for a total amount of 44 million USD. The Fund has established some practices to be able to support community-based organizations:
- It provides small grants (between 50,000 and 150,000 USD);
- Organizations need to demonstrate experience of at least one year on themes related to the objectives of the Call and capacity to execute a minimum of 15,000 USD. If they do not meet the requirements, they can present a proposal with a bigger CSO.
- Small organizations (some may be informal, like the indigenous communities and Afro councils) are incentivized to present a proposal together – thus promoting networking and alliances between them.
- National NGOs can only present proposals if in association with local CSOs/community-based organizations and must demonstrate transfer of funds and capacities to these local organizations.

Role of the Technical Secretariat. For each Call, the Secretariat organizes a webinar/meeting to present and explain the Terms of Reference and process; short-lists the Concept Notes and supports the design process and mainstreaming of gender and environmental considerations for the selected ones (e.g., webinar, direct revisions of documents, meetings); with the UNDP team, assesses the organization's capacity and monitors implementation. It organizes a final event per Call with all CSOs involved (10-15 NGOs) for mutual learning and exchange of good practices, which inform subsequent Calls. Finally, it disseminates communication pieces on experience and learning.

UNDP management team role. Once projects are selected by the Fund, it signs grants with each organization and transfers the resources directly; it conducts a financial and capacity assessment of the supported organizations to determine the type of accompaniment and capacity strengthening support needed; and monitors implementation.

Overall administrative costs are below 10% (Technical Secretariat: 1,6%; MPTFO: 1%; UNDP: 7%).

4.2 Lessons from the pilot cohort evaluation

174. There are several important lessons for future cohort evaluations that should be considered:

- **Mapping project documentation and when it will be available is important to time the cohort evaluation appropriately.** The MPTFO Gateway is a good tool for transparency but is not sufficient for building the E-library: final reports are not always produced/delivered on time; baselines and endlines were not always conducted or were not uploaded to the gateway; links in project reports to other project documents were for the most part expired or not accessible. In future exercises, it would be important that essential documentation is secured prior to the evaluation kick-off (especially projects final reports and evaluation reports, when evaluations were conducted) or the timeline is adjusted to reflect reporting timelines more accurately.

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[170] Guinea-Bissau IRF 406, Mali IRF 408.
[171] For example, Colombia IRF 400.
[172] KIIs; https://fondoonucol.exposure.co/el-fondo-innova-para-que-sean-las-comunidades-las-que-construyan-la-paz-en-sus-territorios?source=share-fondoonucol.

- **A review of UN PBF reporting templates is needed if information of strategic importance to UN PBF is to be systematically reported; this is particularly important as independent evaluations become fewer.** While the UN PBF reporting template puts the focus on peacebuilding outcomes and covers key areas of information, it has some limitations compared to requirements in GYPI calls and in ProDoc forms. For instance, GYPI puts great emphasis on partnerships with national/local CSOs, but project reports do not provide an assessment of these partnerships. Also, while CSO partners probably contribute to the reporting, there is no way for them to provide direct feedback to UN PBF. Information on synergies and complementarities with other peacebuilding projects is well developed in ProDoc, but most final reports are silent about whether these have happened or not. Although a requirement in the GYPI call, the failure by most projects to meet the requirement to channel at least 40% of the funding to partner CSOs in never explained/justified.
- **A rebalancing of resources for more primary data collection, focusing on topics/populations not well-covered in UN PBF reporting templates (see above), could be considered for future cohort evaluations.** Despite issues noted in the quality of small projects evaluation reports, this cohort evaluation benefited from the fact that approximately two-thirds of the 2020 GYPI portfolio had evaluations. As the new UN PBF evaluation policy (adopted in 2022) is rolled out, there are likely to be less project evaluations, limiting the breadth of available information for review. The utility of online surveys should be considered, particularly for CSO respondents.
- **Project evaluations conducted 6 to 18 months after the project has ended or a country portfolio review, as recommended in the MTR, may be a better way to identify catalytic effects and sustainability of UN PBF support more concretely.** Peacebuilding effects cannot always be expected within a project funding cycle. Evaluations conducted might reveal sustained effects and larger strategic impacts of the significant UN PBF investments in PB broadly and GPI and YPI specifically than could otherwise be captured.

5 CONCLUSIONS

175. GYPI has played a key role in systematically incorporating perspectives that are responsive to women and youth, as well as human rights approaches and tools, into the regular portfolio of UN PBF. Additionally, GYPI has contributed to enhancing knowledge and expertise within PBSO and UN PBF specifically related to the WPS and YPS agendas.

176. **Relevance:** While projects were relevant to broader peacebuilding context, they sometimes lacked knowledge of more localized peace and conflict dynamics and peacebuilding needs for populations eventually included in activities. Project responsiveness was at times compromised by insufficient knowledge of location-specific context. Once implementation began, projects that had reliable and timely sources of localized feedback generally managed to adapted in a timely manner to the evolving dynamics.

177. GYPI projects illustrated the intersectionality of themes and target groups. Although ProDocs articulated the links between the thematic areas and group focus of the projects with peacebuilding objectives to some extent, these links were frequently a weaker part of project design and somewhat diluted under dominant, sometimes more tangible, thematic priority(ies).

178. **Efficiency:** Over half of projects requested NCEs, a clear indication that resources were not utilized as initially planned or contexts were not as conducive to implementation as expected. However, by project closure, most projects had a good implementation rate, highlighting project ability to adapt in a timely manner. UN PBF flexibility enabled projects to adapt and shift budgetary resources to cover for unplanned security risks, rising costs, or other changes. Although implementing partners avoided impacting activities, operational and budgetary changes reduced the reach of some project activities. There were notable challenges in establishing partnerships, particularly with government counterparts; fewer challenges were identified in partnerships with CSO actors.

179. Despite the GYPI requirement to transfer 40 percent of project funding to CSO partners and the strategic importance of local partnerships, project documentation often lacks sufficient information on the selection criteria and contribution of CSO partners, or any explanation on why the 40 percent requirement was not/could not be met (about a third of projects met the target), limiting UN PBF learning on these partnerships.

180. **Effectiveness:** Outcome achievement is high in the cohort projects; project documentation (including evaluations) is largely positive about project contributions to peacebuilding results. Peacebuilding results centered on themes of improved capacity development; increased inclusivity and GEWE; improved interactions between stakeholders; and contributed to WPS and YPS agendas. Unintended outcomes, mostly positive, were frequently reported. Most results are likely to be the cumulative effect of different interventions (by UN PBF and others). Direct attribution is plausible only in a few cases.[173] Besides the inherent challenges of measuring peacebuilding and the volatile contexts of intervention that may undo gains, weaknesses in M&E limited assessment of what works and why in several cases.

181. Factors identified as positively impacting effectiveness included high-quality partnerships, including local capacities; integrated and inclusive project approaches; spaces for interactions; and ownership of local stakeholders. Projects not supported by these elements faced challenges in achieving peacebuilding results. The external context (beyond the control of projects), project duration and barriers to GEWE (both from the socio-cultural environment and due to weaknesses in project design) also reduced expected results.

182. **Sustainability/Ownership:** Most projects gave some consideration to sustainability in the project design and implementation but did not develop a formal exit strategy. While projects' sustainability strategies generally stress local ownership (by CSO and institutional actors), partners are not systematically involved in the development of projects or in the decision-making during implementation, even when they hold critical roles for project implementation.

183. There is some, limited evidence of sustained results or potential for sustained results. These results largely stem from the ownership, agency and capacities of local CS and institutional actors. The absences of systematic post-project monitoring limits conclusions and learning about the potential sustainability of activities; lack of funding and the duration of projects were identified as threats to sustainability.

184. **Coherence and Coordination:** ProDocs generally identified other UN PBF, UN and other donors' actions that were potentially complementary to the GYPI projects. However, few final reports or project evaluations provided information on whether the identified synergies and complementarities were achieved or what facilitated or hindered collaborations with the identified projects.

185. **Conflict-sensitivity:** Projects paid attention to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity elements, broadly around elements of inclusivity, ensuring protection of participants and mitigating security and political risks. Despite these attentions, stakeholders were at times exposed to risks. Projects with strong local partnerships (localized in project locations/communities targeted) and frequent communication loops better ensured conflict-sensitivity and adaptation to take account of context specificities and security risks identified.

186. **Catalytic effect:** Like sustainability, tracking catalytic effect within the timeframe of the cohort evaluation, and without systematic post-project monitoring, is difficult. Financial catalytic effects were reported by less than half of the cohort, pointing to a somewhat overambitious target for financial catalytic effect set by UN PBF, especially in contexts of many competing priorities for donor funding. Other catalytic effects of GYPI investment (e.g. attracting more interest to certain issues/peacebuilding results; promoting networks) highlight non-financial benefits from these interventions, though this was not universal to the cohort.

187. **Innovation:** Across the cohort, projects sought to 'innovate' to better support women and youth participation in peacebuilding and human rights work. The resulting approaches were rarely novel in the global sense but, at times, could be considered new within the operational context. The focus on target populations and thematic focus of the projects was new in some contexts and has, in some cases, attracted attention to those issues and CS actors, as mentioned under the catalytic effects.

188. **Local partnerships:** Only two (of the 29) projects in the cohort were implemented by national or regional CSOs. Eligibility requirements make it harder for national CSOs (let alone smaller local ones) to be able to apply and compete with INGO and RUNOs for UN PBF funding thus posing a significant challenge to localization objectives. Additionally, the GYPI level of funding, although small for the standard of the regular UN PBF portfolio, is still too high for more localized CSOs/CBOs, which do not have the absorption or management capacities. These challenges question whether GYPI is a fit-for-purpose tool for supporting local partnerships, which has prompted UN PBF to explore other options for supporting localization. Existing UN pooled funding mechanisms,

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[173] Burkina Faso IRF 386, Mauritania IRF 389, El Salvador IRF 414. See section 3 for further detail.

cascading funding and other channels for supporting local CSOs may provide relevant learning and viable options for UN PBF to rethink how to best support localization of peacebuilding.

189.   Project partnerships are often based on longstanding relations with a few, larger CSO partners. While there are many advantages in these established partnerships, this reliance also limits the opportunities to widen UN PBF support and strengthen local level CSOs beyond the bigger and more capable organizations and beyond the main urban centres.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

190. The following are recommendations for UN PBF to consider as it moves forward into planning for future GYPI calls or, more strategically, into rethinking the GYPI window given the progress achieved on the mainstreaming of gender- and (to some extent) youth-responsiveness and considering potential incongruency with UN PBF localization objectives. While the ET has attempted to identify concrete recommendations where feasible, the below issues are more to stimulate institutional reflection and to help UN PBF at HQ and actors at country level improve peacebuilding strategies. The ET presented these considerations for validation to UN PBF selected stakeholders.

Related criteria	Recommendation / Issue for consideration
Relevance, Sustainability/ownership, Conflict sensitivity	**There should be a more systematic effort to include target groups and key local stakeholders in the design stage.** • Where needed, UN PBF Secretariats could support GYPI Concept Notes that passed the first selection phase for targeted consultations and specific conflict analysis in identified project locations, especially where UN PBF (or Fund Recipients) have ongoing projects, to ensure local context specificities are factored into project design. This would not require significant investment (e.g. sharing analysis, connecting IPs with KIs in those areas, etc.). • As part of its role in ensuring UN PBF country portfolio coherence and complementarities, UN PBF Secretariats in country could support partner CSOs and other local actors (e.g. LAs, community/religious leaders) involvement in project design through preparatory meetings. One example is the project design workshop the UN PBF Secretariat in Mali is doing with a non-GYPI project. • Participatory processes for developing baselines and endlines, workplan meetings and monitoring are also important steps to ensure ownership and deserve closer scrutiny and support by UN PBF Secretariats in-country. • Identify potential spaces for CSO partners to provide direct feedback to UN PBF, besides occasional monitoring visits and technical coordination meetings.
Relevance, Effectiveness	**There is a need to further socialize the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach within the UN family and among CSO and institutional partners in-country. This should help to better articulate peacebuilding objectives and thematic focus.** • With the support of PBSO, UN PBF Secretariats in-country could organize trainings/workshops for Fund Recipients, partner CSOs and inviting institutional partners to socialize them with key concepts for peacebuilding work and UN PBF relevant guidance. • Beyond guidance, there is often a need to support/accompany organizations operationalizing peacebuilding and thematic interlinkages. This is a support UN PBF Secretariats, POs and thematic advisers are providing to the extent possible with limited human resources. If UN PBF is effective in increasing localization, there will be a need to support UN PBF Secretariats and consider more localized accompaniment.

Efficiency, Effectiveness, Coherence and Coordination	**There is a need to review UN PBF reporting templates to ensure appropriate levels of accountability and learning, particularly on strategic information such as partnerships and tracking synergies or complementarities with other projects.**
	• **Partnerships:** (i) Modify UN PBF templates to ensure that information is provided on the selection of partners and their role in the project. (ii) A joint SWOT assessment of the Fund Recipients – CSOs partnership could also be provided in the final project report to promote learning and provide UN PBF with relevant feedback for internal reflection on how these partnerships could be enhanced. (iii) Where the 40% target is not met for funding transfers, a request could be added for additional information on challenges to systematically inform UN PBF learning. • **Coherence and coordination:** UN PBF could integrate a request for details on coordination with other projects identified for synergies and complementarities in the ProDoc. These could include: (i) information on ongoing/achieved synergies and complementarities; (ii) how this has supported results (in the final report only); (iii) main challenges and recommendations for facilitating and enhancing coordination and synergies. • **Flexible implementation:** Given the volatile security contexts of GYPI projects, UN PBF and partners could consider including a budget line for unforeseen expenses (e.g. due to security, inflation, other) in projects or an 'emergency reserve' at UN PBF or GYPI window level to cover for such costs.
Effectiveness	**There is a need to review standards for project-level M&E now that independent evaluations are no longer required**
	• UN PBF Secretariats in country, in coordination with PBSO, could consider conducting joint capitalization exercises of different UN PBF projects for cross learning to the extent that would be feasible. • Now that independent evaluations are no longer a requirement, there is a need to review what monitoring and evaluation activities are systematically conducted. The availability of this data will be essential for future cohort evaluations, where fewer evaluations will likely be available. UN PBF could make it a requirement that a baseline is established within the 1st semester (or year) of the project, and an endline is conducted before submission of the Final Report, and that capitalization exercises are promoted. • Post-project monitoring 6-18 months after the project end should be promoted. UN PBF Secretariats could take on this role (possibly some do already). Other trained local partners – including possibly institutional partners that have been associated with UN PBF work in country for some time and are present in the project locations – could also assist in post-project monitoring, with the support of the UN PBF Secretariat in-country. UN PBF project portfolios in-country could include a dedicated budget, especially now that not all projects are required to conduct individual evaluations.

Innovation, Relevance	**UN PBF should explore alternatives to engage CSOs at a more localized level and diversify the network of potential CSO partners**
	• The MPTFO Colombia or the UN WPHF modalities for supporting local CSOs could provide insights and learning for UN PBF to explore options for more targeted and localized support, taking advantage of the UN PBF network of Secretariats in-country and other UN structures or pooled funding mechanisms, while ensuring modalities are adapted to the existing capacities and limitations in each country context.

- UN PBF could consider issuing country specific GYPI Calls for national/local CSOs only, as a 'pilot', with a lower funding ceiling and with lesser/more adapted eligibility requirements to open UN PBF support to smaller CSOs. This would minimize risks, enlarge the opportunities for smaller CSOs to apply and lead on their own proposals/ideas (vs. being mainly implementing agents), and enable UN PBF to expand its knowledge of local CSOs, identify which have relevant technical capacities and their needs for more targeted support. These Calls could be issued in close coordination with UN PBF/PBSO by UN PBF Secretariats in-country, who should then closely accompany and mentor the CSOs selected. Country specific Calls would also have the advantage of ensuring more strategic alignment with UN country priorities and ensure ex-ante institutional buy-in (where relevant) as Calls would be launched and assessed in-country.
- UN PBF could also consider integrating a criterion in the GYPI Calls (and possibly other UN PBF support) for diversification of CSO partners. These would encourage Fund recipients to identify other options or bring other CSOs partners into long-standing partnerships (e.g., smaller more localized CSO; CSOs with specific expertise, etc.). Country-based Calls for local CSOs only would also help diversification and provide opportunities for smaller/locally based CSOs to prove their technical capacities and be supported in domains where their capacities are weaker.
- In the aftermath of GYPI Calls, systematically share in country the list of local CSOs who have bid with UN PBF Secretariats, and possibly an assessment of those that may be more promising (even if not selected).

7   ANNEXES

Annex 1.   TOR

UN PBF Cohort Evaluation

Terms of Reference

Duration: 6 months

Location: Home-based (with possible field missions)

Type of Contract: Consulting Firm

Brief Statement of Proposed Work

The UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the United Nations' financial instrument of first resort to prevent violent conflict, and to build and sustain peace. From 2006 to 2021, the PBF has allocated nearly $1.67 billion to 65 recipient countries, through diverse peacebuilding programmatic approaches, including those focused on climate security, human rights, security sector reform, rule of law, and gender and youth empowerment in peacebuilding, among others. Between 2018-2021, the PBF required every approved project to conduct an independent end-of-project evaluation, managed by the respective fund recipients. The quality of such evaluations largely differed, with smaller projects with less than $1.5 million budget often struggling to produce high-quality evaluations. The vast majority of these projects fall under the PBF Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) annual competitive call for proposals – the major PBF funding window that invests in projects mainly implemented by national and international Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Reflecting on these circumstances, the newly inaugurated 2022 PBF Evaluation Policy now exempts projects with budgets less than $1.5 million from conducting independent end-of-project evaluations and commits the PBF to instead conduct annual Cohort Evaluations. This assignment will entail the first pilot of such a Cohort Evaluation, which aims to provide a meta-review of 29 2020-approved GYPI projects (all below or equal to $1.5 million) with an aim to distil common trends and lessons learned, providing recommendations to the PBF and its fund recipients. Additionally, the exercise seeks to conduct individual project-level evaluations for a select sample of 4 GYPI projects approved in 2020.

Background

PBF recognizes that high-quality evaluation is key for evidence-based decision-making, learning and accountability. PBF has continuously aimed to improve both the breadth and quality of evaluation coverage to support learning and more effective programming, as well as accountability. Between 2018- 2021, the PBF required every approved project to conduct an independent end-of-project evaluation, managed by the respective fund recipients. Nonetheless, the independent 2020 Synthesis Review of PBF project evaluations and other evaluative exercises noted that the quality of project-level evaluations greatly varies, highlighting that "different evaluation teams applied different criteria and approaches to understanding peacebuilding relevance and effectiveness…[and] found it challenging or impossible to come to firm conclusions regarding the relevance and effectiveness of PBF-funded projects, given limited monitoring and evaluation data, as well as short funding timeframes."[174]
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Another contributing factor is budget. Every UN PBF-funded project has been required to allocate 5-7% for overall M&E needs at the project design stage, which often entailed a humble amount reserved for enabling a high-quality independent end-of-project evaluation, including hiring competent evaluation team for sufficient timeframe and supporting adequate data collection. Factors undermining the quality of evaluations include unrepresentative data collection methods, descriptive reporting of activities undertaken rather than analysis of peacebuilding outcomes, as well as limited capacity to provide tangible and stakeholder-oriented recommendations for future peacebuilding programming in-country.

A little less than a third of all UN PBF investments since 2007 has been allocated towards projects with budgets equal to or less than $1.5 million. Between 2016 and 2021, more than half (59%) of all investments in projects with budgets below $1.5 million have been approved through UN PBF's Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) annual competitive call for proposals. UN PBF launched the Gender Promotion Initiative (GPI) in 2011 and Youth Promotion Initiative (YPI) in 2016 with the dual objective of increasing investments in projects targeting women and youth and providing direct support to national and international Civil Society

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[174] Ernstorfer, Anita, "Synthesis Review 2020: Drawing on evaluations and evaluative exercises of initiatives supported by the Fund," Peacebuilding Fund, Feb 2021, p.9: https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/synthesis_review.pdf.

Organizations (CSOs). Between 2011-2021, the PBF has allocated $219.4 million to 96 GPI projects and 83 YPI projects in over 30 countries. The GYPI call, whilst also open to UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes, is the main funding window through which PBF supports CSO-led peacebuilding initiatives and those developed and implemented jointly by the UN and CSOs. Moreover, YPI is the largest UN funding initiative to support the implementation of the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda. Since its creation, the GYPI call was limited to projects with a maximum duration of 18-months and a budget ceiling of $1.5 million. Starting in 2022, both the duration and budget threshold have been increased to 24 months and $2 million respectively. Since 2020, the PBF assigned thematic foci to the annual GYPI calls.

The 2017-2019 Synthesis Review of PBF evaluations recognized that the "GYPI funding window represents an important area of learning, as a significant amount of work is funded in this area."[2] Reflecting on select GYPI project evaluations between 2017-2019, the Synthesis Review observed that few of the GYPI project evaluations link the project rationale to the conflict analysis, making it difficult to demonstrate how the empowerment of women or youth interface with existing conflict dynamics.[3] The findings of the Synthesis Review suggest that there is still significant room for improvement for evaluating GYPI projects and extracting lessons from their implementation.

The PBF Strategy 2020-2024 committed the Fund to pursuing innovative, iterative, and adaptive evaluation exercises that afford opportunities to learn and course-correct. To address the quality deficit of project evaluations, primarily those under GYPI call, the PBF has committed to piloting a new Cohort Evaluation approach, in which on an annual basis all GYPI projects below or equal to $1.5 million nearing completion (and non-GYPI projects with similar budgets in the future) will be evaluated as a group ('cohort') by independent evaluators and centrally managed by the PBF HQ-based DM&E team. This approach is expected to allow for comparisons between projects, in order to identify trends and best practices to inform future programming.

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[2] Ernstorfer, Anita. "Synthesis Review: 2017-2019 PBF Project and Portfolio Evaluations," *Peacebuilding Fund*, May 2020, p.7:

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/synthesis_review_final_rep ort.pdf.

[3] Ibid, p.36.

Objective

The 2022 Cohort Evaluation will aim to assess the peacebuilding results of 29 2020-approved GYPI projects (all below or equal to $1.5 million) and to conduct individual project-level evaluations for a select sample of 4 GYPI projects approved in 2020, evaluating the degree to which the projects met their intended peacebuilding objectives, providing key lessons about successful peacebuilding approaches and operational practices, as well as highlighting areas where the GYPI projects performed less effectively than anticipated. The Cohort Evaluation approach should therefore ensure adequate attention to evaluation of individual projects, while also allowing for cross-project comparisons. A GYPI-specific approach for the 2022 pilot will provide an opportunity to learn more in-depth lessons on gender- and youth-responsive peacebuilding programming, as well as within the respective thematic areas of the 2020 GYPI call.

Scope and Methodology

While the detailed methodology will be proposed by the Consulting Firm, it is expected that the Cohort Evaluation will be informed by select OECD-DAC evaluation criteria and take a two-fold approach. First, the Consultancy Firm should conduct **a meta-review of 29 GYPI projects approved in 2020**, including 13 GPI and 16 YPI projects. Second, the Cohort Evaluation should conduct **individual project evaluations for 4 GYPI projects** identified by the Consultancy Firm during the inception stage. This stage may include field missions to the countries of the respective projects. The entire Cohort Evaluation should have an adequate focus on the 2020 GYPI themes, namely: 1) Supporting women and youth **leadership**, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements, and 2) Promoting **human rights** and protection of women and youth peacebuilders and LGBTQI+ and human rights defenders. The project list is provided in Annex I.

The Consultancy Firm will be expected to conduct secondary research (desk review) for both phases of the assignment, and primary data collection as part of individual project evaluation phase (Key Informant Interviews and Focus Group Discussions with relevant stakeholders, including PBF HQ and Secretariat staff, fund recipients, national and local implementing partners, as well as project beneficiaries). The evaluation should adopt a Do No Harm approach and take into consideration operational and methodological limitations posed by COVID-19.

At the inception stage, the Consulting Firm will be expected to identify 4 projects for an in-depth examination of the country-specific conflict dynamics and GYPI peacebuilding approaches to address them. The criteria for selecting projects should take into consideration the proposed longlist of guiding questions below (to be adapted and interpreted by the Consulting Firm), whilst ensuring enough diversity within the sample to render the findings generalizable to the cohort. Examples of criteria which could be applied for sample selection include current PBF eligibility, availability and accessibility of data, in-country capacity and institutional buy-in at the national level, representativity of cases along the peace continuum, and geographic diversity.

Guiding questions for the Cohort Evaluation include:

[4] OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria: https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

Evaluation Criterion	Guiding questions for the overall cohort evaluation of 29 GYPI projects approved in 2020	Guiding questions for individual project evaluations of 4 GYPI projects approved in 2020
Relevance	- Were the 2020 GYPI themes relevant for the overarching peacebuilding needs of women and/or youth in PBF eligible countries that year? - To what extent did GYPI projects build on previous or ongoing PBF-funded projects in respective countries, and what was GYPI projects' complementarity or value added? - To what extent did GYPI projects' conflict analyzes and theories of change connect the three dimensions – 1) gender equality and youth empowerment, 2) respective thematic focus, and 3) conflict drivers/peacebuilding needs?	- Was the project relevant to conflict and peace factors identified in the conflict analysis? - Was the project appropriate and strategic in light of the main peacebuilding goals and challenges in the country at the time of the project's design? - Was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the target groups/beneficiaries? Were they consulted during design and implementation of the project? - Did the project's theory of change clearly articulate assumptions about why the project approach is expected to produce the desired change?
Efficiency	- How efficient were GYPI projects in formalizing partnerships with national or local implementing entities, particularly CSOs? - How well did GYPI projects communicate with implementing partners, in-country stakeholders and project beneficiaries on its progress and results?	- How efficient was the overall staffing, planning and coordination within the project (including between fund recipients and implementing agencies)? Have project funds and activities been delivered in a timely manner? - To what extent did the project use available resources (human, financial, material) efficiently to deliver on project objectives?
Effectiveness	- To what extent did the GPI projects support the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda? To what extent did the YPI projects support the implementation of the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda? - What are some of the *peacebuilding* results (at the outcome level) achieved by 2020-approved GYPI projects?	- To what extent did the project achieve its intended objectives and contribute to the project's strategic vision? - How appropriate and clear was the project's targeting strategy in terms of geographic and beneficiary targeting?
Sustainability & Ownership	- How strong was the commitment of the governments and other national stakeholders to sustaining the results of PBF GYPI support and continuing initiatives on women's and young people's participation in peacebuilding? - How did the GYPI projects enhance and contribute to the development of national capacity in order to ensure suitability of efforts and benefits?	- To what extent did the project contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in nationally owned strategic plans, PBF eligibility packages, or annual strategic reports of UN Resident Coordinators? - Did the project design include an appropriate sustainability and exit strategy (including promoting national/local ownership, use of national capacity etc.) to support positive changes in peacebuilding after the end of the project?
Coherence	To what extent did GYPI projects complement work among different entities, especially contributing to greater UN system-wide coherence?	To what extent were the project's design, implementation, monitoring, and reporting aligned with those of other ongoing

		peacebuilding projects in-country, including other projects funded by the PBF?
Conflict sensitivity	● How well did GYPI projects apply conflict sensitivity during design and implementation? ● What unintended peacebuilding results did GYPI projects contribute to?	● Were fund recipients' internal capacities adequate for ensuring an ongoing conflict- sensitive approach? ● Was the project responsible for any unintended (positive or negative) results?
Catalytic	● Has PBF GYPI funding been used to scale-up other peacebuilding work and/or has it helped to create broader platforms for peacebuilding and/or women's and youth empowerment?	● Was the project financially and/or programmatically catalytic?
Innovation	● What lessons can be drawn from GYPI projects' innovative approaches (if any) to inform future programming?	● How novel or innovative was the project approach?

Based on the aforementioned questions, the Cohort Evaluation should also aim to document good practices and lessons emerging from all GYPI projects under review, and to provide actionable recommendations for the PBF and its fund recipients, both under individual project evaluations as well as the entire cohort evaluation.

Deliverables and Timeline

The Consulting Firm will be expected to submit the following documents. Each deliverable must be approved by the PBF prior to proceeding to the next:

- Inception Report, including a light evaluability assessment, an indication of preliminary insights from initial document review and proposed methodology with refined evaluation questions, a project sample of 4 individual project evaluations, and a workplan outlining anticipated timelines and expected Level of Effort for each phase of work.

- Validation Workshop (virtual or hybrid) prior to the drafting of the final report to sensitize the PBF and other relevant stakeholders to emergent findings and fill any remaining evidence gaps.

- Draft Report, including draft reports of individual project evaluations in the annex.

- Fully edited Final Report, including an Executive Summary of no more than 5 pages, and final individual project evaluation reports in the annex.

- Presentation to the PBF and other relevant stakeholders.

Deliverable/Milestone	Anticipated timeline
Inception stage (including producing Inception Report)	19 November-18 December 2022
Data collection (including field missions)	1 January-15 March 2023
Validation Workshop	Late March 2023

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[5] The PBF has a two-fold definition of the catalytic effect: 1) Financial: Did the project help leverage additional investments in related areas of intervention? 2) Programmatic: Did the project help raise awareness and interest in peacebuilding programming and specifically youth or women focused peacebuilding programming? Draft Report	1-30 April 2023
Final Report (including final presentation)	15 May-14 June 2023

Management and Anticipated Audience

The Cohort Evaluation will be managed by the PBF Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E) team, which will have the primary responsibility for quality assurance and approval of deliverables and regular communication with the Consulting Firm.

The key audience for this Cohort Evaluation will be the Peacebuilding Support Office (in particular, the PBF), and UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes as well as CSOs participating in PBF GYPI calls for proposals. In addition, it is anticipated that PBF donors will benefit from the Cohort Evaluation's analysis, findings and recommendations.

The Cohort Evaluation will be procured as an institutional contract through PBF's existing Systems

Contract.

Qualifications of the Consulting Firm Lead Evaluators

Education:

- Advanced university degree (master's degree or equivalent) in one of the social sciences,

international relations, political science, peace and conflict studies, or related field.

Experience:

- At least 7 years of demonstrated relevant work experience with designing and conducting evaluations of development or peacebuilding interventions is required.

- Demonstrated work experience in gender equality and youth empowerment, as well as familiarity with WPS and YPS agendas are required.

- Extensive experience in mixed methods research and participatory gender and youth-sensitive approaches is required.

- Demonstrated experience with report writing is required.

- Familiarity and previous work experience with the UN system, specifically the PBF, is an advantage.

Language:

- English, French and Spanish are the working languages of the UN and the PBF specifically. The lead evaluators must have fluency in spoken and written English. Fluency in French and Spanish within the Consultancy Firm team composition is required.

Expression of Interest

Consulting Firms that have a valid Systems Contract with the PBF are asked to submit the following documentation:

- Technical Proposal that would include but not be limited to the following key aspects: Detailed methodology for both parts of the Cohort Evaluation (meta-review of 29 projects and individual evaluations of 4 projects).
- Clear sampling strategy for identifying 4/29 projects for individual evaluations.
- Methodological limitations to answer the questions outlined in the ToR.
- Methodological considerations to ensure gender- and youth-sensitivity throughout the evaluation.
- Estimated level of effort and timeframe for each stage of the evaluation within the six-month evaluation timeframe.
- Outline of quality standards and procedures, and necessary arrangements for navigating between projects in English, French and Spanish.
- Team composition, including respective responsibilities and qualifications.

2. CVs of evaluation team members, particularly the Team Leader, to meet the desired qualifications outlined in the ToR.

The Consulting Firm's proposal will be assessed based on aforementioned qualifications and the quality of the technical proposal with the key components outlined above.

Annex 2.   Evaluation Matrix

CRITERIA	EVALUATION QUESTIONS			
RELEVANCE[175]	EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	1.1 To what extent the 2020 GYPI thematic focus (youth/women leadership and rights/protection), and the objectives and design of the projects responded to conflict and peace factors identified in the conflict analysis?	2020 GYPI thematic areas are referenced in the CA, and contextualized in relation to the wider peacebuilding needs of youth/women in each context. Objectives and design of GYPI projects informed by a comprehensive[176] and up-to-date conflict analysis (CA) that integrates gender and human rights analysis, and target groups/beneficiaries' perspectives (gender, youth), Projects' intended outcomes address conflict and peace factors identified in the CA.	-ProDocs and other project documents -online survey results -KIIs -Other relevant UN PBF documents (e.g., lessons, thematic guidance, thematic reviews)	-Meta-review -Online survey -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -interaction analysis - triangulation
	1.2 Did the 2020 GYPI projects' design and intended outcomes respond to the peacebuilding needs and priorities of diverse groups of youth/women in each context?	Projects targeted locations and youth/women beneficiaries that were in clear need of support and are representative of their diversity. Projects' intended outcomes respond to peacebuilding needs identified by the targeted women and youth and reflect their diversity. Extent to which women and youth groups were involved in identifying the project priorities/outcomes and designing the project approach and interventions, as evidenced in the needs assessment and the design documents.		

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175 OECD (2021), Applying Evaluation Criteria Thoughtfully, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/543e84ed-en,p38.

176 A comprehensive CA also provides for an understanding of background/history, the identification of key peace and conflict factors, a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, identification of the most vulnerable groups and why they are most vulnerable, and an identification of key dynamics in the context.

1.3 Do the projects' Theory of Change clearly demonstrate the linkages between the projects' thematic focus, conflict drivers or the target groups' peacebuilding needs identified in the projects' conflict analysis and the expected peacebuilding outcomes? Is this articulation clearly reflected in the project activities?	Clearly stated assumptions underlying the ToC The ToC clearly explains how the thematic areas relate to the local peacebuilding context and are relevant for the needs of the target groups. Explicit causality pathways in the ToC from interventions towards outcomes (i.e., why and how the project approach will lead to the expected results) Project interventions are aligned with the ToC logical pathways and appropriately sequenced to produce the desired change.	-Project documentation	-Meta-review -interaction analysis
1.4 If the context changed throughout the implementation of the projects, in what ways did this impact the project and to what extent was the project able to adapt and respond in a timely way?	Extent to which implementing partners could adapt activities timely in response to the changing context, as evidenced in project agreements and in the knowledge/awareness/perception of implementing partners as identified in the online survey.	-Project documents (ProDoc, progress and final reports, other relevant project material) -online survey results	-Meta-review -Online survey - triangulation
Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations-workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
1.5 Do local stakeholders agree with the analysis on the conflict and peace factors in the conflict analysis underpinning the project?	Alignment of local stakeholders' assessment of the context (including conflict and peace factors, and power dynamics) with the CA in the ProDocs Project stakeholders are able to indicate the ways in which these themes respond to their peacebuilding needs and priorities.	-KIIs -FGD - small group interviews	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders - in presence FGD and remote small group interviews with target groups' representative or partner CSOs -triangulation
1.6 To what extent the ToC and the project approach were clear and appropriate from the local stakeholders' perspective, and consistent with their expectations?	Local stakeholders' (local partners and target groups) understanding and views on the ToC, its assumptions and causality pathways. Local stakeholders' (local partners and target groups) feedback on whether the project met their expectations.		
1.7 If during project implementation,	Inclusive feedback mechanisms in place to identify conflict-		

	conflict sensitivity risks or opportunities to leverage peace effects of activities emerged/were identified, were the projects able to adapt and react timely (and if so, how)?	sensitivity risks or generate and disseminate suggestions for improvement at all levels of engagement or seizing emerging peacebuilding opportunities.		
EFFICIENCY[177]	EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives ?			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	2.1 To what extent were project partnerships formalized in an efficient manner, and what factors contributed to this?	Partnerships with women and youth-led organizations Partnership agreements, project workplan, baselines and first meeting of an inclusive project board finalized within the planned timeframe Factors that impacted (positively or negatively) on the formalization of partnership and inclusive planning.	-Project documents (ProDoc, progress and final reports) -KIIs	-Meta-review -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff
	2.2 To what extent were the planned resources (finances, human, material) available on time to the Fund recipient and local partners, and used as per the plan?	Time, financial and human resources available and mobilized on time and as per the project planning, as assessed through the project documents. Number of projects that required extensions (cost and no-cost; extensions for how long) Factors that justified the request for extensions.	-Project documents (ProDocs, final report, financial reports)	-Meta-review
	2.3 To what extent the partnerships established by the projects contributed to an efficient implementation? If so, how?	Local CSOs/partners agency, skills and capacities added value to the partnerships and facilitated project implementation Risks associated with partnering with local Civil Society (CS) actors/organizations.	-Project documents (ProDoc, progress and final reports) -KIIs -Online survey results	-Meta-review -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -Online survey - triangulation
	Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI	Judgement criteria	Additional data	Additional

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[177] "Timely" delivery is within the intended timeframe, or a timeframe reasonably adjusted to the demands of the evolving context. This may include assessing operational efficiency (how well the intervention was managed). OECD (2021), Applying Evaluation Criteria Thoughtfully, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/543e84ed-en., p58.

			sources	methods and analysis tools
	2.4 To what extent did communication and support between the UN PBF HQ/Secretariat in-country, fund recipients and local partners contribute to project efficiency and the realization of outcomes?	Specific UN PBF guidance is considered of quality and valuable by in-country staff and partners. Stakeholders' perceptions of the quality of communication and/or support/accompaniment, as relevant (between UN PBF HQ, UN PBF Secretariat in-country and Fund recipients; between Fund recipients and local partners).	-Project documents -Other relevant UN PBF documents (e.g., lessons, thematic guidance, thematic reviews) -KIIs -FGD - small group interviews	-Meta-review -Online survey -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff and in-country UN PBF Secretariat and partners - triangulation
	2.5 To what extent local partners/CSOs were involved in project planning, steering and implementation of the projects, including on budgeting, staffing and operational choices. How efficient were these processes?	Existence of planning and coordination mechanisms (formal/informal) at project level with active participation of local partners/CSOs Type of issues discussed in those instances and CSOs assessment of their usefulness At least 40% of the project budget was allocated to national/local CSOs as implementing partners UN PBF secretariat in-country, Fund recipient, local implementing partners' feedback on the extent to which interventions were realistic/feasible in the local context, and the time and budget of the project	-KIIs -FGD - small group interviews	-remote in-country KIIs with local stakeholders -KIIs, FGD or small group interviews with partner CSOs
EFFECTIVENESS	EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgment criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	3.1 What are the main peacebuilding results/outcomes achieved by the	Achievement of results framework outcome indicators/perception of achievement	-Project documents (final reports,	-Meta-review -Online survey

	projects? (Differentiated per gender, age, group diversity and location if relevant).	Evidence of capacities strengthened of the beneficiary youth/women-led organizations and other local partners, including for gender/youth mainstreaming, as indicated in project documents and self-reported by local partners/CSOs (disaggregated project document data) Improved interaction between youth/women-led groups and local institutions and/or peacebuilding actors as a result of strengthened capacities as indicated in project documents and self-reported by local partners/CSOs	endline survey, final project evaluation) -KIIs -online survey results	-KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -Interaction analysis -Triangulation
	3.2 Did the projects' interventions result in any unintended outcomes (positive or negative, direct or indirect) ?	Evidence of unintended results (positive or negative, direct or indirect) as identified by stakeholder perceptions and project documentation. Evidence of timely mitigation action to respond to unintended, negative effects		
	3.3 What have been the project's main contributions to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agendas in-country?	Degree of youth/women participation in decision-making processes Evidence of protection of youth/women civilian lives and human rights as identified by stakeholder perceptions (KIIs) and project documentation. Evidence of prevention of violence and promotion of culture of tolerance and intercultural dialogue among youth and women as identified by stakeholder perceptions and project documentation. Degree of engagement of youth and women in development of peacebuilding strategies as identified by stakeholder perceptions (KIIs) and project documentation. Investment in youth and women affected by armed conflict through employment opportunities, inclusive labor policies and education promoting a culture of peace as identified by stakeholder perceptions and project documentation. Evidence of support of youth and women to act as leaders in relief and recovery as identified by stakeholder perceptions and project documentation.		
	3.4 What were the main contributing	Main strengths/contributing factors of the projects that enabled	-Project documents	

and/or hindering factors to achieving the intended peacebuilding results?	achieving the intended (positive) results Main weaknesses or challenges faced by the projects that limited achieving the intended results or led to unintended negative outcomes.	(final reports, endline survey, final project evaluation) -KIIs -online survey	
Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations- workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
3.5 What do in-country stakeholders consider are the most significant changes achieved as a direct or indirect contribution of the projects?	UN PBF secretariat views on results achieved and changes or processes projects contributed to. Fund recipient views on results achieved and changes or processes projects contributed to Youth/women-led organizations and other local partners views on the most significant contribution of projects. Perceptions of improved relationships/trust between projects stakeholders	-KIIs -FGD - small group interviews	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders -KIIs, FGD or remote small group interviews with partner CSOs -Triangulation -Most Significant Change method (integrated in KIIs, FGD and online survey)
3.6 What are the main good practices and learning to be extracted from these projects, from the in-country stakeholders' viewpoint.	Good practices identified and documented Lessons learned identified	-KIIs -FGDs - small group interviews -online survey results	
SUSTAINABILITY AND OWNERSHIP	EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?		
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools

	4.1 What steps have been taken in the GYPI projects' design and implementation to promote ownership and continuity of positive peacebuilding change/results after the end of the projects?	Sustainability and exit strategies included in the project design Evidence that projects incentivized local stakeholders' agency and buy-in throughout the project cycle. Local stakeholder perception of capacity gains in local organizations, including of organizational capacity to continue once funding has ended, as indicated in the online survey	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey results	-Meta-review -Online survey -KIIs -Triangulation
	4.2 Has there been commitment of state/local institutions (governments, local authorities) to the peacebuilding results/continuing initiatives on youth/women empowerment/participation in peacebuilding and protection?	Published declarations/policy plans and/or legislation supporting objectives promoted by the projects, as indicated in project evaluations, final reports Perceptions of stakeholders' commitment/ownership throughout the project as identified in the online survey Available resourcing for implementation/continuity of engagement on WPS and YPS agendas from national/local sources as indicated in project evaluations, final reports and in the online survey Evidence that new/newly supported institutions/participatory mechanisms continue being used as indicated in project evaluations, final reports.	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey results	
	Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations-workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
	4.3 Have youth/women led CSOs and other local stakeholders' taken ownership of the projects and continue to engage/promote peacebuilding efforts?	Evidence of local stakeholders' capacities strengthened (state or civil society, at national or local level) to sustain results after the discontinuation of funding. Evidence of women and youth-led organizations and beneficiaries' agency and efforts to fundraise and/or establish partnerships that enable them to remain engaged in peacebuilding initiatives.	-KIIs -FGDs - small group interviews	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders -in-presence FGD or remote small group interviews with partner CSOs
	4.4 Have the project's results with regard to youth/women empowerment led to meaningful participation and/or rights	Evidence of sustained (direct or indirect) results Evidence of continuity of the engagement of youth/women led CSOs and beneficiaries in peacebuilding activities and goals of		

		the WPS and YPS agendas Mechanisms to fund/support peacebuilding initiatives independent of UN PBF support Key factors that ensured sustainability of project results and benefits		- interaction analysis - triangulation
	4.5 To what extent did the GYPI projects contribute to broader strategic outcomes identified in nationally owned strategic plans, UN PBF eligibility packages, or annual strategic reports of UN Resident Coordinators?	Lessons on youth/women mainstreaming have been/are being integrated in national policies, WPS/YPS strategic plans Lessons on youth/women mainstreaming have been/are being integrated by the UN PBF/UN strategy/activities in-country	-UN PBF/UN Country reports/strategy -National policy documents -KIIs	
COHERENCE AND COORDINATION	**EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?**			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	5.1 To what extent did GYPI projects build on previous or ongoing UN PBF-funded projects in the country?	Synergies with previous UN PBF support Complementarity with other UN PBF supported interventions running in parallel.	-Project documents -KIIs -UN PBF and UN Country reports/strategy -UNSG Reports on the UN PBF -Online survey	-Meta-review -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -Triangulation
	5.2 To what extent were GYPI projects designed to be consistent and complementary to UN system support in-country or other international support to WPS/YPS and local peacebuilding?	Coordination of UN and international support to WPS/YPS agendas or wider peacebuilding support in-country. Projects built on or complemented other UN system relevant thematic objectives or other peace efforts	-Project documents -KIIs -UN PBF and UN Country reports/strategy -UNSG Reports on the UN PBF -Third party documents/strateg	

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	Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations-workstream 2	Judgment criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
	5.3 To what extent did UN-CSOs partnerships and direct support to local CSOS promoted by UN PBF/GYPI add value to existing peacebuilding support in-country? What lessons can be learned?	National and local partners (CSOs/CBOs) perspectives on GYPI funding RUNOs and NUNOs perspectives on their partnerships under GYPI funding Evidence of benefits from UN PBF support to CSOs, CSOs networks and grass-roots organizations Projects supported national legislation and initiatives that aim to improve gender equality and human rights Projects filled gaps in international support to WPS/YPS agendas Local partners provide evidence of enhanced localization of peacebuilding efforts	-KIIs -FGD - small group interviews -UN PBF/UN system country reports/ strategy -National policy documents -UNSG Reports on the UN PBF	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders -in-presence FGD or small groups interviews with partner CSOs/CBOs -online survey - triangulation
CONFLICT SENSITIVITY	EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	6.1 Did projects identify (at start or in the course of implementation) any potential risks that activities might feed into local conflict? If so, was there a clear/explicit strategy to minimize the risk of exacerbating tensions/divisions/marginalization and maximize the opportunities for peace?	Explicit understanding/risk assessment in project documents of the possible interactions between the interventions and the context (and vice versa) Existence of a risk management strategy Projects regularly monitored the evolution of the context and the behavior and dynamics of the targeted groups, and were regularly informed by monitoring data, as evidenced by inclusion of monitoring mechanisms in ProDoc and monitoring data in progress reports Evidence of opportunities for peace identified and leveraged. Perceptions of stakeholders on the extent to which projects	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey results	-Meta-review -Online survey -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -interaction analysis - triangulation

		were implemented in a conflict sensitive way (online survey)		
	Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations- workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
	6.2 Did the Fund recipients and the local partners have the required capacities to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach?	Self-assessment of fund recipients and their reflection on local partners' capacity to apply a conflict sensitive approach Fund recipients and local partner's perceptions on the effects of training/capacity development on local capacities for implementing conflict-sensitive approaches (be sensitive to others, unbiased in their judgements, respectful of people with different opinions or approaches; factoring in local power dynamics, etc.)	-project documents -KIIs with local stakeholders -FGDs - small group interviews	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders -in presence FGD or remote small group interviews with partner CSOs/CBOs
	6.3 What is the local stakeholder's assessment of the conflict-sensitivity risks and opportunities, and of how they were managed/seized by the projects?	Good practices identified Lessons learned for better capacity-development and approaches for conflict-sensitivity	-KIIs with local stakeholders -FGDs - small group interviews	
CATALYTIC-UN PBF has a two-fold definition -1) Financial: Did the project help leverage additional investments in related areas of intervention? 2) Did the project help raise awareness and interest in peacebuilding programming and specifically youth or women-focused peacebuilding programming.	EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?			
	Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
	7.1 To what extent did the projects help leverage additional investments in the areas related to those targeted by the project?	Examples/perceptions of additional investments to leverage project results or pursue similar peacebuilding approaches by other stakeholders in the country, as obtained through project documentation and/or the online survey. Continuity or scaling up of GYPI approaches or results by other UN or international donors	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey results	-Meta-review -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -Online survey -Triangulation
	7.2 Did GYPI funding help create or boost interest and/or broader platforms for peacebuilding and/or for women's and youth empowerment in-country?	Evidence of in-country platforms promoting peacebuilding and WPS/YPS agendas created or strengthened by the projects	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey	

|		Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations- workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools
		7.3 To what extent local partners/CSO/CBOs gained visibility and/or credibility as a result of their engagement with GYPI projects?	Other national and international peacebuilding actors manifested interest in the work of CSO/CSOs as a result of their involvement in the projects	-KIIs with UN PBF Secretariat, fund recipients, local partners -FGDs - small group interviews	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders (UN PBF secretariat, fund recipients, local partners, other relevant stakeholders) -in presence FGD or remote small group interviews with CSOs/CBOs
		7.4 Did fund recipients and local partners secure funding (by the UN or other sources) continuing a similar focus and approach after the GYPI project?	Fund recipients and local partners continue engaging in GYPI themes and taking a similar approach through other funding sources		
INNOVATION		EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?			
		Sub question for workstream 1	Judgement criteria	Data sources	Methods and analysis tools
		8.1 To what extent did GYPI projects identify/experiment with novel/innovative approaches or initiatives?	Examples of innovative approaches/initiatives piloted by GYPI projects, as indicated in project documents	-Project documents -KIIs -online survey results	-Meta-review -KIIs with UN PBF/PBSO staff -Online survey -Triangulation
		8.2 Are there any good/practices or learning to be drawn from these innovative approaches that can inform future UN PBF/UN programming?	Lessons identified from innovative approaches piloted as identified in project documentation and self-reported in the on-line survey		
		Additional sub-questions for 4 GYPI individual project evaluations- workstream 2	Judgement criteria	Additional data sources	Additional methods and analysis tools

	8.3 Local stakeholders' perspective on any novel or innovative elements in the project approach, and their contribution to peacebuilding/positive change.	Stakeholder perceptions of GYPI projects as innovative compared to other donors Stakeholder's views on most significant change of these innovative peacebuilding approaches. Evidence that these innovative approaches are being replicated locally, elsewhere in-country or in other contexts	-KIIs with UN PBF Secretariat, fund recipients, local partners and other relevant KIs.	-remote/in-country KIIs with local stakeholders

Annex 3.   Evaluation Methodology

The ET used a mixed method approach employing quantitative and qualitative methods for the collection and analysis of primary and secondary data, with a particular focus on qualitative methods. The data collection methods were guided by the evaluation criteria and questions (presented in the evaluation matrix in Annex 2). While some methods covered both workstreams, others will be applied only to workstream 2 (i.e. the four individual project evaluations) as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 Evaluation Methods and Tools per Workstream

	Work-stream	Data Collection Methods and Analysis Tools
2. Sample project evaluations	1.	Meta Review Online Surveys Stakeholder consultations: remote KIIs with PBSO/UN PBF staff at headquarters (HQ) level Triangulation
	2.	Key Informant Interviews (remote and in-person) with stakeholders in the four countries of the sample project evaluations Focus Group Discussions (in-person). Interaction analysis Most Significant Change (MSC)

7.1.1   Methods and tools

The following methods and tools were used in the evaluation:

Meta Review: The Inception phase started with a select review of general UN PBF and GYPI documents for the ET to develop a better understanding of GYPI within the wider UN PBF efforts, its evolution over time and learning from GYPI support over the last years. The main documentation reviewed included UN PBF strategy documents and reviews, United Nations Security Council resolutions on WPS and YPS and related programming documents, UN thematic plans/policy documents related to the themes of the GYPI Call (e.g. UNSG Call to Action for Human Rights) as well as thematic reviews and UN PBF guidance documents relevant to the GYPI themes and approach. Building on this initial documentation review, the ET carried out a meta-review of the project documentation made available by UN PBF. The meta-review covered all 29 projects and served as the main basis for the analysis of the projects' performance and results, and for the preparation of the remote and in-country missions of the four sample project evaluations.

Online Surveys: The ET prepared two online surveys: one targeting the direct Fund recipients (RUNOs/NUNOs) and the other targeting the CSOs/implementing partners that received indirect support through the Fund recipients of the 2020 GYPI Call. The two surveys respond to several purposes: (i) to collect some quantitative and qualitative reflection/views and experience of directly and indirectly funded partners of the UN PBF support; (ii) assess GYPI outcomes and sustainability, including CSOs/local partners' ownership and capacity development, from these two groups' perspectives; (iii) identify potential issues for follow up in the KIIs; and (iv) strengthen triangulation between the assessment and perspectives of the Fund recipients and CSO partners. The surveys complemented the data collected through the meta review and helped mitigate to some extent risks associated with insufficient information or quality of data in project documentation. Priority was be given to aspects less easily captured via the meta-review, notably their added

value compared to other support/experiences; ownership and sustainability of project results, including stakeholders' perceptions on the more substantial changes achieved; catalytic effects of capacity-development and other enduring effects of the support provided while also addressing lightly other criteria.

The final version of the surveys was translated into French and Spanish. Each survey took approximately 30 minutes and entailed a limited number of both closed and open questions in order to maximize the response rate. To ensure confidentiality, participation in the surveys was voluntary and anonymous (name, position or organization will not be requested to access and respond to the survey questionnaire); feedback was consolidated; and the survey platform does not collect information concerning the implementing partner location of respondents or from which email responses were received. Direct quotes are used in the final evaluation report but are not attributed to any region or organization. The online surveys were launched in mid-June for 5 weeks. The survey was closed on 18 July 2023.

The launch of the surveys was pre-announced by the UN PBF to the Fund recipients and to the national and/or local CSO partners. The survey link was sent by the UN PBF DM&E team with an explanation that the data will only be viewed by the ET. The survey link will direct respondents to the survey hosted through the SurveyMonkey platform.[178] Respondent data was stored in SurveyMonkey data centres that adhere to security and technical best practices. SurveyMonkey is compliant with the European Union General Data Protection Requirement and the International Organization for Standardization 27001 on Information Security Management.

The email included a short introduction to briefly explain the topic and purpose of the survey and a confirmation that UN PBF will not have access to response data. The survey introduction included: an explanation of KonTerra as the contracted agency for the evaluation, goal of the survey and how data will be used, including confirmation that participation is anonymous and voluntary. With the Team Leader (TL) guidance, the ET Senior Evaluator and the Data Analyst led on the surveys and data treatment.

Key Informant Interviews (KII): The ET conducted remote semi-structured interviews with PBSO/UN PBF former and current staff during the Inception phase and continued during the data collection with interviews to former staff involved in the 2020 GYPI Call identified by the UN PBF.

KIIs were conducted with the main stakeholders of the four sample projects selected for individual evaluations, mainly: the UN PBF Secretariat in-country, Fund recipients, national and local implementing partners/CSOs, as well as project beneficiaries and other relevant state and non-state stakeholders to be identified for each sample project. Interview questions were adapted to each stakeholder group, role in the project and the political and socio-cultural setting and integrated the most significant change tool (discussed in the next sub-section) for workstream two. Confidentiality of participation and inputs depended on the stakeholders' decision: the ET duly informed key informants (KIs) ahead of the interviews that no quotes or attribution shall be made unless they specifically indicate they would like to be quoted; they were able to choose not to have their names listed in the list of KIs interviewed.

KIIs will be conducted online for the two remote project evaluations, and mostly in-person for the two sample projects that will have in-country missions (IRF 400 in Colombia and IRF 408 in Mali). The ET benefited from KonTerra's significant expertise in remote qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies. These include the application of multiple remote platforms including Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Skype, cell phone, Google Meet, and online collaboration platforms such as Teamup Calendar, Google Docs, Dedoose, and Mural-among others.

Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) or small group interviews: For the two project evaluations that will be conducted in-country, the ET conducted FGDs with beneficiaries and intermediary stakeholders (e.g. local CSO partners). For the remote project evaluations, the ET organized small group interviews online with those categories of stakeholders (up to three persons per interview), using the preferred/commonly used media among the targeted beneficiaries and CSO partners. Like in the KIIs, the ET integrated the most significant change tool into FGDs and small group interviews, but discussions focused on a more limited set of issues/EQs than in KIIs, and especially on issues that speak directly to the participants experience and expectations with the project, change perceptions, sustainability and catalytic effect (especially regarding

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[178] surveymonkey.com

partner CSOs capacities and resources). Participation across gender, age, socio-cultural groups, location was ensured.

7.1.2   Sampling for the stakeholders' consultations

The primary focus of the remote and in-country consultations was on stakeholders with direct concern for or experience with the 2020 GYPI sample projects.

When engaging with implementing agencies/partners and intermediary CSOs to identify and select target groups to be interviewed (in KIIs or FGDs), the ET paid special attention to ensuring participant diversity (in age, gender, location, socio-economic status, religion or ethnicity, as relevant) in order to avoid manipulation and/or reproduction of power control paradigms from traditional power holders. The ET separated FGDs by gender when feasible to support a more open dialogue. The ET attempted to interview traditional power holders separately through KIIs to avoid intimidation or reluctance from other participants to speak. Finally, facilitators took note of non-verbal cues and encouraged open discussion of dissenting views to capture a range of opinions.

7.1.3   Light-touch project evaluations

In addition to the meta-review of all 29 GYPI projects, the ET conducted four light-touch individual project evaluations, of which two were conducted remotely by the ET, and two by local consultants in-country accompanied remotely by the ET and supported in-country by the UN PBF Secretariat (e.g., facilitation of contacts, meeting rooms, transportation). The inclusion of remote evaluations, as opposed to all in-person, was appropriate for the ET to align with the evaluation schedule and resources.

Sample selection and criteria: This sample of projects was selected according to a set of criteria discussed and agreed with UN PBF.[179] Table 2 lists the key criteria for the sample selection of project-level evaluations.

Table 2 Criteria for the selection of sample projects

Sampling Criteria
Projects not yet evaluated, to avoid duplicating efforts;
Availability and accessibility of data;
Geographic representation;
Thematic representation (within and across the two main themes: WPS/YPS and leadership, HR and protection);
Coverage of the diverse categories of Fund recipients: UN agencies/RUNOs, non-UN agencies/NUNOs (i.e., INGOs, NGOs/CSOs), and partnerships between RUNOs and NUNOs.
Presence of a UN PBF Secretariat/Coordinator in-country and their availability to support the ET (for the in-country project evaluations);
Capacity, information, accessibility and security of stakeholders in-country (e.g., whether the evaluation team can safely access stakeholders; stakeholders are not subject to security risks or reprisals as a result of engagement with the evaluation team; respondents are sufficiently familiar with the activities to provide relevant and diverse peacebuilding insights)
Institutional buy-in/interest at national level (from local partners and/or national institutional actors);
UN PBF interest in showcasing and gather learning from specific innovative approaches or good practices;
Coverage of context cases along the peace continuum.

The ET sought a balanced geographic and thematic representation of the projects to reflect the overall thematic and geographic distribution of the 2020 cohort. However, during the inception phase, several

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179 Following the clarifications in the evaluation kick-off meeting on March 28, UN PBF eligibility was excluded from the selection criteria. Instead, priority consideration was given instead to projects that have not yet been evaluated. Under the conflict spectrum criteria, the ET has considered the OECD Fragility framework (from the States of Fragility 2022 report), complemented with general information on the country conflict situation.

changes were made to the originally proposed criteria following consultations with the POs, GYPI coordinator and the UN PBF monitoring and evaluation manager. Only the nine projects not yet evaluated could be considered for the sample selection, thus limiting the coverage of all criteria in the sample originally envisaged in the proposal. As a result, no projects in Asia were included[180] nor were projects with national/local CSO as direct Fund recipients.[181] Instead, the individual evaluations included two projects in Africa and two in the Latin America & Caribbean region. Thematically, the evaluations included one GPI and three YPI projects, including two on Human Rights/protection and two on Youth/women Leadership. The UN PBF Secretariat or a MPTF Office/coordinator (in Colombia) was aware of the evaluations and supported the process in-country. The ET was aware that the IRF 400 project in Colombia is a case study for an ongoing Human Rights and Peacebuilding Thematic Review. The ET coordinated with the team that has conducted that exercise in Colombia to identify the stakeholders' interviewed and the issues they have focused on to ensure complementarity, and to compare notes.

The following select projects were included for light touch evaluations:

Table 2 Projects included for light-touch project evaluations

Country / Project #	GPI /YPI	Main Evaluability issues[182]	Fragility & conflict spectrum[183]	Geographic area	Thematic area[184]	Fund recipient
For remote evaluations (by the ET)						
Haiti UN PBF-IRF-407	YPI	Project ongoing until June 2023. No Final report available yet. Strong interest in a lesson learned exercise.	Ranked among the top 10 "extremely fragile" countries in the OECD *States of Fragility 2022.* Political volatility and crisis. Poverty, insecurity and highly vulnerable to environmental disasters.	LAC - Caribbean	Youth Leadership for justice, social cohesion, and integration across displaced and host communities	RUNO + NUNO (INGO): UNHCR OHCHR) World Vision International
Burkina Faso UN PBF/IRF-IRF 386	YPI	No endline	Fragile [now more likely in 'extremely fragile' category]. Frequent terrorist attacks in the border areas with Mali and Niger, and violent clashes with security forces. Inter-community tensions; conflicts around resources; political instability (military coups).	Africa - Sahel	Human Rights: promotion and protection of youth peacebuilders and HR defenders	RUNOs only: UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF

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180 The ET proposed two projects in Africa, one in Latin America & Caribbean and one in Asia

181 The ET proposed the coverage of all categories and configurations of Fund recipients (RUNOs, INGO, local NGO/CSO, and RUNOs jointly with INGO or with CSOs).

182 The evaluability criterium considers two dimensions:

    a) Availability and accessibility of documentation and data, notably project doc, implementation reports; conflict analysis is accessible to the ET; quality of data and reporting. Should the selection privilege projects that have been or are being evaluated, or projects that have not yet been evaluated and will not be evaluated under other contracts.

    b) In-country stakeholders' capacity, availability/interest, information, accessibility and security

183 OECD Fragility framework in States of Fragility 2022, complemented with additional info on conflict situation.

184 2020 GYPI thematic areas: 1. Leadership (Women and youth empowerment/Leadership; Women and youth representation and participation in peace building processes/implementation of peace agreements); and Human rights (Women and youth rights promotion; Protection of women and youth peacebuilders; LGBTQI+; Protection of HR defenders).

For in-country evaluations (by local consultants with remote accompaniment of the ET)						7
Mali UN PBF-IRF 408	YPI	Security and logistics for access to project locations outside Bamako TBC.	"Fragile". Extreme poverty (over 50% of the population) and high vulnerability to climate change effects. Political instability and insecurity, with terrorist attacks and armed confrontation in parts of the territory.	Africa - Sahel	Youth Leadership and participation in reconciliation processes	RUNO + NUNO (INGO): UNICEF, UNDP and Avocats sans frontières Canada
Colombia UN PBF - IRF 400	GPI	Baseline survey and final project to be shared by PO.	Not listed in *States of Fragility 2022* report. Post-conflict. Difficult implementation of the peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and negotiations with other armed groups. Violence against CS actors continues.	LAC – Latin America	Human Rights: access to justice, women and LGBT	INGO: Christian Aid Ireland

7.1.4 Data analysis and triangulation

Most Significant Change (MSC): The ET integrated the most significant change tool into KIIs, FGDs/small group interviews, and online surveys. The **most significant change** technique was mainly used in the individual project evaluations to stimulate the discussion with key informants around peacebuilding results and change processes and gather the perspective of different stakeholders. In some cases, these discussions have helped clarify key enabling or hindering change factors/conditions and what meaningful change meant for different stakeholders in each context.

For the meta-review, the ET sough to collect evidence and perceptions of change through the KIIs with UN PBF staff, the document review and the online surveys, but a more in-depth MSC exercise was not feasible given the very nature of the exercise.

Interaction analysis was used as a complementary tool to help focus on the mutual interaction between the project's peacebuilding interventions and the context. Building on the context/conflict analysis, the projects' Theory of Change, and the data collected on the results/changes achieved, this qualitative research and analysis tool also helps to assess conflict-sensitivity in the projects, and the validity of the theory of change and underpinning assumptions. It helped the ET to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in project interventions in relation to the context and the stakeholders' needs, thus supporting the assessment of the projects' effectiveness, relevance of the outcomes and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions, and

Triangulation of data to compare findings on critical areas of inquiry, ensuring the impartiality of analysis and reducing the risk of bias. This included triangulation of data collected from the project's documentary sources during the meta-review and, during the sample project evaluation, from diverse stakeholder sources in different locations. Triangulation helped the ET to identify which results/processes can be generalized versus those that are limited to a particular context. The detailed evaluation matrix presented in Annex 2 specifies the different data sources the ET used to identify results, findings and draw conclusions and recommendations. These include projects evaluations, online surveys' results, cross-referencing of projects in other GYPI projects documentations (for instance for projects implemented in the same country and where complementarities were envisaged/explored); and projects' primary data when available (e.g. baselines, endlines, surveys). Data triangulation was more limited in the meta-review for those projects with no evaluations and not covered by the individual project evaluation to be conducted under within this Cohort Evaluation.

7.1.5 Rights Based approach and Gender mainstreaming considerations

As a standard KonTerra operational strategy and requirement, the evaluation team will comply with the 2014 UNEG Guidelines on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations and take a gender- and youth-sensitive approach.

The evaluation incorporated a systematic review of how GYPI projects integrated UN PBF technical guidance, notably on Gender Marker scoring, Youth and Peacebuilding, Theories of Change and others mentioned in the 2020 GYPI notice for applicants, as relevant. Key features areas for evaluation of inclusion of gender and youth-sensitive approaches in GYPI projects include assessing the extent to which projects:

Conducted gender and age-sensitive conflict analysis, including participation of diverse age and gender groups in development of conflict analysis

- Included a "Do No Harm" risk analysis
- Included appropriate YPS outcomes and indicators and degree of youth engagement in their design
- Clearly identified age and gender groups for inclusion
- Provide youth-specific information in monitoring
- Meet minimum requirements of YPS programming[185]
- Provide data disaggregation by age, sex and key social factors

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[185]p.13 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/yps_programming_handbook.pdf

- Include diverse stakeholders in GYPI projects' design, implementation and reporting, recognizing differential outcomes for diverse target groups and stakeholders within groups in the cohort evaluation process as well

- Include relevant rationale for focusing on youth (negative/positive rationale)

- Include relevant groups targeted by the project and the selection process ("vulnerable youth", "at risk youth", urban/rural, ethnic groups, socio-economic groups, religious)

- Considered gender dimensions in project rationale, design, and implementation (Was there an effort to involve young men/young women equally? Does the project address harmful gender norms and/or facilitate the transformation of gender roles that can contribute to peacebuilding?)

The evaluation incorporated gender and youth sensitive methodology. Key features include:

- Maximizing the degree of participation of target groups and diversity of local stakeholders in the evaluation of the four sampled projects;

- Ensuring that evaluation outputs use gender- and youth-sensitive language;

- Disaggregating results by age, gender and key social factors as available;

- Ensuring that special measures are taken to include women and youth and any other groups (especially minority groups) for data collection;

- Provide the requisite environment to make participants comfortable and safe to respond to data collection efforts;

- Work to include target populations in the review of the analysis and recommendations for the four country evaluations to the extent possible;

- Conduct a stakeholder analysis informed by the UNEG tools to help target and balance inclusiveness in the four countries selected; the ET will also use this tool when reviewing the methodology of the projects that have already conducted an evaluation of the project to assess how well inclusiveness informed the methodology.

Annex 4. Light-Touch Project Evaluation Summary Notes

4.1. Burkina Faso IRF 386: *«Appui à la promotion, à la protection des jeunes consolidateurs de la paix et des défenseurs des droits des personnes dans les régions du Sahel, du Nord et de l'Est, Burkina Faso » - JDDP*

(YPI, Human Rights theme)

1. Introduction

1.1. Project objectives and context

With about 79% of the population under 35 years old and nearly a third aged between 15 and 35 (2018 data), Burkina Faso is a country of surging young population. The JDDP project, implemented by UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF between January 2021 and December 2022, with a budget of 1.5 million USD, targeted mainly youth (men and women) Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) and the institutions charged with protecting and creating an enabling environment for the youth actors to operate.

The project had three **main objectives**: (i) to reinforce existing mechanisms for the protection of young HRDs, girls and boys; (ii) to strengthen the capacities and skills (including economic empowerment) of these young HRD so that they can carry out their missions safely/in a favorable environment; and (iii) to promote the effective integration of young HRD and peacebuilders in protection and local mechanisms for conflict prevention and management.

Throughout the project duration, Burkina Faso has witnessed increased jihadist attacks, insecurity and political instability. Military coups (in January and September 2022) led to the country's suspension from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, and to the suspension of much of UN's cooperation with the Government until the military junta agreed to the transitional period proposed by ECOWAS for a return to the constitutional order (elections are expected in February 2024).

The project covered 12 communes in the North, Sahel and East regions of Burkina Faso. These areas are most affected by intercommunal conflicts, and by violence against civilians by both jihadist groups and by military forces and pro-government militias during counterterrorism operations. As a result, nearly 2 million people are displaced; approximately 40% of the country's territory lacks food, water, electricity and basic health and education services, also as a result of violence and the blockade imposed by jihadist groups.

Figure 1: Map of the areas of intervention of the *Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso* (PUS-BF) including the project intervention areas

Source: extracted from the ProDoc.

1.2. Methodology

The project evaluation is a light-touch exercise carried out remotely by the cohort evaluation Team Leader for a period of two weeks in the second half of July. The purpose was to gather primary information and the perspectives of different stakeholders involved in the project to complement and triangulate data extracted from the project documentation review. The ET conducted twelve Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with seventeen people representing nearly all categories of stakeholders, except for youth beneficiaries. Despite the limitations inherent in a short, light-touch and remote exercise, KIIs provided valuable insight and additional information that would not have been possible to grasp with the documentary analysis only. The full list of KIs interviewed, documentary sources used and additional information on the methodology are provided in section 6 (annexes).

This note presents a summary of the main findings (per evaluation criteria) and learning, which have been integrated into the main report of the cohort evaluation. It provides some conclusions and recommendations that are specific to the project assessed.

2. Findings

2.1. Relevance

EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?

The evaluation found the project was very relevant to the country context and to the challenges faced by civil society and youth, as confirmed by triangulated sources. The project targeted some of the most vulnerable and violence-affected areas of the country, including youth from diverse language and ethnic communities, according to several sources, although clear data on beneficiaries' diversity is not visible in the project documentation.

The project focus on Human Rights (HR) was relevant given the increasingly limited space for civil society to engage and the rise in rights' violations because of jihadist groups attacks on civilians and the military; of security and defence forces counteroffensive operations; and of limitations to basic freedoms imposed by the transitional military government, despite the national policies in terms of Human Rights and Justice (ICG 2023; HRW 2023). The objectives of the project were thus mainly Human Rights-oriented, addressing the needs of young HRDs in terms of protection, empowerment and autonomy, with attention to the specific challenges faced by women/girls within this group, but also linking to peacebuilding priorities. Project outcomes centered on women and youth HR Defenders' needs for capacity, knowledge, protection and autonomy, also with the aim of strengthening their capacities to play a role in local governance and peacebuilding. One outcome was more directly related to peacebuilding objectives, addressing perceptions of impunity, marginalization and disenfranchising of youth that the conflict analysis (CA) refers as one of the factors contributing to feed violence and Violent Extremism.

The project was informed by a general comprehensive analysis of the context and of conflict dynamics (presented in the ProDoc) that was done also by experts that had a direct knowledge of the situation on the ground and with the involvement of partner CSOs. The CA identifies the main conflict factors feeding intercommunal violence, notably competition over natural resources between pastoralists and farmers, mineral resource exploitation, land grab, development disparities across regions fueling a sense of discrimination, with periods of violence often linked to political/electoral processes. The CA also identifies vulnerability and other factors eroding youth trust in the social and political institutions that are said to be pushing youth towards the use of violence and feeding inter-ethnic conflicts (e.g. unemployment, politicization of customary and religious leaders,

security and defence forces abuses, elites' corruption, impunity). KIs interviewed, including partner CSO, shared the assessment in the CA, although some had less alarmistic views on the security situation, acknowledging however heightened risks in some locations. The inter-generational

> *"La situation que nous vivons aujourd'hui est en partie liée à l'écart en terme de vision entre les vieilles générations et les jeunes"*

gap was highlighted by some KIs as a source of conflict in the country.

CAs refer to some challenges specific to the local context of the three targeted regions but does not differentiate between them. However, mapping studies per region and the specific study on women HR defenders conducted at the start of the project provide a more targeted assessment (including of the strengths and weaknesses of identified local CSOs to inform the project targeting, as well as the opportunities and threats/risks they face). Although the focus of these mapping studies is primarily in the thematic area, the link with peace and conflict factors is mentioned mostly as a higher-level outcome, in a context where youth are both victims and actors of violence and subject to manipulation (notably by armed non-state groups, political actors, etc.). According to KIIs, the CA remained relevant throughout the project, but needs increased significantly during this period.

As confirmed by institutional actors and CSOs interviewed by the ET, the preparation of the concept notes and project document was informed by consultations with national institutions, line Ministries representatives in the region and in the related areas of the project (e.g. youth, justice and HR, women), and civil society platforms and organizations working on HR, gender and youth. The process was participatory and iterative, integrating their feedback. Technical services of line ministries, youth structures at regional and local level and CSOs were also very involved in the identification of needs and selection of the targeted beneficiaries through the mapping studies, and in the discussion on adaptation to the workplan in light of the challenges faced by the project.

The project Theory of Change (ToC) was coherent and consistent with its thematic focus and objectives, but the assumptions were not explicitly formulated nor did it factor some of the main barriers to the level of change intended. Interviewed KIs consider, however, the ToC was and remains valid, while recognizing the underestimation of the socio-economic and security context, which negatively impacted access to the targeted locations, the participation of youth beneficiaries from those locations, and on results and sustainability.

The project was able to adapt to some of these challenges, as confirmed by different sources, by changing location of activities, transporting participants from "red areas" to activities' locations, and last-minute partnership with youth CSOs for the implementation of activities that could no longer be conducted by State partners due to the suspension of cooperation with the Government following the first military coup.

2.2. Efficiency

EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives?

The project required a **no cost extension** (NCE) of five months due to delays. A main factor for delays and key challenge to the project was the deteriorating security situation that made many project locations inaccessible to RUNOs and even, in some cases, to state officials/decentralized services involved in the implementation of the project. Besides limiting the project's ability to reach the targeted beneficiaries, this resulted in extra costs to continue the activities in other locations (additional security precautions, transportation of participants to project trainings/events with detours through other countries to avoid higher risk areas).

Another main reason for the NCE was the **suspension of UN cooperation** with the Government in early 2022 following the military coups. As a result of the latter, the project established partnerships with two youth led CSOs for activities that were initially planned to be conducted through the Government institutions. In addition, local governance entities, Governors and Regional Directors of line Ministries the project was working with were replaced, requiring the project to rebuild some of the relationships and wait for the establishment of the new entities. Insecurity and the rise of the cost in construction materials also meant that the costs for planned infrastructure works (Multifunctional Centres) was higher than budgeted, requiring a downward revision of the target of Multifunctional Centres from six to three.

The **project was able to adapt**, as confirmed by all sources, reviewing budget allocations and targets as allowed by UN PBF flexible rules, and most importantly addressing the access and security concerns by implementing activities via local CSOs, delocalizing certain activities and transferring participants to areas where the security conditions were deemed acceptable.

Partnerships with CSOs played a key role in the project ability to: access most project locations where even State officials had limited access because of the insecurity; engage local CSOs and beneficiaries; liaise with State

representatives and local authorities at the regional level; and adapt to the specific context and the security challenges given their knowledge of the local context, presence and networks in the project areas. The fact that RUNOs already had established partnerships with these CSO, facilitated their early engagement in the project design and planning, and their quick mobilization when the project had to find alternatives to institutional partners after the suspension of UN cooperation. Partner CSOs experience on some of the themes and type of activities conducted (e.g. community dialogues, trainings on peace, GEWE) also contributes to efficiency and effectiveness.

Three national CSOs – Nooden Nooto (A2N), Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (CGD) and Mwangaza Action – were involved from the very early stages of project design and in planning, implementation and coordination meetings. The other two CSOs – the youth-led UNIJED Afrique and ROJALNU – came later into the project, in mid-2022, and did not have, therefore much space to change or add to the project plan. Together, these partner CSO received 34% (507 583 USD) of the total project funding, according to the Final project Report. Besides the funding, CSOs valued the longstanding relationships with RUNOs and appreciate their respective strengths. They have mentioned the following main advantages from these collaborations:

- RUNOs facilitation of contacts with national level Institutions or Government actors;
- the visibility CSOs get from these collaborations, including from the participation in UN PBF projects coordination structures that allow them to meet with officials, donors and other partner organizations;
- the knowledge acquired through the project activities – several mentioned the project mapping studies;
- the space for sharing good practices, discussing implementation challenges and jointly defining solutions to address these.

Both RUNOs and CSOs also appreciated UN PBF flexibility, coordination, accompaniment and the frequent communication, facilitating the discussion on options for addressing difficulties encountered by the project, the NCE process and budget adaptations. However, the UN PBF rule of 75% activities' completion rate for the disbursement of the 2nd tranche also meant that some activities were impacted by the delays with the Multifunctional Centres (for the reasons already mentioned). Heavy and complex RUNO procedures were also mentioned as a factor slowing partnerships and implementation.

2.3. Effectiveness

> EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?

Due to the security and socio-economic situation, the project did not reach all the intended target locations and youth beneficiaries from those areas, which limited the results. Notwithstanding, in a context of deteriorating security situation, shrinking civic space and increasing needs, different stakeholders confirmed some peacebuilding results and benefits for those involved. The overall implementation rate was satisfactory, with output indicators realized at over 80%. The refurbishment of the three Multifunctional Centres was completed after the end of the project; at least two were operational at the time of the remote interviews conducted by the ET.

There are indications that **youth beneficiaries/CSOs' technical capacities were strengthened** as a result of project activities (e.g., 500, including 200 women/girls, peacebuilders and HRD). Project trainings strengthened their knowledge and understanding of existing laws on Human Rights Defenders and Fund for legal assistance, and their capacities for self-protection, monitoring and reporting of HR violations, including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), and for conflict management[186]. There are **mixed views** as to whether these capacities have translated into **youth participation and role in local peacebuilding mechanisms**. Some KIs see youth more present, more active and vocal in the defence of their rights, speaking out on HR violations. Accounts are more mixed when it comes to women beneficiaries: while some have been empowered, others are still not given a voice or space for engagement. An example mentioned was the strong resistance to engaging women/girls by very traditionalist leaders in a targeted community, leading the project to withdraw the activity to avoid creating further problems. Notwithstanding, the project succeeded in ensuring a significant number of women/girls'

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[186] As per end of training assessments reported in the annual progress report of 2021.

beneficiaries participated (see in section 3/good practices). The project also trained 150 law enforcement officers from the three targeted regions for awareness on their roles and responsibilities to implement the Law on the Protection of HRDs and thus create a more enabling environment for HR work; these trainings included information on WPS and YPS resolutions and legislation on Sexual and Gender based violence and victims' protection.

> *« Avant j'avais peur des représailles donc je n'avais pas le courage d'aller vers la police ou la gendarmerie pour des cas de violations des droits Humains recensés, mais maintenant grâce à la formation reçue, je n'ai plus peur de dénoncer »* – youth beneficiary.
>
> Source : Final Project report, 2022.

Triangulated sources indicate also **improved inter-generational dialogues, youth networks** (boys and girls), **and dialogues with institutional actors** as a result of the project activities (capacity development, spaces for dialogues, sensitization activities, etc.), including **dialogue with security forces,** which some KIs consider are the **most significant changes** enabled by the project, **alongside youth/CSO/CBOs empowerment**. Community dialogues with traditional/customary leaders, and with security forces in charge of applying the HRD protection laws and mechanisms, are credited with contributing to build bridges across generational divides (one of the root causes of the conflicts in country, in the analysis of some KIs), promoting understanding on the role of youth HRD and openness to involving youth and taking into account their specific needs and aspirations in local conflict prevention and management mechanisms – at least while the project was being implemented. Action plans and priorities for the integration of women and youth HRD into local peacebuilding mechanisms, developed in consultation meetings in each region, have been implemented according to RUNOs. The ET could not verify the content of these Action Plans or confirm directly with youth beneficiaries or community leaders themselves as no interviews with these stakeholders could be conducted.

Community dialogues also provided an opportunity for the State services to address local perceptions of lack of justice and explain the procedures for actioning justice mechanisms. Trained HRDs also received training on HR monitoring and reporting by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), which expected many to contribute to their system, but at the time of the ET interviews only about 20 had remained.

An **unintended positive change** that has seemingly been a direct result of the project is the change in the attitude and perception of some line Ministries on working with CSOs. While previously opposed/very reluctant to having CSOs implementing activities in the Justice/HR sector, the project has **opened avenues for collaboration** between them, as indicated by both partner CSOs and officials interviewed. Both reported very positive collaborations during the project, with each appreciating the added value of working with the other. For officials, working with CSOs provided an indirect channel to working with communities they had no access to due to the security risks and restrictions. For CSOs, this collaboration facilitated the identification of beneficiaries, the targeting and adaptation of activities, problem solving during implementation, synergies and complementarities with other activities, and opened channels for collaboration with Ministries at central level. A KI also referred to improved dialogue between the Ministry of HR/Justice and security forces.

This YPI HR focused project has potentially made some contribution to the Youth and Women, Peace and Security agendas, although this is mostly self-reported. This includes:

- the **participation of youth,** including women/girls, in community mechanisms and dialogues for peacebuilding, as confirmed by different sources. In the Sahel region for instance, the project reports that "80 girls have benefited from the training and are now able to approach and advocate with administrative, local, customary and religious authorities to ensure their needs and aspirations are taken into account" (Final Report, June 2023). A KI stressed, however, that although youth is more visible, the change has been less significant than hoped for;
- the promotion of a **culture of tolerance and prevention of violence** through community dialogues, radio sessions/debates and enhanced youth capacities for communication and awareness raising (equipping 26 youth HRD with mobile journalism skills and kits). KIs indicated some got very motivated and have continued

to produce materials and experimenting on the techniques learned, although not necessarily on the project themes;

- **supporting victims of HR violations** getting access to legal aid; training 25 social workers on care for victims of gender-based violence and supporting medical care to 100 girls' victims; sensitizing and training rule of law personnel on their role and responsibilities in upholding HR and protecting the rights of HRDs; and training youth HRDs on the legal mechanisms and good practices for self-protection. There is, however, no clear evidence these activities have resulted in more effective protection.
- supporting the **resilience and economic autonomy** *o*f youth (125 girls and 125 boys) through entrepreneurship and management skills, and start-up kits. Interviewed officials indicated that some were not able to set up an activity and make use of the start-up kits because of the insecurity and displacement but confirmed the autonomy of many beneficiaries and the ensuing positive impact in terms of self-confidence and improved living conditions. Some hinted at a contribution to reducing the likelihood of some unemployed youth joining non-state armed groups.

Localization was the key enabling factor for implementation and results. Working with partner CSOs and youth organizations with a presence in the targeted regions was key for the project ability to work in the targeted regions and throughout the suspension of UN cooperation after the coup. The involvement of decentralized structures of the government in the regions was equally relevant for implementation and sustainability of results. Regional Directors of line Ministries in particular were instrumental in facilitating and adapting project activities and priorities to each regional context, helping find solutions to implementation challenges as they emerged; ensuring synergies with previous interventions; connecting the regional and central levels; and monitoring and accompaniment of youth beneficiaries/CBOs after closure of the project.

Some **weaknesses** may, however, limit longer-term results and sustainability. One relates to the **selection of beneficiaries**. Despite the criteria defined, some beneficiaries/CBOs did not meet the basic criteria, according to KIs interviewed, who noted their low level of capacity, education and the lack of basic knowledge on HR work. The targeting of beneficiaries was also complicated by the population displacements as the security situation worsened. Although this less selective targeting may have contributed to socialize HR work among other youth/CBOs, it is likely that this impacted results in terms of a stronger and sustainable core of young HRD. Another weakness or gap regards the near **absence of direct engagement of the project with the communities**, which some KIs consider would have been important to facilitate behavior change. **Cultural and religious barriers to GEWE** were also a serious obstacle to achieving gender parity in the project activities, especially in the rural areas – the project managed, nonetheless, to have 2/3 of women/girls' representation in general (and parity in a few activities).

2.4. Sustainability and ownership

> *EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?*

The project was designed, implemented and monitored with the involvement of CSOs and State authorities with the intent/expectation that they could capitalize on the project results and replicate/extend its benefits. KIs confirmed this close involvement at the central level as of the Concept Note and in the coordination structures. KIs also concurred on the close collaboration between RUNOs, CSOs and the authorities, especially with the Regional Directorates of the Ministries of HR, Youth and Women in the project locations, including in the needs assessment at the start of the project.

These institutional actors in the targeted regions have taken ownership of the project and continue accompanying at least some youth/CBOs beneficiaries and women/girls' victims, as confirmed by several stakeholders and interviews by the ET with some of these actors. The anchoring of the project in national policies on development, youth, Human Rights and GEWE and implementation plans should also favor **ownership and continuity**, especially as decentralized services remain in place and can capitalize on benefits from the project.

Several activities sough to promote **beneficiaries' agency** and continuity such as local action plans for youth participation in local peacebuilding mechanisms, training of local youth organizations on management and resource mobilization; and revenue generating activities starting kits. There are indications of youth beneficiaries

training other youth, using the communication skills acquired through the project trainings and tools, facilitating information sessions, and conducting sensitization in the communities on their own volition, but there is no concrete evidence of what the contexts of these were. According to one source in one of the regions, some 80% of youth that benefited from the starting kits under revenue generating activities continue with their activity, including women/girls, with positive impacts in their children's schooling and the women status in the family. The fact that these kits were effectively adapted to the needs of the beneficiaries was critical for the sustainability of its benefits.

The refurbishment of **infrastructures** like the three Multifunctional Centres will also stay and should be maintained by the local institutional structures. The security situation is, however, likely to strongly impact how much they will be used by the youth and the authorities. The shortcomings of the justice system (impunity, perceived absence of progress on the prosecution of HR abuse cases, difficult legal access) also have not incentivized trained youth HRDs to remain in the **CNDH monitoring and reporting system** of HR violations - only 20 have remained in the system at the time of the evaluation interviews). Another challenge is the **project duration**, considered too limited to consolidate and sustain results.

Interviews with KIs provided some indications that beneficiary **youth/youth-led organizations and platforms continue to be active** and are being mobilized for other projects, notably as their capacities have been strengthened and they have a good knowledge of their local contexts. The fact that the project also worked with youth beneficiaries/CSOs involved in other peacebuilding projects is likely to enhance sustainability of capacities. Some **partner CSOs** indicated they **remain engaged in the HR and peacebuilding themes**, taking a similar approach (e.g. youth individual development and economic autonomy; integrating information and sensitization on HR in other projects). The results of the project study on the specific situation of women HRDs, which highlighted the double challenges faced by these HR actors, is also likely to inform other RUNOs and CSOs interventions, as well as government attention to gender issues – it was frequently referred to by interviewed stakeholders as an 'eye opener'.

2.5. Coherence and coordination

EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?

The ProDoc laid out opportunities for synergies and complementarity with five UN PBF projects (e.g. relevant studies; capacitated youth in the same regions), and two projects by other UN and international partners (on Rule of Law, social cohesion, resilience), some in the same regions targeted by the JDDP project under the wider *Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso* (PUS-BF). Project documentation and KIs interviewed confirm the project brochures for the sensitization and information campaign on the Legal Fund were developed by another project, which the JPPD project translated into local languages of the regions targeted. KIs also confirm the project has capitalized on youth capacities built through those projects, and that working with already sensitized community leaders facilitated the project work towards more inclusive local peacebuilding mechanisms and integration of gender equality aspects. Conversely, the UNDP CoSED project in some of the same locations of the JDDP, working also with youth HR defenders, may be able to build on the project results, continuing accompanying stakeholders whose capacities have been strengthened through the project.

Having the UN PBF Secretariat in-country acting as the overall coordinator of UN PBF actions and in the PUS-BF has facilitated exploring synergies and complementarities. Decentralized State structure representatives also played a role in local coordination, ensuring no duplication and complementarities with other activities (e.g. complementing an earlier project by Expertise France on professional training, providing those youth beneficiaries with starting kits and integrating them professionally.

Regarding **internal RUNOs coordination**, KIs noted that their different procedures make the UN PBF requirement for more joint work/joint activities difficult. Revenue generating activities and providing starting kits were initially foreseen to be provided jointly but, because of diverse procedures, RUNOs opted for dividing up the regions between them. Notwithstanding, some activities were organized jointly, with separate budgets managed by each RUNO. Another difficulty regards competition over funding and leadership/visibility, although always discussed and resolved in the technical committee according to KIs. RUNOs recognize, however, the advantages of working jointly: they learn to work better together, strengthens cooperation between UN agencies, and evidences their respective expertise and added value.

2.6. Conflict sensitivity

EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?

The term is not mentioned in the main project documents, nor is there any clear reference to potential negative interactions of project activities on the context. Potential risks to project implementation were, however, identified and Do No Harm considerations integrated into the project planning and implementation, considering as well, the risks incurred by HRD/CSOs that are often a target of extremists, conservative communities/leaders and/or security forces (depending on what violations they denounce).

The project **monitored the evolution of the context** and of youth participation and took measures to protect the beneficiaries and project stakeholders from security risks, notably by: delocalizing some activities; transferring participants through alternative routes to minimize risks; and integrating of topics in the trainings of HRDs issues like urgency planning, self-protection good practices and gender sensitive data management to ensure data confidentiality. It also **took into consideration local sensitivities**, especially in rural communities where gender and HR themes often clash with traditional rules and practices, by taking a phased approach, starting with activities for girls only, sensitizing other youth, and then other actors to reduce risks for girls and for CSOs that work with them. Where that still risked generating tensions, the project withdrew, as was the case in one specific community.

2.7. Catalytic effect

EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?

Despite having attracted the attention of other donors to the situation and work of youth HRDs, the project helped leverage only limited new funding (100,000 USD, according to the Final Report of the project). Partner CSOs interviewed consider, however, that they may be able to capitalize on the reliable data and findings from the mappings studies to feed into new projects. Some RUNOs and CSOs continue, in any case, engaging in the project themes, taking a similar approach through other funding, including from UN PBF and other donors, and building on some results of this project (e.g. the UNDP project on WPS financed by the UN PBF to strengthen the capacities and role of women in the transition and peace-building process builds on elements of the JDDP).

The project had mainly **non-financial catalytic effects**, notably:

- The integration of project components or outputs in other projects (e.g. mobile journalism; findings of the study on women HR defenders are integrated in another UN PBF project);

"The [JDDP] project is a reference for the formulation of the capacity-building support project on the role of women and girls in the transition and peace-building process, particularly with regard to the involvement of women and girls in conflict prevention and management mechanisms, but also on issues relating to the care of women/girls who are victims of SGBV" (Final Report)

- Strategies of the project like the inter-generational dialogues are being applied to other domains (e.g. reproductive health and youth);
- Attracted the interest of other communities not targeted by the project;
- The inclusion of peacebuilding in the mandate of one of the RUNOs, facilitating implementing a humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus approach;

- Opened up new CS-Government Ministries collaboration (the case of a partner CSO with the Ministry of HR).

2.8. Innovation

EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

The project seems to be the first in Burkina Faso to **focus on Youth and Women HR Defenders/CSOs**, which all stakeholders consider was a clear added value of the project. Its attention to the additional challenges faced by women/girls HRDs highlighted in the mapping studies conducted by the project was valued. This specific focus led the Ministry of Human Rights to work with youth HRDs/CSOs for the first time. The focus on youth also enabled youth HRD/CSOs to engage with authorities on matters affecting their role and safety (e.g. radio programmes and community dialogues bringing together youth and community leaders; the dialogues between youth and security forces).

The training of youth HRD/CBOs on **data protection and management of gender sensitive data** to ensure data confidentiality was mentioned as a novel element. Furthermore, for some Ministries, the project provided a concrete example and model of how to build gender-sensitivity into activities. Several KIs confirmed there were at times more girls than boys in some activities (even if there was no gender parity in general) due to the project strategy to invite local authorities (mayors, provincial/regional directors) to accompany women beneficiaries to sessions held in the provincial capitals for security reasons (sometimes escorted by a military convoy), which gave parents/husbands more confidence to allow the girls to travel.

3. Good Practices and Lessons Learned

Several **good practices** can be identified in how the project was designed and conducted:
- Its design and the mapping studies' methodology was inclusive and participatory, which has contributed to the ownership of the decentralized services and CSO involved from early on.
- Authorities/decentralized state structures at local level were involved when the project was being formulated and kept informed of what it was going to do and their role in supporting the implementation of activities. Different KIs found this has significantly contributed to their ownership and allowed them to build relationships other projects can build on.
- Partnering with CSOs, including youth CSOs, that also had a presence in the regions (and at community level), and hence a good knowledge of the context and entry points for the local actors, which facilitated implementation and monitoring.
- Inter-generational dialogue between HRDs and associations working in the domain, which generated dynamics of collaboration and networking, and a critical mass of HR associations that future activities can build on.
- The project's phased approach to gender and HR given the local sensitivities and clash with customary/religious norms, especially in rural communities, starting with activities for girls only, sensitizing other youth and other actors subsequently, to reduce risks for girls and CSOs.
- The inclusion of self-protection good practices and of sensitive data management to safeguard confidentiality and Do No Harm in trainings for young HRD/CSOs.

Key lessons from the project, some of which are being integrated into new projects, include:
- Better factoring in the potential impact of context changes into project planning: new projects now identify backup areas in case the security situation deteriorates.
- The importance of involving religious and traditional leaders for promoting behavior changes – another UN PBF project under implementation is taking this lesson into account.
- Longer-term monitoring and sustained accompaniment of beneficiaries should be part of the strategic reflection of partnerships. While the project sustainability strategy considered the potential role of the decentralized Government structures in ensuring continuity, there is a need to consider if they have capacities and tools to continue the monitoring and accompaniment beyond the project duration, and factor that into the project planning.
- It was signaled by some KIs that it is easier/more effective to accompany youth that are part of organized structures (CSO, CBOs), compared to individual HRDs.

4. Conclusions

- **Relevance**

The project was relevant to the Burkina Faso context and its targeted groups (youth and women HR Defenders/CSO/CBOs), in a context of deteriorating security, mounting violence and shrinking civic space. A comprehensive general conflict analysis informed the ToC and the project design, which was a participatory and iterative process involving partner CSOs and institutional counterparts from as early as the concept note, and consultations in the targeted regions, which was a strength of the project. Mapping studies in the regions provided a specific needs assessment and analysis of local youth and HR CSO/CBOs that informed the selection of beneficiaries and the fine tuning of the project planning. Its approach was valid overall but required some adaptation in the face of unplanned events and deteriorating security situations.

- **Efficiency**

The project faced significant challenges and delays stemming from the deteriorating security and rising political instability that led to a temporary suspension of UN cooperation after the military coups. UN PBF flexibility (the five-month NCE granted and the possibility to adapt activities and targets) and productive partnerships with CSOs played a pivotal role in addressing these challenges.

- **Effectiveness**

Despite context challenges and weaknesses/gaps, the project implementation rate was overall satisfactory (over 80%) and contributed to some peacebuilding results. Youth HRD/CSOs developed their knowledge and understanding of legal tools and mechanisms for HR protection and monitoring; strengthened their capacities and economic autonomy; promoted greater youth and women participation in local peace mechanisms; and sensitized key local actors for a more enabling environment and protection of women victims of SGBV. Community dialogues with traditional leaders and security forces helped address generational divides and the role of youth and women HRDs in local conflict prevention and management mechanisms. These results also potentially contributed to implementation of YPS and WPS agendas in-country. However, there were mixed views on whether these effectively translated into increased space and meaningful participation of youth (and women) in local peacebuilding mechanisms. Cultural and religious barriers continue hindering GEWE results, although the project achieved a good rate of women/girl's participation in project activities. The project also had limited direct engagement with communities, which are key for behavior change.

Localization, through the role of partner CSOs and involvement of decentralization structures of the government, was a key enabling factor for project implementation, results and potential sustainability. The project has directly and unintentionally resulted also in a change of perception and more open attitudes in the HR/Justice Ministry towards working with CSOs, which has increased opportunities CSO-State cooperation in these thematic domains.

In the current political context, the project activities connecting CSO/HRDs with institutional actors charged with the protection of HR could effectively promote their protection or put them at greater risk.[187] The case of the youth beneficiary who was put in jail because he wrote on HR abuse by security forces is an example of the thin line walked by the project in the rapidly evolving context of Burkina Faso. On the other hand, strengthening the capacities and autonomy of youth CSOs/HRDs, and of CS in general, is even more important in the current context, especially in the absence of institutional checks and balances.

- **Sustainability and ownership**

The project has fostered ownership and engagement among key stakeholders. Institutional actors have actively participated in project activities, continue accompanying youth beneficiaries, and could potentially play a role in monitoring of results beyond the project closure. Youth HRD/CBOs benefits in terms of economic autonomy and capacities appear to continue, with some youth/CBOs training others on their own initiative, contributing to the national HR monitoring system and engaging in community-based peacebuilding activities. Some are mobilized for other projects initiatives, leveraging their enhanced capacities and local knowledge, while ensuring some

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[187] With a military junta governing the country, suspension of the Constitution and of the legislature, laws increasingly limiting freedom of expression, and in a climate of increased insecurity and violence linked to the fight against non-state extremist armed groups

continuity of accompaniment. Project studies may also inform future efforts and promote gender-sensitive HR work, with the potential to have some impact on peace and YPS and WPS agendas. The security and political situation may, however, substantially affect the sustainability of some results.

- **Coherence and Coordination**

The project effectively harnessed complementarities and synergies with UN PBF and other peacebuilding projects. The UN PBF Secretariat in-country played a critical role in that regard and in the coordination within the wider *Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel au Burkina Faso* (PUS-BF). Decentralized State structures avoided duplication and ensured complementarities with other activities. Within the project, differing procedures and competition between RUNOs over funding and visibility still limit joint implementation. RUNOs recognize, however, that it helps improving cooperation among UN agencies and showcases the expertise and added value of each.

- **Conflict-sensitivity**

Although conflict-sensitivity was not mentioned in the project documents, the project demonstrated a proactive approach in addressing potential risks and integrating "Do No Harm" considerations through the identification of risks to project stakeholders and adoption of protective measures, the active monitoring of the context and by considering local sensitivities (notably on GEWE).

- **Catalytic effect**

The project had limited success in attracting new funding but had some non-financial catalytic effects that may contribute to some lasting results, like the integration of project elements into other projects, attracting attention to youth HRDs/CSOs, collaborations between civil society and national institutions/Government entities, or the expansion of organizational mandates to facilitate a Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus approach within RUNOs with more humanitarian roles.

- **Innovation**

The project's unique focus on Youth and Women HRD/CSOs was a significant added value. It attracted attention to the challenges of this specific group and fostered collaboration between youth HRDs/CSOs and the Ministry of HR/Justice for the first time. Trainings on data protection and gender-sensitive data management was a novelty in the projects in-country.

5. *Recommendations*

- Involve local CBOs in the preparation of project planning for more realistic and adapted planning and targeting of project locations.
- Foresee some sort of budget 'reserve' for unplanned difficulties due to context changes.
- Accompany the beneficiary youth CBOs for a longer period or ensure continuity through other projects or actors.
- Involve religious and traditional leaders for greater effectiveness and sustainability, especially concerning promoting behavior changes in traditional communities.
- Consider integrating trainings and tools for the monitoring by local stakeholders post project (CSOs, LAs or decentralized government structures in the policy areas of concern), and feedback mechanisms to UN PBF secretariat/UN Resident Coordinator Office, in addition to UN PBF coordination and monitoring.
- Further incentivize RUNOs joint work/activities - possibly through financial rewarding when projects have at least two substantial joint activities.

6. *Annexes*

6.1. Methodology note

In addition to the main evaluation methods used for the whole cohort evaluation (documentary review and KIIs), other tools like the Most Significant Change and Interaction analysis were integrated into the methodology for this exercise. The ET relied on the documentation available in the MPTFO Gateway and additional documents provided by the lead RUNO. It complemented these sources with context and thematic analyzes from recognized

sources for an assessment by external/third-party sources unrelated to the project and the implementing partners.

Data collection was guided by the same evaluation criteria and questions defined for the entire cohort evaluative exercise, with the difference that interviews were focused on sub-questions under workstream 2, adapted to this specific project and context. The ET interviewed institutional/Government representatives at central and regional level, the UN PBF Secretariat in Ouagadougou, RUNOs and partner CSOs, including youth CSO.

The project evaluation had some limitations: the short duration of the exercise, its remote nature and the fact that the ET could not interview youth beneficiaries, despite efforts by local partners, due to availability of beneficiaries, language barriers and network connections. The ET also could not make use of existing media files with beneficiaries' experience/testimonies as these were in local language only.

6.2. List of stakeholders interviewed

KI category	Name	Position	Organization
UN PBF Secretariat	Abdoulaye FADIGA	M&E specialist	UN PBF Secretariat
RUNOs	Ms. Rokhaya PAQUITA	Project Coordinator	UNDP
	Thierry ZANGO	M&E specialist	
	Brice MILOGO	Governance expert	
	Ms. Nadine GHILATPARABELEM	Focal point for the project	UNFPA
	Dahomi BAHAN	Strategic coordinator	
	Daouda SAKO	Focal point, Protection	UNICEF
	Issa KONE	M&E expert	
CSO Partners	Maxime NIKIEMA		A2N – Nooden Nooto
	Ms. Brigitte YAMÉOGO	Project Manager	Mwangaza Action
	Ms. Agnes KABORE	Project Manager	CGD-Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique
	Ismael TRAORE	Executive Director	UNIJED Afrique (Youth NGO)
	Adama OUATTARA	Project Manager	
Institutional actors	Jean de Dieu BAMBARA	Former Director for Human Rights	Ministère des Droits Humains et de la Promotion Civique (MDHPC)
	Moussa TASSEMBÉDO	Regional Director for Youth, North Region	Ministère de la Jeunesse et de la Promotion de l'Entrepreneuriat des Jeunes (MJPEJ)
	Kouzodon BAH	Human Rights Advisor	Commission National des Droits de l'Homme-CNDH

6.3. List of Main Reference Documents

Project Documents

- ProDoc; NCE (July 2022);
- Project reports: semi-annual and annual narrative and financial reports 2021 and 2022; Final Report (June 2023) and
- Mapping reports: A2N and CGD reports of the CSO mappings (October 2021) and of the study on women HRDs (November 2021)
- Meeting reports of the "Cadre de Concertation" (February and November 2021)
- Annual Action Plans 2021 and 2022
- Communication pieces (brochure presenting the project; media pieces)

<u>Context and thematic sources</u>

ICG, *Maintaining Relations with Transitional Regimes in Bamako and Ouagadougou*, 12 May 2023 https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/wl-burkina-mali-spring-2023.pdf

Human Rights Watch, World Report 2023 – Burkina Faso (events of 2022) https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/burkina-faso

Belanger, C. ; Derenoncourt G ; and Landry, C.G. *State Fragility in Burkina Faso.* Analysis and Policy Brief. Carleton University, Fall 2020. https://carleton.ca/cifp/wp-content/uploads/Burkina-Faso-Fragility-Brief-2021.pdf

(GPI, Human Rights theme)

1. *Introduction*

    1.1.   Project objectives and context

In 2016, a peace agreement was signed between the Colombian State and the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), which established a framework for guiding peace actions in Colombia based on international studies of peace and conflict and the accompaniment of the United Nations Peace Mission. In this sense, the framework establishes that peacebuilding actions are strictly those focused on the root causes of the decades-old conflict; thus, the peace agreement establishes five priority peacebuilding points:

-   Rural reform and change in land tenure conditions in the Colombian countryside
-   Political participation: democratic openness to build peace
-   Demobilization of former FARC-EP soldiers and reintegration into civilian life
-   Solution to the illicit drug problem
-   Reparation of victims and truth and recognition of the facts of the conflict.

According to the monitoring reports five years after the signing of the Final Agreement, the peace agreement has not been fully implemented due to political changes and internal political polarization. The overall implementation status shows that 30% of the provisions are complete, 19% are in intermediate status, 37% in minimum status and 15% have not yet started implementation.[188]

The peace agreement was signed with only one of the different armed actors present in the country's territories, and their demobilization was not complete due to the lack of guarantees for the life of the demobilized, creating the FARC dissidences, and contributing to the continued actions of the ELN guerrilla group, as well as the associated paramilitary gangs that have been reported to be associated with the regular army of the State, drug trafficking gangs, and common criminal gangs strengthened by illegal economies.

During the development of the project, a phenomenon known as "social explosion"[189] occurred in Colombia. This consisted of a series of citizen protests in 2021 in all regions of Colombia against regressive policies of the government in power. This situation led to the closure of roads in the country; many national activities were paralyzed.

During the implementation of this Project, there was a change of the presidency. This did not affect project implementation but was used as an opportunity for advocacy on gender equality issues.

Project objectives

The overall Project goal was to 'strengthen the leadership and agency of women and LGBTQ+ people to address the barriers of discrimination, exclusion and violence undermining and limiting their participation in local and national peacebuilding,

The project had three outcomes:

-   **Outcome 1:** Women, LGBTQ+ people and communities promote a culture of non-repetition, trust and acknowledgement of gender-based violence.
-   **Outcome 2:** Women, LGBTQ+ people and youth have greater influence on decision-making over Development Programmes with a Territorial Focus (PDETs).
-   **Outcome 3**: There is increased visibility and engagement of women and LGBT people as advocates for the implementation of the FPA gender provisions.

The Project was implemented in Bogota as well as in four departments of Colombia: Chocó, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Putumayo. The four departments where the project was developed have historically been some of

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[188] IKroc, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2022), Five years after the signing of the Final Agreement: reflections from monitoring to implementation.
[189] https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protestas_en_Colombia_de_2021

the areas most affected by violence, and their status as territories on the periphery of the country makes their populations vulnerable in socioeconomic terms.

1.2. Methodology

The evaluation was 'light touch' and primarily included a secondary data review of official project documents from the UN PBF database on the project as well as additional documents from UN PBF (audio-visual materials and communication materials). Key informant interviews were also conducted with Christian Aid HQ and Colombia, RNM and CD as well as the MPTF Office in Colombia. The evaluation was also able to interview seven participants of project activities from the four departments. In total, it conducted 14 interviews with 17 persons. The evaluation was conducted by a local consultant, Mario Guerrero, supported remotely by the Cohort Evaluation Team.

Secondary data review began in late June with key informant interviews conducted during the first 3 weeks of July. Some interviews were conducted in person in Bogota while participant interviews were remote; contacts for participant interviews were provided by RNM and CD. As this project ended in November 2022, some staff had already left the local organizations; the evaluator was able to contact the most relevant personnel for the three main organizations.

The main limitation of the project comes from the potential bias in the participant interviews. The evaluator contacted those persons whose contacts were provided by the local partner. While they did represent a range of activities and geographies, ideally the evaluator would have had the ability to select participants independently. Regardless, participants were able to give detailed feedback on the activities and their roles - helping to meet the objectives of the light touch evaluation.

This note presents a summary of the main findings (per evaluation criteria) and learning, which have been integrated into the main report of the cohort evaluation. It provides some conclusions and recommendations that are specific to the project assessed.

2. Findings

2.1. Relevance

EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?

The Project is in line with the thematic focus of 2020 GYPI call - while officially focusing on GPI and human rights - in design and implementation it touched on both gender and youth as well as leadership and human rights themes.

The interventions are in line with the Theory of Change (ToC) oriented to the visibility and intervention of situations of gender-based violence. However, the route of change towards peacebuilding is not entirely clear in relation to what is established in the peacebuilding model derived from the 2016 peace agreement, as none of the structural causes of the conflict are targeted. In this sense, the actions established in this project are strongly oriented to all the themes of the PUN PBF 2020 call; the women's and LGBTQ+ human rights agenda was also established in the particular agendas of the three organizations in-country (CAC, RNM and CD) but weakly aligned to a peacebuilding agenda derived from a deep analysis of structural causes of the conflict. While this weak alignment is evident in the formulation of the proposal as presented in the ProDoc, the project's actions were oriented to specific elements established in the 2016 peace agreement, and thus generated localized peace impacts in some communities in the four departments.

Participants interviewed from the four local departments were very positive regarding the projects activities because of their relevance to the needs of the communities, especially women who have historically suffered from inequalities in Colombia and LGBTIQ+ people who seek social recognition of their rights. However, the participants mentioned that the duration of the actions was not relevant to objectives of achieving lasting impact.

Likewise, at the national level, the advocacy activities in political scenarios from a gender perspective were relevant, especially the advocacy carried out before the JEP defending specific cases of gender-based violence and the promotion of the macro-case of gender-based violence in the context of the armed conflict. In this way, the project activities were highly relevant and the interventions fit the logical pathways the ToC traced towards the recognition of the gender approach in political scenarios, and specific actions of the peace agreement.

With respect to the implementation of the conflict sensitivity approach, while CAC, RNM, and CD had worked previously with the target populations and therefore were aware of their needs and interests, the local organizations and participants themselves did not seem to be part of the assessment or design of the project. Hence, the ToC and subsequent analysis does not differentiate activities based on the differing contexts in each of the four departments but rather treated them as the same.

In the formulation of the project, the concept of diversity is simplified by associating it only with minorities, indigenous women, Afro-descendant women and LGBTIQ+ people. However, in the implementation, the project reflects an adequate level of diversity by emphasizing women and youth from historically disadvantaged populations in the four selected regions.

"As an Afro-descendant community it is the coming together between communities that have been violated. I believe that joining ties and braids between us is what has allowed us to strengthen actions to reduce the invisibility that we have as vulnerable populations". Afro LGBT social and youth leader participating in the memory laboratories in Cauca.

At the department level, participants interviewed noted the project did allow them to propose strategies and emerging activities aimed at making gender-based violence visible within its microgrants component, since it was the participants themselves who built their own project. Within the diploma course, participants interviewed did not note opportunities to give feedback or identify further peacebuilding opportunities given the lecture-based approach of the course. Participants interviewed from the psychosocial activities felt the identification of personal resilience and forgiveness activities helped inform reconciliation components, contributing to peacebuilding indirectly.

2.2. Efficiency

EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives ?

The project was able to reach the 100% of logframe objectives and meet or exceed all targets with a three-month no cost extension (which was due to external factors, namely COVID) and widespread protests). The project was efficient in the execution of resources, reaching 99% financial execution. KIs confirmed the overall efficiency of execution.

Efficiency in execution was in part due to the fact that the executing organizations (CAC, RNM and CD) created a non-hierarchical project management committee where the three institutions deliberated and could make decisions quickly. This allowed quick and efficient decisions to be made, even in the case of the expulsion of one of the organizations that was initially part of the project (at the beginning of the project there were four executing organizations); in this situation, the three organizations were able to quickly rethink the project while maintaining objectives, goals and coverage.

Local partners were essential in implementation. MPTF KI noted that the two chosen CSOs were very solid with widespread reach. Almost 70% of the project budget was allocated to activities executed directly by the local partners, exceeding the minimum threshold required by UN PBF.

Regarding Support and monitoring from UN PBF, the two CSOs (CD and RNM) reported no contact with PBSO but a KI from MPTF noted a visit from the programme officer in NY who went out with the MPTF M&E advisor to visit the programme at least once. Christan Aid did note that PBSO came to the Diploma ceremony closing but feedback was not mentioned. From the stakeholders interviewed, there seemed to be limited communication between the executing agencies and PBSO. There was a mismatch of expectations concerning coordination that was noted in the KIIs. CAC noted that there was no kick-off ceremony with PBSO or MPTF – as if they expected the donor to organize such an event. MTPF noted that this should have been within the capacity of CAC organize.

2.3. Effectiveness

> *EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?*

As the project does not start from these causes of the internal armed conflict in Colombia, nor does it take specific actions to influence these root causes, it is not possible to directly relate the project to the impact on the non-repetition of the armed conflict, and therefore its contribution to peacebuilding is indirect.

The project was able to establish a coherent and comprehensive structure of activities aimed at political advocacy with a gender focus and carried them out with a positive impact in the selected departments to address gender-based violence. Key activities included:

- Advocacy training - capacity building workshops for women leaders and young people under 20 years of age;
- Self-protection schemes for human rights defenders;
- Preventing gender-based violence through the implementation of the peace agreement, specifically on the point of political participation;
- Memory Festivals;
- Microgrants for small projects of the local organizations enabling them to develop their mission objectives while developing administrative capacities for planning and execution of activities and budget. One example is the theatre play "Juntanza por la diversidad y la justicia" (Togetherness for diversity and justice) by the organization Asoconstrumu of the organization Asoconstrumujer, from Putumayo;[190]
- Psychosocial support for women and LGBTIQ+ victims of the conflict

With these interventions, it was possible to broaden the scope and recognition of the gender approach in the implementation of some specific actions of the peace agreement and increase the visibility and impacts at national and regional level (in the four departments) of situations of gender-based violence. Examples of advocacy activities and some key results in gender visibility and equality at the national level include:

- A booklet of recommendations to strengthen the gender approach in the implementation of the peace agreement;[191]
- Advocacy with the national government to develop the participatory route for the elaboration of the National Action Plan of Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council to protect women's rights and promote their participation in the peace agreements.
- Interventions and contributions to the document CONPES 4080: "Public policy on gender equity for women: towards the sustainable development of the country"[192]
- An event with presidential pre-candidates to provide them with recommendations to strengthen the gender approach in the Peace Agreement.
- Follow-up to the participation of the Colombian State in the sixth session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).
- Contributions to the National Development Plan (2024-2026) from a gender perspective
- Participation of the new government's roundtables in the women's sector.
- Delivery to the new government of the document "Women propose 5 priority axes of public policy for a country of equality and freedom for the effective enjoyment of our rights.

The development of working networks was mentioned by some participants as a positive outcome of the project and that the dynamism provided by the project has been a catalyst for the creation of broader alliances in the territory.

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[190]   https://youtu.be/r1CZesbBszg   https://youtu.be/r1CZesbBszg   and   the   development   of   the   entire   project   at:
https://youtu.be/QiOqBu9nweE

[191] https://allanandocamino.files.wordpress.com/2022/12/gpaz_recomendaciones_candidatos_2021.pdf?force_download=true

[192] https://allanandocamino.files.wordpress.com/2022/12/comentarios-conpes-rnm.pdf?force_download=true

Funding and partnership with the INGO, CSOs and local organizations strengthened the agenda of RNM and CD; enhanced organizational capacities of the regional NGOs participating in the microgrants; promoted networking and seemingly lasting partnerships. Some participants noted that the Project increased the political advocacy and visibility of the LGBTIQ+ and women population in the departments which they felt was important because the national government does not promote projects for the political participation and recognition of such groups at the local level.

2.4. Sustainability and ownership

> *EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?*

According to CD and RNM, these two organizations have a long history in peacebuilding and already have a defined advocacy agenda on gender and gender-based violence issues. Thus, this project allowed them to maintain that agenda and expand it to some regions where they had not been present. At the national level, the project has allowed them to continue their advocacy work, especially with regard to the JEP (Special Justice for Peace), supporting specific cases and promoting the gender approach in restorative justice in Bogota.

The microgrants, as a strategy to strengthen local NGOs, also contributed to ownership and enhanced the capacity of location organizations. The microgrant element is a feature CAC replicated from its experience in a UN PBF-funded project in Myanmar. In Colombia, it achieved good results with strengthened capacity of local organizations in terms of hardware as well as increased skills and experience in project management.

Three local organizations reported raising some additional money enabling them to continue some of the work started within the microgrant (Red Mariposas, Red del San Juan, Orito Diverso).The participants also noted that activities in which they interacted with other participants of other local organizations helped them created networks of contacts and possible collaborations to continue with the activities or plan other types of actions in their territories.

Other participants of local organizations interviewed expressed their willingness to continue with the activities initiated, but it is clear that their continuity depends on access to resources, which are not easy to find (there are reportedly few sources of funding). All participants interviewed requested that additional funds be made available to give continuity to the project to continue the territorial dynamics built; although they generated capacities and created some new networks and experience, more work and support is needed given the challenges and dynamics in the regions.

2.5. Coherence and coordination

> EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?

In terms of coordination with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system involved in peacebuilding in-country, the ProDoc notes a long list of UN/UN PBF, MPTF, and other bilateral donor-funded projects that complement the work or otherwise informed the work of this project. Similarly, the ProDoc states that agreements were made with relevant government entities for the development of the activities. Two examples of strategic coordination involve the work done with the JEP and the participation of UN agencies in the Rowing Festivals .

Christian Aid Colombia, RNM and CD mentioned that the coordination of MPTF Colombia was absent during the first months of the project but that this improved after a change of the coordination structure of MPTF Colombia late in the project. According to CAC, MPTF was able to participate in the closing ceremony of one of the elements of the Project (the diploma course).

Interviews with MPTF noted that they are very stretched when it comes to coordinating with all the peace-building-funded partners, including those funded by UN PBF in New York. MPTF becomes aware of these projects only after they are approved by UN PBF NY; MPTF does not receive resources to monitor or support the UN PBF-funded projects though they do try to coordinate field visits and there was a mention of a joint UN PBF PO and MPTF field visit to the CAC Colombia project. Additionally, MPTF staff noted that they were also able to give feedback on the design of the project at the outset and they also followed up on some items at the request of

CAC; they would have preferred to have been more involved but that they are very thinly staffed and noted they have no extra resources to support UN PBF projects. The MTPF office does a two-day kick-off workshop for the projects they fund following a call for proposals. UN PBF projects are not included for the reasons mentioned. MPTF suggested that UN PBF could do a kick-off call with their funded projects at the regional or country level but that in this case, CAC was a large and well-capacitated organization and they should have had the resources they needed to launch the projects with their CSO partners.

In terms of coherence, there are two areas to evaluate: one is the specific to conflict of gender-based violence, and the second is the area of the Colombian internal armed conflict. Within the area of gender equality and gender-based violence, the evaluation found that the Project design is fully coherent - aligning the objectives, activities and results, tracing a clear path across the ToC.

In the second area, internal armed conflict, there is no conflict-sensitive analysis in the official documents on the relationship between gender-based violence and the conflict, so it is not adequately supported how this project is framed in the long-term transformation of the Colombian armed conflict and in the construction of a stable and lasting peace. There are some activities that respond directly to elements of the 2016 peace agreement, but no clear ToC is traced between structural causes of the conflict and the interventions of this project, which diminishes its capacity to generate lasting impact in Colombia, especially considering that one of the greatest problems of peacebuilding is the dispersion of efforts and the lack of consistency of the programs.[193]

1.1. Conflict sensitivity

EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?

Despite the mention of the Do No Harm approach and of an initial risk analysis, there is no evidence of strategies on the adoption of conflict-sensitive approaches by project participants, with the exception of the diploma course and the psychosocial support components.

Assessing the conflict sensitivity of the Allanado el Camino Project involves a context analysis of Colombia with regard to:

- the specific issue of gender-based violence. The project carried out an adequate analysis of the situation of gender-based violence in Colombia and, based on this, created a transformation route with specific actions that have a concrete impact on the visibility and social recognition of this type of violence and human rights violations. These are in line with the long-term transformation agendas of the three implementing organizations, which were able to strengthen their national strategic capacities in this regard by inserting the gender approach in restorative justice scenarios, in political debate and even public policy. In addition to these national advocacy actions, specific actions were developed in the four prioritized departments, which allowed the development of specific capacities of the participants and of 22 local organizations to promote their local work. In this way, the project is coherent between its analysis of the specific conflict of gender-based violence, the transforming route it proposed and the results obtained.
- Colombia's internal armed conflict. By focusing on gender-based violence in Colombia, the project acted on one of the multiple effects of the armed conflict (although not all gender-based violence in Colombia is a consequence of the armed conflict or perpetrated by armed actors), tracing an indirect route of impact for peacebuilding and combining it with actions aimed at transforming the gender inequality conflict in Colombia, which are not directly related to peacebuilding. This combination of objectives is evident in the survey applied by CAC (Annex 1) to project participants, in which they focus the attention of the participants on gender violence (question 3 "Do you approve of the struggles against violence against women and LGBT population?"), which is a very broad spectrum, and not on sexual violence

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[193] Redprodepaz & CLACSO -Briceño Muñoz, Luis Hernando; Torres Bustamante, María Clara;Córdoba Caviedes, Álvaro Francisco; Le Blanc, Joerg; Maldonado Castellanos, Diego Fernando- (2016). Construcción de desarrollo y paz: aprendizajes y recomendaciones desde los territorios, Bogotá

against women and LGBTI population, exercised in the framework of the armed conflict and as a military strategy.

The project's non-differentiated activities on the wider issue of gender-based violence in the four departments was not problematic because the gender inequality issue is relatively homogeneous throughout the territory of Colombia. A focus on sexual gender-based violence in the context of the conflict would have required differentiated activities depending on the impact of this type of violence on women's communities and the LGBTI population, in intersectionality with their ethnic condition (Afro-descendants, indigenous).

One of the components of the project was to achieve the articulation between historical women's organizations and LGBTQ+ organizations in the field of protection, in order to increase their capacities for the protection of their women leaders and defenders with the contributions they could make to each other; thus, a diagnosis of violence and political risks faced by women and LGBTQ+ activists in the prioritized territories was made, and based on this, each organization consolidated its plan for the prevention, protection and non-repetition of aggressions against women leaders and human rights defenders.

1.2. Catalytic effect

EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?

RNM and CD state that they have continued with their long-term work agenda, which includes activities that were part of the project and are still being carried out today, especially in Bogota. Thus, this project contributed to the continuity of each organization's agenda and generated a cooperative link between the three organizations in terms of advocacy on gender-based violence in Colombia.

The operative interaction between the three organizations generated long-lasting linkages through an alignment of the objectives enhancing political participation and the visibility of gender-based violence, based on the intersectionality between feminist and LGBTIQ+ work. In this regard, the project achieved important non-financial catalytic impacts in that it created new partnerships, expanded the work with the LGBTQI population and created new linkages with women's groups and increased collaboration between the two.

The program had significant financial catalytic effects. Following the success of this programme, Chrisitan Aid worked with Irish AId to obtain a 5-year, 6-country peacebuilding program (including Colombia) that built on the approach and lessons of this project. The Eu 17.4M (or US $18.4M) programme aims for marginalized women, men, people of diverse sexual and gender identities, and communities to claim their rights and hold power holders to account to address the root causes of inequality and conflict and to live in sustainable peace.[194]

1.3. Innovation

EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

The most important innovative approach of the project was the articulation between gender and LGBTIQ+ approaches that led to the configuration of a new intersectionality, which was implemented in all components and has allowed the consolidation of lasting relationships between the three organizations. To address the direct and structural violence suffered by women, especially Afro-Colombian and indigenous women and LGBTI+ people during the Colombian armed conflict, the project used victim-cantered memory and truth as tools to make this violence visible to the Colombian population and thus promote guarantees of non-repetition. The Memory Bazaars were carried out using artistic and community culture methodologies such as symbolic acts of memory and reconciliation, celebrating the participation of intergenerational and mixed groups. The participants of the Memory Bazaars recognized that there are other ways of making memory beyond the academic and institutional. These forms include the body, art and ritual.

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[194] CA Final Report: October 2022.

Due to the Memory Festivals,[195] the community learned how women and LGBTQ+ people are contributing to the construction of memory in the country in innovative ways, focusing on a challenging and promising future rather than a painful past, transforming them from passive victims of violence into resilient survivors and active peace builders.

3. *Good practices and Lessons Learned*

Good lessons emanating from the project include:

- The joint project coordination table made it possible to adjust the project after the departure of the fourth partner, and subsequently allowed for collective, agile and dynamic decision making, which resulted in project efficiency.
- Security schemes for participants from regions where the conflict is still active are very important.
- The CD psychologist interviewed noted that during the exercise of providing psychosocial care workshops in the four departments, she deepened her vision of the exercise and learned that psychosocial care is not only a psychological first aid intervention, but should include providing tools for participants to place the violent action they suffered in a given socio-historical and political context, as well as providing multiple tools for the management of the psychological effects derived from the trauma.
- The CD artist interviewed noted that more confidence is generated in the communities if the victims are not questioned as subjects of study, from a research perspective, but are included as active agents of change, decision-makers in their projects.
- CAC set a high standard for the documentation and preservation of project results when creating the project website.[196] The website contains a record of project activities, all the visual products as well as documents and testimonials from participants.

4. *Conclusions*

The project had a positive and significant impact on the political strengthening of the gender perspective in Colombia and especially in the (i) implementation of the gender perspective in some points defined in the 2016 peace agreement such as the political participation of women and LGBTIQ+ population in regional decision-making scenarios; (ii) the construction of collective memories of victims of the armed conflict and the recognition of these stakeholders as agents of change and peace builders; (iii) and the recognition of violence towards historically vulnerable groups and their inclusion in the transitional justice tribunals JEP. The project succeeded in strengthening capacities of resilience, self-protection and understanding of the Colombian internal armed conflict for participants in four departments of Colombia, as well as on the organizational and project implementation capacities of 22 local NGOs in the four departments. It also strengthened the advocacy agenda and national work of CAC, RNM and CD, organizations that had already been working on the visibility of gender-based violence in the country, giving them the opportunity to expand their reach and create lasting working relationships between the three organizations.

Based on a decent design, the project results aligned with the plan and were efficient and effective. There were significant, positive impacts on political advocacy from a gender perspective, and in the implementation of the gender perspective in some aspects of the 2016 peace agreement;

The project focused its objectives on an effect of the conflict (gender-based violence), but not on any of the structural causes of the conflict, according to the framework established by the 2016 peace agreement. For this reason, its impact in terms of peacebuilding in the broader context is not clear. This is due to the lack of an

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[195] A description of the festivals in each department can be found at: Chocó: https://allanandoelcaminounUN PBF.com/2022/12/09/choco-ritual-y-festival-cuento-de-agustina/; Cauca: https://allanandocamino.wordpress.com/2022/12/09/cauca-ritual-y-festival-resignificar-lugar/; Valle del Cauca: https://allanandocamino.wordpress.com/2022/12/09/valle-ritual-y-festival/; Putumayo: https://allanandocamino.wordpress.com/2022/12/09/putumayo-ritual-y-festival-rescate-lugar/
[196] https://allanandoelcaminoun.com/

adequate analysis of the relationship between gender-based violence and structural causes of the armed conflict as established by the conflict sensitivity methodology.

5. Recommendations

It is understood that UN PBF projects should be focused on peacebuilding, but in the case of this project it is not clear how it relates to the peacebuilding framework established in the 2016 peace agreement. This is due to weaknesses in the implementation of the conflict sensitivity methodology in the project formulation, and the lack of causal relationship with the structural causes of the conflict. In this sense, it is recommended that the UN PBF in coordination with MPTF, structures a unified orientation for the projects it finances, about what it means to build peace in Colombia by focusing attention on the root causes, in line with what has been established by the most important reports on violence in Colombia:

- Historical Commission of the conflict and its victims, 2015.
- Basta Ya Report, by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013.
- 2016 peace agreement
- Final Report of the Truth Commission of 2023).

The methodology of conflict sensitivity establishes starting from a responsible and careful analysis of the historical and social context before carrying out any type of interventions. The history of violence in Colombia and recommendations and lessons for its transformation are given in the reports mentioned above, which have already outlined a route for peace building. Thus, it is recommended that the UN PBF channel its projects along this route, advising the projects with a group of experts to adequately identify the relationship of the objectives of each project with the structural causes of the Colombian conflict, thus ensuring that they will be projects that have an impact on the construction of a stable and lasting peace and the non-repetition of the conflict.

It is also important to keep in mind that the structuring of a unified orientation for UN PBF projects in Colombia is necessary to avoid continuing to promote the wide dispersion of peace project efforts in the country, which minimizes social impacts.[197] Currently, there are many peace projects scattered throughout Colombia that impact small groups of people for whom it is a useful but temporary aid that later has no continuity and is a factor that generates new uncertainty and a feeling of new "oblivion and abandonment" (as stated by project participants in their interviews). Therefore, a unified orientation on the part of the UN PBF to its projects in Colombia, through a group of experts in the Colombian conflict and conflict sensitivity methodologies, would provide consistency in the formulation and alignment of objectives with the peacebuilding framework.

Finally, greater efforts are recommended to network UN PBF projects in Colombia to maximize their impact, and to share with each new project team the experiences of previous projects and lessons learned. Considering that the organizations are more focused on the implementation of activities and budget execution, it is suggested that the MTPF/UN PBF contribute to the projects with specialized advice on conflict sensitivity, do no harm approaches and conflict transformation, which would consolidate conceptual uniformity on peace building to all projects, maximizing the impact.

6. Annexes

3.1. List of stakeholders interviewed

KI category	Role	Organization	Department	Activity	Notes
Beneficiaries and/or local CSOs/CBOs	Participant	Butterfly Network	Buenaventura	Psychosocial support	Interview 1
	Participant		Putumayo	Microdonations	Interview 2
	Participant		Chocó	Microdonations	Interview 3

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[197] Redprodepaz & CLACSO p.17, 77, 80

	Participant		Chocó	Diploma	Interview 4
	Participant		Valle del cauca	Diploma	Interview 5
	Participant	Orito Diverse	Putumayo	Psychosocial support	Interview 6
	Participant - staff		Cauca	Diploma	Interview 7
Partner CSOs	Staff	Colombia Diverse	Valle del cauca	Memory	Interview 8
	Staff	Colombia Diverse	Putumayo	Psychosocial support	Interview 9
	Staff	Colombia Diverse			Interview CD
	Staff	National Women's Network			RNM Interview
Fund Recipient	Staff	Christian Aid Colombia			Interview CAC
	Staff – 3 persons	Christian Aid (Colombia and HQ)			staff
MPTFO	Staff – 2 persons	MPTFO Colombia	Colombia		Interview with 2 staff

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(YPI, Leadership theme)

1. Introduction

1.1. Context of the project

Since 2012, Mali has experienced political and security instability, further exacerbating the country's development challenges. Armed political groups and ethnic movements, jihadist groups and organized crime networks seek to control parts of the territory and the trafficking routes in the northern part of the country. The instability in Mali has spilled over into other countries in the Sahel, exacerbating vulnerabilities and furthering instability and security risks in the region.

In June 2015, a peace and reconciliation agreement was signed between the Malian government and an alliance of rebel groups in northern Mali - Platform and Coordination of the Azawad movements (CMA). The agreement aims to re-establish peace in Mali mainly through a process of decentralization or regionalization, the reconstitution of a national army from members of the former armed groups signatories of the agreement, and the revival of the economy (particularly in the north), based on dialogue, justice and national reconciliation. However, it remains difficult to implement, and acts of violence continue to be perpetrated by both sides, and by jihadist groups and government-allied foreign fighters. Following the coups of 2020 and 2021, the military took control of the government. Relations with certain allies have deteriorated considerably since then. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is in the process of withdrawing from the country at the request of the Malian authorities.

With a predominantly young population (around 60% of the population is under the age of 25), young people in particular are subject to a number of social, economic and security challenges that hamper their participation in the governance of the country, including in the peace and reconciliation process. From the outbreak of the crisis in 2012 to the present day, young people have played various active roles with armed groups, often as informers, fighters and logisticians. But they have also been victims of human rights violations. Despite the different roles that young people have played in the conflict, and the fact that they are perceived by many as a threat to peace and security, the participation of young people in the ongoing peace process in Mali remains limited.

1.2. Project Objectives

The aim of this project, implemented between February 2021 and February 2023, was to contribute to reconciliation and the establishment of lasting peace in Mali by supporting the participation and consideration of the voice of the country's young women and men (aged 15-30) in the continuation of the transitional justice process foreseen in the 2015 agreement. To this end, the effective participation of young women and men in Mali is essential.

The main intended results of the project were that young women and men in Mali feel involved and able to make their voices heard in the transitional justice processes provided for in the peace agreement (R1); and the active participation of young women and men in the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and in the dissemination of its results will enable young people in Mali to take greater ownership of this process (R2).

1.3. Project targeting and main partners of the project

Financed by the UN PBF (US$1,500,000), the project was developed and implemented jointly by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF, coordinating agency), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the INGO Avocats Sans Frontières Canada (ASFC). Several state and civil society partners were consulted and involved: youth organizations, victims' associations, universities,[198] the CVJR, ministries and regional

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[198] *Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques* in Bamako, the Ségou Université, *Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers Multimédia Balla Fasséké Kouyaté.*

directorates,[199] other state institutions at central and regional level, local authorities and other decentralized services.[200] The main civil society partners were the *Conseil Consultatif National des Enfants et des Jeunes* (CCNEJ, a platform for youth organizations), the *Association des Enfants et Jeunes Travailleurs* (AEJT), the *Compagnie Dankun* (CIEDANKUN) and *Action pour la Promotion des Jeunes et Enfants Communicateurs* (APJEC) and other youth organizations such as the *Tribune des jeunes pour le Droit au Mali* (Trijeud) in Gao, the *Réseau des jeunes pour une justice transitionnelle inclusive au Mali* (R2JTIM) in Timbuktu; the *Association Noyau dur* (AND-Mali, specialising in transitional justice); Democracy Tech Squad/Fondation Tuwindi (a nationwide network of young web-activists), AIESEC (a university students' association in Bamako and Ségou).

Many of the project's activities were conducted at national level, thanks to the institutional anchoring of the partners: the CVJR has its headquarters in Bamako and branches in the regions; the CSOs all have networks covering several regions. The communities more specifically targeted are mainly displaced persons in Bamako and surrounding areas, as well as young people, who are vulnerable and more excluded from political dialogue in the regions of Ségou, Mopti (Bankass, Koro, Douentza and Bandiagara), Gao (Gao, Ansongo and Bourem) and Timbuktu (Timbuktu, Goundam and Diré), thanks to collaboration with grassroots organizations and universities in these areas.

1.4. *Methodology and overview of Summary Note*

The project evaluation is a light-touch exercise carried out by a local consultant in Bamako, accompanied remotely by the ET, over a period of approximately seven days during July and August 2023. The objective was to gather information from the original sources and the views of the various stakeholders involved in the project in order to complement and triangulate the data extracted from the review of the project documentation. The evaluator conducted 12 key informant interviews with 12 people representing the different categories of stakeholders (the UN PBF secretariat, RUNOs, ASFC, CVJR, youth associations, the University of Legal and Political Sciences, etc.). There was a focus group with the *Association Noyau Dur de la Justice Transitionnelle* (AND)-Mali. Most of the interviews took place face-to-face in Bamako. Others were conducted online, especially with the beneficiary partners in the Gao and Timbuktu regions, which allowed the ET to gather useful information that complemented the documentary analysis. The full list of KIs interviewed, documentary sources used and additional information on the methodology are provided in section 6 (annexes).

This note is a summary of the main findings (per evaluation criteria) and learning, which have been integrated into the main report of the cohort evaluation. It provides some conclusions and recommendations that are specific to the project.

2. *Findings*

2.1. *Relevance*

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[199] The Ministries and Regional Directorates (in the target regions) for Social Cohesion, Peace and National Reconciliation (supervisory Ministry for the CVJR and lead institutional partner for the project); for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family; for Justice, Human Rights; and the Regional Directorates of Social Development and Solidarity Economy. The project also involved the Ministries of National Education; Higher Education and Scientific Research; Youth and Sport; and Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
[200] Prefectures, sub-prefectures and town halls.

The thematic focus on Youth Leadership is important in Mali because young people make up more than half the population. They have played a visible role, both as actors and as victims; there can be no peace without young people. The 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement provides for transitional justice mechanisms to which the project aimed to contribute, and more specifically to the work carried out by the CVJR, as it is a mechanism that is intrinsically centered on victims and civil society, and whose potential for including young people is great but still largely untapped.

The project addressed two root causes of the lack of inclusion of young people in the transitional justice process, on the one hand by (i) strengthening youth organizations and the capacity of the CVJR to raise awareness among young people and, on the other hand, (ii) ensuring greater inclusion of young people, and in particular young women, in the work and decisions of the CVJR.

The project also contributes to the implementation of Resolution 2250, which states that young people "can play an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, particularly with regard to stabilization, integration capacity and the success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities". The African Youth Charter (article 17) also calls on member states to strengthen the capacities of young people and youth organizations in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution through the promotion of intercultural education, education in civic-mindedness, tolerance, human rights, democracy, mutual respect for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, and the importance of dialogue, cooperation, responsibility, solidarity and international cooperation.

The project's target intervention areas are highly relevant, as they concern the main regions of the north and center, plus the district of Bamako, where the majority of internally displaced people and victims of the conflict are located.

The choice of UNICEF, UNDP and ASFC is appropriate in view of their **experience in the project's areas of intervention, thematic expertise** and the diversity of their status. Since 2014, in collaboration with partners on the ground, UNICEF has been implementing projects financed by the UN PBF, which have contributed to stability, peacebuilding, and strengthening social cohesion in Gao and Timbuktu and more recently in Mopti and Ségou. Since 2018, it has also been providing direct technical assistance to the CVJR through the provision of an expert. The UNDP has been present in Mali since 1978 and has a specific mandate in the area of governance and strengthening the rule of law. It also has extensive comparative expertise in transitional justice issues. ASFC has been active in Mali since 2012 and has been supporting the CVJR since 2017, in particular by providing expertise.

The project emerged from consultations with the "Cadre de concertation des organizations d'enfants et des jeunes pour l'implication des enfants et jeunes au processus de justice transitionnelle et de la CVJR". This is a group of around fifteen organizations launched at the end of 2019 by the CCNEJ, with the support of UNICEF. This group has benefited from capacity building on transitional justice as well as on project development methodologies with the aim of being able to contribute to the implementation of this project. Civil society youth organizations (Trijeud in Gao, R2JTIM in Timbuktu and AND-Mali in Bamako), AIESEC (an organization made up of students from Malian universities, chaired by a student), and Democracy Tech Squad/Fondation Tuwindi were closely involved in the identification and various phases of developing and implementing this project. However, the final study of the project highlighted the **lack of representativity of the organizations** involved in the consultation framework. Furthermore, KIIs revealed that youth CSOs did not have an overview of the project beyond their region and were not aware until a later stage of other CSOs involved beyond those ones in their group, which questions to what extent they were effectively involved in the project design.

2.2. Efficiency

All three fund recipients are well-established organizations in Mali with a good reputation with the government, youth organizations and local populations. This has enabled them to work with institutional partners and youth

organizations, but also to adapt to the volatile security situation. All three applicant partners worked downstream with several youth organizations, most of which they assisted and trained to act as torchbearers for their peers. Partnerships with most CSOs and other local partners were thus formalized and running on time without any particular problems.

The duration of the project was initially 18 months but was extended by 6 months. The departure of the project manager, the delay in disbursement which affected certain activities, the security situation, the COVID 19 pandemic and the instability in the department in charge of peace and national reconciliation caused delays in the implementation of the project. The rate of achievement of project outputs was affected by the end of the CVJR mandate in December 2022 and the delay in the publication of its report - some planned activities were linked to the publication of this report, which did not take place (3 out of 16 indicators); other indicators (six) lacked final data; nine target indicators were achieved or exceeded.

All the members of the consortium have made financial and human resources available for the successful implementation of the project. The financial resources granted to the local partners are estimated at more than 45% of the overall funding granted by the UN PBF. Youth organizations and other partners have mobilized human and financial resources for the project.

2.3. Effectiveness

> EQ3. To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?

The project has achieved most of its results, namely information, support for the CVJR and legal assistance, according to the various sources interviewed. The UNDP-SIPRI survey provided the basic data for the results indicators, in addition to other opinion surveys and studies carried out by the project[201].

Young people who were less involved before the project are now involved in the transitional justice process and in peacebuilding in Mali, and some remain committed. According to the UN PBF Mali secretariat, the project has contributed to the consolidation of peace in Mali. However, the implementation of the Algiers Agreement - and therefore transitional justice - still faces major challenges given the recent resumption of hostilities between the Azawad coalition and the military authorities.

- *Capacity-building for youth CSOs.*

The project has made considerable progress towards building the capacity of young women and men to participate in transitional justice mechanisms, particularly in the work of the CVJR, whose mandate ended in December 2022. The youth CSOs claim to have been strengthened in transitional justice issues, data collection and the conduct of surveys, as well as in organizational development, project management and logistics. The beneficiaries learned about the CVJR, peace and reconciliation mechanisms, the importance of starting from declarations, reparation mechanisms, having real information, having partners, raising questions, having psychologists, and peer sessions.

Many of the activities were carried out by young people. In this way, the project has enabled youth organizations to be more autonomous and develop their own activities. Thanks to the coaching activities carried out by the project, these young people have been able to carry out their own activities with their peers: they have designed and carried out "more than a hundred micro-projects focusing on transitional justice and youth involvement, and have thus been able to express their needs, expectations and perceptions. It also raised the profile of youth associations, partners and the UN PBF. Following the end of the CVJR's mandate, the DNPFEF and the *Cadre de Concertation des Organisations d'Enfants et Jeunes* worked together to build the capacity of twelve member organizations of the cadre and 61 beneficiaries (27 women/6 girls) of micro-projects in Timbuktu, Gao, Bamako and Mopti. Overall, the beneficiaries interviewed said that the project added value to their organizations both in terms of their knowledge and work organization and in terms of the results produced, these beneficiaries see a clear positive change thanks to the project.

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[201] U-Report survey (https://mali.ureport.in/opinion/4923/) and an ASFC study (annual report, October 2021)

- *Gender sensitivity*

The activities of the partner CSOs, which addressed certain themes in single-gender groups in order to facilitate, at least initially, young women and girls speaking out, enabled young women survivors of sexual violence to share their experiences within their community and to realize that they are not alone.

- *Participation of young people in the transitional justice process*

The youth CBOs supported under the project have acquired practical experience and a detailed understanding of the issues involved in transitional justice, which has equipped them to engage with these mechanisms and participate in the process. Whether through their support for the CVJR's mandate, their recommendations for its final report and for the successor bodies, or more broadly through their activities in favor of social cohesion and peace, these youth organizations have been able to mobilize and be mobilized for peaceful coexistence between the populations and constructive dialogue with the State.[202] However, one key activity - the multi-stakeholder forum involving members of the consortium, youth organizations, state partners including the Ministry of Reconciliation and the CVJR - which should have enabled the recommendations made by young people to be taken into account, could not be carried out due to the end of the CVJR's mandate and the unavailability of the state. Nevertheless, local activities and surveys were carried out to make recommendations which were shared with partners.

- *Information and communication support for the CVJR*

The project supported the CVJR in terms of information and awareness-raising. It helped the CVJR institutions to communicate more effectively with young people. For example, artistic products related to the conclusions of the CVJR (film, documentary film, photo exhibition) were produced and given to the CVJR and the Ministry for National Reconciliation (MRN).

Thanks to the project, the CVJR is known on social networks. An evaluation questionnaire (1st quarter 2022) was sent to 30 young victims, including 15 women consulted as part of the study on young people's participation in the peace and reconciliation process to assess the real impact of the project on their lives. In response to the question "What did your participation in this survey bring you?" 58 per cent of the young people questioned said that their participation had enabled them to be more open to the transitional justice process and to learn more about the peace process".[203]

- *Interactions: between partners and with institutional players*

Interactions between CSO partners in the implementation of the various activities have helped to strengthen links between youth organizations and to share expertise and experience. Some KIs signaled, however, that there was limited communication between youth CSOs working with different RUNOs; those from the same partner were in contact with their counterparts but were not in direct contact with other organizations from other partners at the start of the project. It was only towards the end of the project that some realized other youth organizations had the same missions in different areas, which would seem to reflect a lack of knowledge or information sharing about the project as a whole.

Collaborations between CSOs and the CVJR, local authorities, and public and private universities in Bamako, Ségou, Mopti and Gao have enabled joint activities to be carried out. In particular, the project has supported the operationalization of a legal clinic at the University of Legal and Political Sciences in Bamako and the development of training modules in practical law and transitional justice, which has made it possible to include this training at bachelor's and master's levels and to conduct training on transitional justice and the CVJR's mandate for youth CSOs, which have subsequently been able to conduct talks in grassroots communities.

- *Main factors in project effectiveness*

The relevance of the players involved in implementing the project in areas they know well and the upstream consultation carried out in the design of the project were factors positively affecting project effectiveness. The UN PBF secretariat supported the partners from the beginning to the end of the project with high-quality

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[202]According to the project documents and confirmed by other sources
[203] Annual Report 2022, p.13

guidance. They state that the guidance was useful before and during the implementation of the project. The consortium partners report good collaboration with the UN PBF secretariat, the head office and also between consortium members. This made it possible to have a coordination framework for the implementation of the project. Each consortium partner has also established good communication with the partner CSOs that they support.

A number of challenges limited project effectiveness:

- Some activities were not carried out because the CVJR report was not made public;
- The security situation limited participation because of the fears of young people and the community when it comes to justice (final study of the project);
- There were questions about the representativeness of the project's partner youth CSOs, according to the project's final study (i.e. young people from informal organizations in the target regions who do not meet again in the project's partner CSOs).

2.4. Sustainability and ownership

EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?

UNICEF, UNDP and ASFC worked upstream with several youth organizations, most of whom they assisted and trained to act as torchbearers for their peers. The youth associations involved in implementing the project, who are both beneficiaries and actors, and the other implementing partners guarantee the sustainability of the project. Their organizational and thematic capacities have been strengthened and they continue conducting activities, raising awareness and advocating on behalf of victims.

- *Products that continue to be used*

Youth organizations indicate that they have maintained links established with the youth beneficiaries they sensitized; they have been able to present what they have produced under the project to the government. The legal clinic supported by the project is still operational, with permanent staff from the University of Legal and Political Sciences/Faculty of Private Law and will continue to build the capacity of young academics, particularly through the modules on transitional justice developed by the project. Similarly, the dissemination of artistic information products about the CVJR will be able to continue after the project, particularly through the CVJR's successor body, which has now been appointed. This will enable future generations to learn more about the historical events in their country and thus help to ensure that these violations are not repeated.

- *Youth CSOs collaborations with transitional justice actors continue*

The last project activities aimed to include the voice of young people in the reparations policy and to take their needs into account within the successor bodies. These activities will be all the more successful because of the strong experience acquired by youth organizations, which will be able to mobilize them because they are better equipped and able to create lasting change in their communities. Mobilizing young people, enabling them to acquire knowledge, share their opinions and create value among themselves by strengthening their voices, are tangible benefits that the project has been able to generate, and which will sustain its action. At present, the youth CSOs that benefited from the project are invited to meetings with the management authority for reparations to victims of the Malian crises, which has replaced the CVJR. The expertise of the youth organizations involved in the project is now recognized by the government.

2.5. Coherence and coordination

EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?

- *Alignment with UN action in Mali, in terms of both strategic and thematic priorities.*

The project is in line with the priorities of the Integrated Strategic Framework of the United Nations System in Mali (ISF 2019-2021), particularly on the rule of law and security; social cohesion, conflict prevention and reconciliation and human rights; and priority axis 1 of the United Nations Cooperation Framework for Sustainable Development in Mali (UNSDCF 2020-24) and its Effect 2, which aim to strengthen national reconciliation. The project is also in line with MINUSMA's strategy for the Centre regions adopted in December 2018, particularly through the promotion and protection of human rights axis linked to the strengthening of justice and reconciliation, to combat impunity and facilitate the establishment of a safe environment conducive to rapid and effective humanitarian action. It also forms part of the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Youth in Mali, which is currently being finalized, and of the G5 Sahel's Integrated Youth Strategy, which aims to build peace and security through participatory governance involving young people as agents of peace and development. The project has indirectly supported the operationalization of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 2250 and 2535, by promoting the participation and active role of girls and women in transitional justice and peacebuilding.

- *Complementarity with UN PBF support in Mali*

The project is fully in line with the UN PBF's portfolio in Mali, which places particular emphasis on women and young people. It is linked to initiatives supporting the participation of young people in the peace process (e.g. UNICEF-FAO 2019-2020) and the inclusion of women in the transitional justice process (IRF 105,146). It complements the "Integrated approach to combat impunity and improve access to justice in central Mali" project implemented by the OHCHR, UNDP, UN Women and Interpeace, as the latter does not include support for the transitional justice process. In addition, the project strengthens the UN PBF's gender agenda by complementing the project "From Victims to Actors for Peace: Strengthening Women's Participation in Implementing the Peace Agreement and Improving Social Cohesion" implemented in Timbuktu and Gao by UN Women, UNFPA and MINUSMA and capitalizing on the project "Jeunesse Alafia: Actions des jeunes en faveur de la consolidation de la paix inclusive et de la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent" implemented by ACORD/CNJ in several regions including Timbuktu and Mopti".

The project is complementary to the joint UNDP-UNFPA project "Youth and Peace: A Cross-Border Approach between Mali and Burkina-Faso". It is based on the achievements, good practices and lessons learned from this project and the joint UNDP-FAO-UNIFEM project "Jobs and Youth for Peace - An Integrated Pilot Approach to Stabilization and Peacebuilding through the Promotion of Youth Employment and Participation in the Mopti Region".

- *Difficulties in the coordination with and ownership by the authorities*

A technical committee was set up, but the steering committee was unable to meet throughout the project. The steering committee would have provided a relevant framework for addressing the recommendations made by the young people. Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and National Reconciliation officials were not available, possibly also due to changes in leadership within the Ministry. Questions remain, however, as to whether the authorities have taken ownership of the project, despite the good collaboration with the CVJR. The recent announcement of the creation of the body for reparation with the continuity of the same leadership that led the CVJR indicates, however, that the issue of transitional justice remains on the government's agenda.

2.6. Conflict sensitivity

> *EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?*

The project has used local partners (government and NGOs) who are less subject to security constraints, while investing in information, awareness-raising and sensitizing local communities to the project's objectives and approaches. It has benefited from security measures taken by MINUSMA and by state partners to avoid putting project participants and staff at risk. It maintained continuous contact with the new government through the Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and National Reconciliation. During the implementation of the project, the project stakeholders were regularly informed of the risks in order to adapt the project accordingly.

The proactive involvement of young people as part of the response plan for COVID-19 is seen as an opportunity for the project to support young people further. Youth organizations have carried out consultations and disseminated messages with the aim of providing peer-to-peer community psychosocial support in this crisis context.

2.7. Catalytic effect

EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?

Various sources confirm the significant financial and non-financial catalytic effects.

- *New funding ensures continuity of thematic work*

Since last June, ASFC has been implementing its 5-year Justice and Peace project (JUPAX), which will work on peace and reconciliation issues in Bamako, Timbuktu and Gao, among other places. AMC-GAC (Affaires Mondiales Canada-Global Affairs Canada), with funding of 18 million Canadian Dollars - US$14 million.

There has also been a catalytic financial effect for the partners. The *Association Noyau Dur* (AND-Mali) and the *Réseau des jeunes pour une justice transitionnelle inclusive au Mali* (R2JTIM) recently received funding from the Africa Transitional Justice Legacy Fund (ATJLF) for "improving citizen participation in the transitional justice process", thanks to the activities they carried out as part of this project.

- *Non-financial catalytic effects for CSOs*

In terms of the partners' ability to implement the project, the positive effects of their participation in the project have already been observed. In addition to the funding obtained by some of the organizations, the partner CSOs are more autonomous, and are beginning to interact more directly with the CVJR or other players such as the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH). Sometimes the effects can also be seen at an individual level, with one of the respondents to the youth study, for example, gaining a job opportunity as a result of his participation in data collection. In addition, the expertise and role of youth CSOs is now recognized by the transitional justice institution that succeeded the CVJR.

2.8. Innovation

EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

The project has enabled young people to participate in the transitional justice process in their country by allowing them to be at the heart of awareness-raising about the mechanisms. It has enabled the opinions and expectations of young people to be effectively considered in the ongoing work of the CVJR, and also in the drafting of its recommendations, which will guide a series of reforms and policies in the future. This specific focus is an added value of the project. The innovation consisted of a structural rapprochement between civil society organizations, universities, and transitional justice mechanisms, in particular the CVJR, in order to get young people involved.

The project has enabled integrated approaches to youth reintegration to be piloted by CSOs working together. This is the case with the combination of economic reintegration efforts (carried out by a UNICEF partner NGO as part of other funding) with social reintegration by peers from the Association des Enfants et Jeunes Travailleurs. Analyzing the life projects of these teenagers several months after their reintegration will show whether such approaches deserve to be scaled up.

3. Good Practices and Lessons Learned

Several *good practices* can be identified in how the project was designed and conducted:
- The project's approach to having youth CSOs organize and lead on activities. It enabled youth organizations to gain the skills they need to develop their own interventions and carry out actions using new tools adapted to Mali (social networks, artistic activities, etc.). The organizations were equipped to mobilize and raise awareness, including among young survivors of human rights violations.

- A *focus on gender and adapted approaches:* The initiative took particular account of the voices of young women, who suffer greatly from conflicts and are even more under-represented than young men in decision-making mechanisms. The approach has been to initiate dialogues that engage key stakeholders and in particular young women who are victims of conflict. It has adopted appropriate approaches to discuss issues of sexual violence against girls who are victims of conflict, which have enabled them to speak out and facilitate support for the victims.
- *The partnership with the universities* enabled transfer of knowledge on transitional justice by the youth at school who then carried out sensitization activities with peers. The training programme offered to law students also facilitated the socio-professional integration of young graduates who have had the opportunity to be in contact with remote populations and their needs in terms of legal assistance.
- *The implementation of micro-projects*, especially in the sites of displaced persons, using image boxes which were simpler and more accessible for the beneficiaries. This facilitated young people's comprehension of justice; they also made image boxes to show their vision of peace and the fight against impunity.

4. Conclusions

The project has achieved the majority of its results, namely information provision, support for the CVJR and legal assistance, and has promoted the involvement of young people in the transitional justice process and in peacebuilding in Mali.

The project has strengthened youth CSOs organizational capacities and thematic knowledge on transitional justice. It helped them structure internally and acquire working and communication materials that will enable them to continue carrying out awareness-raising activities and possibly adapt to evolving socio-political circumstances. It has also raised the profile of youth associations and partners, which has helped catalyze additional funds for one of the Fund Recipients, but also for youth CSO partners, enabling them to extend their activities to other areas.

The activities carried out by the project were relevant. Targeted youth as well as the CVJR have taken some ownership. At least some youth CSOs continue engaging on the issue, working together and with the transitional justice mechanisms. Although the CVJR report was not published before its mandate ended (December 2022), the beneficiary youth CSOs continue advocating on behalf of victims with the authority responsible for managing reparations for victims of the Malian crises that replaced the CVJR.

However, the project duration was deemed too short for more significant impact, and its implementation was affected by the government's political agenda, which moved at a slow pace.

5. Recommendations

Given the issue and nature of the process supported by UN PBF, it is advisable to have a longer project duration (around 3 years) or a possibility of renewal after tangible results have been achieved. Other issues for consideration in future projects include:

- Not to link the project to a political agenda, as there are challenges in engaging the government
- Provide more revenue generating activities for victims and emphasize empowerment of young people
- Involve informal youth associations at local level to ensure greater inclusivity and effectiveness, by facilitating access to segments of young people that formal youth organizations may find more difficult to reach.
- Involve youth organizations from the initial stages of project design to give them the opportunity to propose activities that meet their needs and thus ensure that they take ownership of the activities.
- Strengthen the network of youth and children's organizations in order to promote closer collaboration and better synergy between them.

As key partners of the transitional justice institutions and process, the UN PBF and the Fund recipients may want to consider advocating for:

- The involvement of young people in the CVJR's successor body and all relevant commissions (i.e. CNRSS & CNDDR) and in drawing up the terms of reference for the positions in this new body

- Extending the consultation framework for children's and youth organizations to informal organizations so that the latter can also be involved in the transitional justice process.
- Increase the participation of young people with disabilities by adopting a proactive approach to enable them to take part in activities.

6. *Annexes*

3.1. *Additional notes on the methodology*

In addition to the main evaluation methods used for the whole cohort evaluation (documentary review and Key Informant Interviews), other tools like the Most Significant Change and Interaction analysis were integrated into the methodology for this exercise. The ET relied on the documentation available in the MPTFO Gateway and additional documents provided by the Find Recipients. It complemented these sources with online available context and thematic analyzes from recognized sources for an assessment by external/third-party sources unrelated to the project and the implementing partners.

Data collection was guided by the same evaluation criteria and questions defined for the entire cohort evaluative exercise, with the difference that interviews were focused on sub-questions under workstream 2, duly adapted to this specific project and context. The ET interviewed institutional/Government representatives at central and regional level, the UN PBF Secretariat in Bamako, Fund recipient representatives, Institutional partners, universities and youth CSO partners, that were also beneficiaries of the project.

The main challenges of the project evaluation were the limited time and resources available for the exercise, which meant that interviews with stakeholders in regions outside Bamako had to be conducted online, also due to the security situation in some areas.

3.2. *List of stakeholders interviewed*

KI category	Name	Position	Organization
UN PBF	Pierre Antoine Archange	Senior Peacebuilding Advisor	UN PBF Secretariat in Mali
	Kissima Sylla	National Expert	
Fund Recipients	Ms. Sokona Tounkara	UNV, project manager	UNICEF
	Ms. Manuela Viana Xavier Da Trindade	Project coordinator	UNDP
	Ms. Minata Mariko	Project manager	
	Abdoulaye Doucouré	Project Coordinator	ASFC
	Ms. Mariam Bocoum	Project manager	
CSO Partners (and youth beneficiaries)	Ms. Néné Goita	Coordinator	Conseil Consultatif National des Enfants et des Jeunes
	Makan Sylla	Project manager	
	Issouf Diabaté	(Interim) President	Association Noyau Dur (AND-Mali)
	Abdoul Mounir Baby	Project Coordinator	
	Djeneba Bagaya	CSO Member	
	Samerou Diallo	CSO Member	

	Abdourhamane Haidara	Coordinator	TRIJEUD
	Ms. Koninba Samaké	President	
	Mohamed Dicko	CSO member	
	Djibrila Maiga	Project coordinator in Gao	
	Ms. Fatoumata Youssouf	CSO member	
	Diahara Mahamane	CSO member	
	Fodé Barry	President	R2JTIM ((in Timbuktu)
Institutional partners	Omorou Zakaria Touré	Head of external relations, Rectorat	Bamako University of Law and Political Science
	Oumar Hasseye Touré	Youth and Gender affairs commissioner	CVJR

3.3. *List of Main Reference Documents*

<u>Project Documents</u>

- ProDoc; NCE (June 2022)
- Project reports: semi-annual and annual narrative and financial reports 2021 and 2022; Final Report (May 2023)
- Communication of the Mali Council of Ministers (on the transitional plan), June 2021
- Complementary information note to UN PBF, August 2021
- « Jeunes et Justice Transitionnelle au Mali », report of research study prepared by AND-Mali for the project (June 2022)
- Endline study (draft), May 2023

<u>Context and thematic sources</u>

ICG, *Maintaining Relations with Transitional Regimes in Bamako and Ouagadougou*, 12 May 2023 https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-05/wl-burkina-mali-spring-2023.pdf

Human Rights Watch, Mali country page https://www.hrw.org/africa/mali

4.4 Haiti IRF 407: Semences de paix: une jeunesse haïtienne engagée pour construire une société meilleure

(YPI/Leadership theme)

1. Introduction

1.1. Context of the project

Haiti has a history of political instability and violence. It is also one of the world's poorest countries and among the most affected by natural disasters that further exacerbate the recurrent humanitarian and economic crises. Violence has increased exponentially in the power vacuum that followed the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, leading to a call for a UN intervention, which has been recently approved (in October 2023). The escalation of violence in mid-2021 resulted in widespread death, rapes, property damage, communities fleeing violence, and disruption of food, water, and fuel supplies. In 2022, deaths from gang violence surpassed 2,200, more than doubling from 2021; thousands of kidnappings also occurred and were on the rise; and the number of women murdered rose 75 percent, from 93 to 163. Violence has directly impacted at least 1.5 million people in accessing education and health services. Internal displacement has increased exponentially from 2,100 in 2019, 7,900 in 2020, 17,000 in 2021, to more than 88,000 in August 2022.[204]

In a context marked by corruption, widespread impunity, collusion between the economic, political, and security spheres, and the lack of capacity of the State to provide basic services and respond to the country's multiple crises, the legitimacy of the national and local institutions is eroded. There is little trust in the State, by the Haitian population. The Haitian National Police and the military are unable to ensure security and enforce the law; they lack funding and are too poorly equipped compared to the gangs. As such, backed by wealthy oligarchs, gangs now control nearly two-thirds of the country in the absence of the State.

Despite the threat of recruitment by gangs, youth needs are not addressed in public policies (e.g., employment, education, vocational training, and entrepreneurship), and youth voices remain largely ignored. Some of these disenfranchised youth are attracted by the gangs and join their ranks, often in search of economic benefits, opportunities, and respect, however, most are victims of the situation in the country and see their access to education, protection, and economic opportunities increasingly limited by the violence. Women and girls are especially affected with an increase in SGBV reported since 2020 as armed gangs use rape, including collective rapes, and other forms of sexual violence to instill fear, punish, subjugate, and inflict pain on local populations with the ultimate goal of expanding their areas of influence, throughout the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.[205] About 63% of women aged 15-19 have experienced physical or sexual violence[206].

1.2. Project objectives

The "Semences de paix" project was implemented by Concern Worldwide with two CSO partners (Lakou Lapé and Sakala) between February 2021 and June 2023, in the Port-au Prince neighborhoods of **Cité Soleil, Bel Air, and St. Martin**. With a budget of 1,5 million USD, the project targeted mainly youth (male and female) and community leaders/organizations with the aim of building *positive, non-violent leadership among young women and men, and strengthening links in the community*.

The main *objectives of the project* were:

(i) to reduce armed groups/gangs influence and attraction to the youth, providing youth with tools to empower themselves and to seek alternatives (e.g., life skills, professional training, sports, and arts);

(ii) to raise awareness among gang members about protection and their participation in a development process geared towards peace; and

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[204] Data from different sources mentioned in NPSIA, *Haiti Conflict Analysis 2023,* Carleton University (https://carleton.ca/cifp/wp-content/uploads/Haiti-Conflict-Diagnostic-2023-1.pdf), and in International Crisis Group

[205] BINUH and OHCHR. *Sexual violence in Port-au-Prince: a weapon used by gangs to instill fear*. October 2022; p.3.

[206] UN. *Analyse Commune de Pays - Haiti*. July 2022

(iii)   to accompany CBOs/communities to help them define or structure their priorities with an active participation (and visibility) of youth in the dialogue with local actors for improved access/provision of basic services prioritized by the communities.

Map of Haiti: project areas in Port-au-Prince

Source: Google maps

1.3. *Methodology and overview of Summary Note*

The project evaluation was a light-touch exercise carried out remotely by the cohort evaluation Team Leader for a period of approximately two weeks in the first half of July 2023. The purpose was to gather primary information and the perspectives of different stakeholders involved in the project to complement and triangulate data extracted from the project documentation review.

The evaluation took place as the project was closing implementation and conducting capitalization meetings. The final report and endline study were not yet available at the time of writing. The project assessment is therefore informed by the documentation available at the time of the remote mission and interviews conducted remotely. Three small group interviews were held with youth beneficiaries (youth CBOs, youth peacebuilders, and members of the *Comité Consultatif des Jeunes*-CCJ) from all the three project locations together, and nine key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with different categories of stakeholders that included the UN PBF Secretariat, the Peace and Development Adviser and members of the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Taskforce in the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the Fund recipient (Concern Worldwide management and local staff), the two partner CSOs, and community members/leaders. In total, 27 people were interviewed. The full list of KIs interviewed, documentary sources used, and additional information on the methodology are provided in section 6 (annexes).

This note presents a summary of the main findings (per evaluation criteria) and learning, which have been integrated into the main report of the cohort evaluation, as well as the main conclusions and recommendations that are specific to the project assessed.

2. Findings

2.1. Relevance

> *EQ1. To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?*

The evaluation found the project focus and approach very relevant to the local context. Its combination of strengthening of youth/CBOs' capacities for peacebuilding, creating space for interaction and joint activities between youth from communities set apart by the armed groups fighting over territorial control, promoting youth civic engagement in the communities, and professional training or revenue generating activities for vulnerable youth, addressed needs identified by key informants and youth from the targeted locations. The project also aimed at empowering youth as peacebuilders and making them less vulnerable to armed groups influence. The project was inclusive as well, in how it was implemented. The partners' presence and experience of working in the targeted locations helped it to adapt to a challenging and evolving context.

Relevance of thematic focus and targeting. The project thematic focus on youth leadership is highly relevant to the context of the three project locations that is presented in the conflict analysis. The three Port-au Prince areas of project intervention are some of the most densely populated areas and are highly affected by violence as armed rival gangs fight over control of the neighborhoods. These gangs are mostly composed of male youth (16 to 35 years old) but more recently some females have taken an active role in these armed groups[207]; they are responsible for destruction of property, killings, abductions for ransom, and rapes. The youth are also the ones putting up resistance to the gang control and violence given that they are also victims in the conflict. Criteria for the targeting of the project beneficiaries are identified in the ProDoc: socio-economic vulnerability, risk of being recruited by gangs, area of residence, age, gender, disability, and status in the household.

Conflict Analysis. The ProDoc provides a general analysis of socio-political and economic fault lines and gender inequalities that are disrupting the social fabric in Haiti. It also zooms into the specific situation in the three neighborhoods targeted by the project to some extent, identifying the types of violence that affect these areas and the key actors in these conflicts. It contextualizes the situation of youth and the risk factors in the project areas that drive violence in the communities notably: the sense of exclusion among youth; the near absence of state authority and of basic services that contribute to further alienate youth; the inequalities that generate a sense of discrimination and feed conflict between sectors of the same neighborhood (and is taken advantage of by political actors); as well as the violence as a means for youth to obtain opportunities and recognition (education, economic benefits, and respect, especially in the slums of urban areas). The conflict analysis (CA) maps the factors that may hinder peace efforts (e.g. the interests, power sources, and motivations of the main actors in the conflict), as well as the actors that have an interest in peace (youth; CBOs; community leaders), and their capacities and needs for a more active peacebuilding role.

Gender-sensitive analysis and mainstreaming. The CA includes an analysis of gender-based violence in at least one of the project areas and of other socio-economic and cultural factors that especially affect women and girls and constitute barriers to a more equal participation.

Intended outcomes are consistent with the analysis of the conflict and aims at minimizing the impact in the targeted communities of wider violence factors in the country. The project aimed at reducing the incidence of gang-related violence by creating opportunities for youth (economic, social, and identity-related) outside affiliation to armed groups and reducing their influence over/attraction to youth. It intended also to promote social cohesion within and between communities by promoting youth civic engagement and dialogue with the communities, bringing together youth from neighborhoods controlled by different armed groups, overcoming the barriers these groups have set, providing opportunities for trauma healing and forging friendships between youth within and across neighborhoods.

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[207] Project report on the barriers and opportunities for peace (by Lakou Lapè), 2023.

Inclusive design and responsiveness to needs identified by target groups. The project built on previous peacebuilding and social cohesion projects and **experience of the IPs in the project locations**. The project design was informed also by context analysis conducted by the IPs (in 2017, 2020) in the project locations, conflict dynamics, protection risk, and gender-based violence. In addition, specific **consultations with groups of boys and girls** (organized by different age groups), **CBOs and KIs** were conducted to inform the project preparation in at least one location. Due to an increase in violence and displacement, similar consultations were not deemed appropriate in one of the other project areas. During implementation, consultations with young people (Young Agents of Peace/JAPs, CBOs, youth groups and other community leaders) were conducted and a document was produced on barriers and opportunities for peace (indicator output 1.1.3).

The project was implemented in collaboration with the selected youth from the targeted areas (JAPs, CBOs, the CCJ, the network of local leaders for peace and other youth groups), as part of the project strategy to encourage community participation, social cohesion, commitment, and ownership by stakeholders. These groups and structures provided feedback on activities and an assessment of contextual challenges and risks, which enabled the project to adapt and respond to interests and recommendations of the targeted groups. During implementation, also, project activities and budget were adapted accordingly (ProDoc NCE1, triangulated KIIs). Enquiries to measure knowledge pre- and post-capacity development activities were also conducted.

Theory of Change (ToC). The ProDoc includes a well-substantiated ToC, with assumptions for each of the hypothesis presented and a causality chain that is logically and clearly articulated. The ToC also recognizes the armed groups as the main barrier to the emergence of other leadership models.

Adaptation to deteriorating context. During implementation of the project, the President of Haiti was assassinated, conflict dynamics changed, and violence spiked as gangs vied for control of territory. Hundreds of people were killed, many more displaced, access to certain communities was blocked, depriving many of basic services and goods. Some project areas were especially affected. Throughout this period, despite access problems, the project closely monitored the context through the project participants (youth of the JAP and CCJ, youth CBOs, community leaders) and the implementing partners network of contacts in the communities. This **semi-permanent involvement of the project stakeholders and beneficiaries, the implementing partners agility and UN PBF's flexibility, allowed the project to constantly adapt as the situation evolved**. In fact, IPs had foreseen a rise in armed violence given the approach of elections in 2021, although not quite how the wave of violence unleashed and combined with other factors. IPs had to reassess peace and conflict factors following these changes as power dynamics and political and economic interests of armed and non-armed groups and of political and economic sectors in country had changed, requiring adaptation of strategies to ensure the protection of participants, project staff, and of dialogue processes.

2.2. Efficiency

EQ2. To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficiently and delivered timely on the stated objectives?

The project implemented the planned activities and achieved most output targets but required nearly 28 months (instead of the planned 18) and budget adaptations, mostly due to contextual challenges. The project transferred a significant amount of funds (49%) to local CSO partners.

Partnerships and resources. Concern Worldwide already had experience working with Lakou Lapé and Sakala. They jointly designed the project from a Concept Note mostly elaborated by Concern; as such, formalizing the partnerships was a quick process. During the starting phase of the project, the human and financial resources were available; exchanges of knowledge and strengthening of capacities were conducted and continued throughout. A detailed work plan, mobilization plan, and criteria and methodology for selecting the CBOs were defined, revised, and validated at internal planning meetings; the selection of the youth participants initiated; and the CCJ had been established and started meeting (semi-annual report 2021; KIIs).

Transfer of funds to local CSOs. As per the final report, nearly 49% of the total budget was transferred to local

partners, mainly Lakou Lapè and Sakala, exceeding the GYPI target of at least 40% of the project funding to local partners.

No cost extensions (NCE). The project eventually required two NCEs, extending the implementation period from 18 to 27.5 months. Budget readjustments were necessary to cover for unforeseen rising costs (higher and exponential inflation; for instance, the cost of the professional training activities was six times higher than estimated at the start of the project), and to adapt the project to interests and recommendations of youth, following consultations. The costs of baseline and monitoring activities were shared with other projects, and administrative and support costs were reduced which helped rebalance the costs and enabled an efficient use of the financial resources (Prodoc NCE 1 and 2).

The extensions enabled the project to *implement the planned activities, although in few cases the number of activities was lesser than the target defined, in most cases due to the challenging context. At the project's end, most output targets were met or surpassed (78%), according to the final project report*.

The *main factors* impacting the delays and need for NCEs were contextual and beyond the control of the project. The socio-political situation, the dynamics between armed groups and the peace and conflict interests of the local stakeholders had changed as of mid-2021, when armed violence intensified, increasing internal displacements, and changing the dynamics between communities/sectors in the areas of intervention (1st NCE). Social unrest (manifestations, strikes, looting) and violence led to a temporary suspension of activities with many having been displaced and access to certain areas of the project limited (including IPs' offices in the project areas). Notably, suspension of activities affected the youth professional training, CBOs and youth led peace and advocacy activities, and dialogues with leaders of armed and non-armed groups. Inflation and a cholera outbreak (because of limited access to water) added to the challenges (2nd NCE).

2.3. Effectiveness

EQ3. *To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results/outcomes?*

The project could not meet all the intended outcome indicator targets (it met three out of seven), especially those related to the non-violent leadership (outcome 1), amid a significant deterioration of the socio-political, economic, and security situation in the project locations as of mid-2021. It achieved, nonetheless, significant peacebuilding results. KIs and documentary sources stress the social and economic empowerment of targeted beneficiaries (youth and CBOs) whose capacities and self-confidence were strengthened, the creation of spaces for interaction between young people from across communities and imaginary dividing lines imposed by the armed groups. They also emphasize the youth peace and civic engagement which has contributed to improvements in social cohesion and some space for alternative non-violent youth models and leadership.

Peacebuilding results. IPs claim the project has reduced the youth's attraction to the armed groups as a means to access power, social influence, and economic resources. While this is difficult to measure, several sources confirm increased social responsibility and empowerment of youth. They mention that these young people are taking more interest in social work in the community and are sensitizing other youth for peace and non-violent leadership. Interviewed youth indicated that the project has empowered them, helped them improve their image in the communities, and opened dialogue channels between communities divided by the armed groups, with state actors like the Ministry of Youth, Sport, and Civic Action (MJSAC) and institutions like the Office for the Protection of Civilians (OPC). Different sources mentioned cases of young people leaving armed groups. Some sources provided examples of young people in the project that helped save lives (e.g. by interceding with armed groups in one case, and with the community in another). Young men seem to have become more dominant in community decision-making according to data from the project endline study.[208] This could indicate

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[208] 31.88% of participants in the endline study indicated that young men are now the dominant decision-making profile in the communities (project final report).

that the project may have contributed to raise the profile of youth in the communities as positive actors (and not just as members of armed groups and perpetrators of violence).

These results can potentially contribute to protection and social cohesion by keeping channels of communication open between communities and with armed groups, but it has not and cannot alone abate the violence spread by gangs that has continued to increase in 2023 in project locations.[209] In mid-July 2023, a truce between the G-9 and GPEP, the two main gang coalitions in the Cite Soleil area, has given some space for residents to go about their lives and cross between sectors, which may also help the youth/CBOs trained by the project to maintain the interactions and continue with activities on their own[210]. Towards the end of the project, meetings of CBOs always involved all the three project locations, meaning that bridges between the targeted youth across these communities were still maintained and youth were intent on continuing with these contacts.

Youth empowerment. The project has pursued a holistic approach to support youth in the targeted locations. Training activities in conflict management, entrepreneurship, trauma management, gender transformation and leadership (including sensitization against GBV) have strengthened the capacity of 491 Young Agents of Peace (JAP), including 255 women, and supported 13 youth CBOs/groups (including 4 women-led, and 5 youth groups). The capacity strengthening of these youth actors have enabled them to multiply the effects as they passed on their knowledge by training other youth.

Professional training courses and revenue generating activities (RGAs), in partnership with the MJSAC, provided youth and youth-led CBOs with skills to improve their financial situation/autonomy. JAPs could also choose between a 6-month professional training course or benefit from technical and financial support for revenue generating activities (RGAs). Professional training was chosen by over 2/3 of the JAP, who would not have otherwise been able to afford them, increasing the chances of these youth finding work, which "gave them hope", as stated by interviewed youth beneficiaries; 76.51% of the 315 young people in this training have completed the course and received the diploma (slightly below the 80% target). Support to RGAs mainly strengthened active RGAs. The project also set up savings and credit associations[211] which were being managed by the youth themselves (after the first round of credits); more members of these associations were taking up credit by end of the project as they were gaining trust in how it works (42%, of which 58% were women), although still below the 75% target. The insecurity, violence, displacement, inflation, floods, armed groups blockade, all greatly impacted the economic activity in the targeted communities, including the RGAs, savings and credit. The final report indicates that at the project end, 91 (52%) of the 175 beneficiaries of grants for RGAs were however still in business (over 51% by women) – less than the planned target of 75%, but still significant given the context.

Social cohesion activities across communities. The project organized psychosocial*,* cultural and sports activities within and between divided neighborhoods for social cohesion across dividing lines created by armed gangs. Given the violent and insecure context, the project changed the strategy, favoring activities in small groups to generate trust and confidence. CBOs conducting these activities were accompanied by the project, which focused on strengthening their structures, analysis capacities, values, and inclusion, with interviewed CBO representatives confirming these benefits.

Spaces for dialogue and cooperation. The project creates spaces for dialogue between youth, youth CBOs, and community organizations and community leaders, for social cohesion, community protection and peacebuilding. As reported in the projects documents and confirmed by KIIs conducted as part of this evaluation, the project

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[211] Participants AGR automatically become members of a Savings and Credit Association.

helped establish direct communication lines between these community actors in the targeted neighborhoods, which has helped to ease tensions when problems involving youth from these different communities arise.

Several activities appear to have contributed to positive interactions:

- *between youth* from the JAPs, CBOs, and community leaders, notably thorough the reflection and analysis on barriers and opportunities for peace that the project promoted, and the small grants to youth CBOs, which triangulated sources indicate have generated more civic engagement and commitment of youth in their communities, also improving their image in the community; and
- *Between communities* in conflict zones, through dialogues on peacebuilding and community conflicts, organized by a network of 41 community leaders (25 men, 16 women), supported and accompanied by the project, that set up 15 talks between leaders (9) and between CBOs and youth groups (7 activities).

The project also promoted *dialogues with institutional, political, and economic actors*. Community forums (3) with the participation of these actors, and dialogues with political parties/actors (2), the private sector (1) and the government (3) provided a space for young people to have a say, raise their problems and show that youth can play other roles than those associated with gang violence. These dialogues have given some visibility to youth structures (the CCJ, JAP, CBOs) and community leaders and facilitated access to institutional actors for resolving some issues (e.g., CBOs registration, ID cards). The project encountered, however, difficulties in mobilizing political actors. The mistrust in the role of State actors in the socio-political situation, the weakness of the State structures, and the near absence and lack of legitimacy or credibility of the local authorities are still dominant perceptions, from the testimonies the ET gathered. Interviewed youth showed, however, interest and appreciation for the opportunity to engage with these actors and stressed these dialogues have enabled a better understanding of state actors' roles and constraints. Lines of communication and dialogue between youth groups and institutional actors were being established (e.g., youth focal points in the OPC and the MSJAC).

GEWE and transformation of gender norms: KIIs confirm increased awareness on SGBV and some positive behavior changes with regard to gender roles and norms, although SGBV remained an issue in the project locations as violence by armed groups increased during this period. Interviewed young women confirmed they have gained self-esteem and confidence in their own capacities to speak for themselves, take initiative and take on leadership roles in a context where girls have few opportunities to do so. Young women beneficiaries have challenged stereotypes (e.g., taking on certain professional activities that are seen as typically men's roles) and are able to access credit to support their own activities, which has contributed to their economic empowerment. Male youth are said to be now promoting GEWE strategies within their communities, and CBOs are becoming more inclusive (integrating women and minorities).

The project mainstreaming of transformative gender and positive masculinity strategies in capacity-building activities of the JAP and CBOs, in professional trainings, and in activities aimed at promoting social cohesion (e.g., sport, culture, art, psychosocial support) may have contributed to these changes. Sensitization on GEWE was not limited to youth. Trainings on GBV were also attended by community leaders and were used to sensitize them as sexual violence has increasingly been weaponized by gangs "to disrupt the social fabric by targeting women and girls crossing "frontlines" or moving across neighborhoods on foot or in public transport to carry out their daily activities".[212] The project also sensitized the professional training schools on GEWE consideration in their training activities. Women leadership issues were included in community leaders' dialogues on peacebuilding and community protection, with particular attention paid to promotion of women's active participation in the community leaders' network and in community development, and to gender-sensitive planning of these dialogues. The participation of women in the activities was generally high (e.g., in the capacity-building trainings for JAPs, young women were always close to or above 50% of the participants). Disaggregated data is systematically provided in the project reports.

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[212] BINUH and OHCHR. *Sexual violence in Port-au-Prince: a weapon used by gangs to instill fear*. October 2022; p.3.

Most significant change and direct contribution of the project. Interviewed KIs and documentary sources concur that the project initiative to bring together youth from across communities in conflict has been very significant in a context where armed groups have isolated and divided communities. The project has enabled youth from the targeted locations to get to know each other, share their perspectives, develop their capacity for analysis and communication, speak out their frustrations and have a say in the problems in the communities and set up their own activities together. This has changed their perspectives about youth from the other sectors/neighborhoods, boosted their self-confidence, improved their image among peers and in the community, empowered them to take initiative and think differently about the future, showing them that the barriers that armed groups have built around them are also their own mental barriers but also that it is in their power to change that, thus, promoting youth leadership for peace. Interviewed youth speak of positively influencing other youth in armed groups, and some referred to a reduction of violence in their neighborhood, although there is no concrete data to corroborate this possible effect.

Youth voices on the *Semences de Paix* project

"The participation in trainings has shown us we have more in common than we thought we would, and even when our opinions diverge that does not make of us enemies. (letter of JAPs from Cite Soleil quoted in final project report)

"We have realized we have capacities we did not know we had. We now have tools that have helped us go beyond what we thought we could."

"Young people come to us (including youth influenced by armed groups) interested in joining in; they come to us to share their problems; they trust us. (CCJ member).

"We started to see things differently, to see the opportunities open to us as young people as part of a structure (CCJ) we have the chance to make our voices heard".

(Sources: KIIs and project reports)

Localization. The project was strong in its localization efforts, supporting youth and local CSOs/CBOs leadership for local peacebuilding. Implementing partners speak of a co-creation of the project from the start and of a process designed to make use of the specific expertise, added value and strengths of each, for the project objectives and approach. These strengths are identified in the ProDoc, as are the activities each partner was responsible for. For the partner CSOs, the funding was especially critical during the Covid period but also the visibility gained with international organizations and national institutional actors, and the opportunity to scale up their experiences of community violence reduction and local mediation. The project also worked with and directly supported women and youth-led community-based organizations and youth groups, strengthening their capacities and structures, and providing small grants for them to implement own initiatives, autonomously.

Factors impacting on results. The strong community anchoring of all three implementing partners, each based in a different location targeted by the project, was a significant advantage of the project. Concern Worldwide and the two partner CSOs all have a long experience of working in the project areas, with well-established community links, which was critical for feedback on the project and the context enabling project adaptation, and to continue engaging with the targeted beneficiaries even when access was difficult, and activities had to be suspended, temporarily. The major challenge faced by the project was the rise in violence between gangs in project locations creating displacement, insecurity, and adding constant pressure in the communities.

2.4. Sustainability and ownership

EQ4. To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?

The project sustainability strategy relied mainly on local stakeholders' strengthened capacities, acceptance and ownership of the processes supported by the project, and on networking and dialogue spaces for peace between youth, CBOs, and community leaders of the project locations. From the design stage and into implementation, the project has involved the youth and community actors on a voluntary basis to encourage their participation, commitment, and ownership of community peace processes and alternative models of youth leadership.

The project did not really have an **exit strategy** at start. Such a strategy emerged towards the end of the project as plans for continuity of the CCJ and the JAP through integration into other PBF and Concern projects and capitalization on the project results and good practices were developed.

Although too soon to assess sustainability of results as the project was just coming to an end at the time of the remote evaluation mission, there were some indications that processes and results promoted by the project continue and signs of some degree of ownership by the targeted youth and partners:

- The role of the CCJ is being integrated into other PBF community violence reduction projects. At the time of the remote mission, the CCJ youth were in the process of developing advocacy strategies and identifying key target persons.
- Concern continues supporting the JAP through other funding and supporting the CCJ.
- JAP have initiated community activities independently (outside the project framework). With the support of traditional leaders and the local economic sector, they continue sensitizing for a culture of peace, multiplying the knowledge and tools they have acquired through the project trainings, promoting socio-cultural activities and clean-up operations, providing spaces for youth and creating a sense of belonging. KIs speak of 800 youth indirectly benefitting from the trainings on conflict management (through the trained JAP and CBOs).
- JAPs continue to be involved also in cross-sectoral strategic meetings in areas such as protection, GBV and peace, according to the project final report.
- Implementing partners remain engaged in the targeted locations and will continue to accompany the youth and community networks established, thus continuing to provide space for youth to exchange and be involved in community development and peacebuilding. For instance, Sakala, who thanks to the project was able to extend its activities into other neighborhoods in conflict with Haut Cité-Soleil, will continue promoting social cohesion between these sectors of Cite Soleil after the end of the project.
- Over 50% of the supported RGA continue in activity, providing a lifeline for beneficiaries; the savings and credit associations also continue operating.
- Coordination mechanisms of the MSJAC and the OPC with youth groups and CBOs were established and seem likely to continue; for instance, OPC requested youth representatives to follow a specific training.

Other results have the potential to generate benefits and some sustainability in the future, in particular:

- CBOs strengthened organizational and management capacities and renewed links with the community should help them to continue engaging in matters of the community and participate in decisions that affect youth; they are also better equipped now to access other funding (acquired legal status, bank account);
- Youth that completed the professional training course had the possibility to do an internship, thus providing them with a professional experience that could eventually lead to work opportunities.

The evolution of the socio-political and security situation in Haiti remains, however, a major factor impacting the lasting effects of the youth socio-economic empowerment and leadership promoted by the project. As evidenced by the endline data on outcome indicators, it was difficult for the project to promote the intended change in a context of heightened violence. The absence of a state policy on youth, training and education is another structural limitation for YPS efforts in Haiti.

2.5. Coherence and coordination

EQ5. To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?

The project was aligned with UN PBF and UN action in Haiti, as well as with the Government national Strategic Development Plan, and the MJSAC objective of developing civic action and a culture of peace among young people. The MJSAC was, furthermore, part of the project Steering Committee.

The ProDoc refers to other complementary UN PBF actions in-country by UN agencies on control of arms and ammunition; access to justice for the most vulnerable populations, in particular women and children, with a view to improving social cohesion. In particular, the ProDoc mentions "Reducing community violence in Martissant

and La Saline" (UNOPS, UNDP and UNFPA) that takes an approach in some regards similar to the Semences de Paix project as it supports the emergence of a new model of civic engagement at community level, though working through community platforms.

Project reports and KIIs confirm coordination with other PBF projects for learning from each other and exploring synergies, especially with the UNOPS, UNDP and UNFPA project in Martissant and La Saline. There were initial efforts to coordinate and learn from each other; the two projects shared activities (the baseline and the conflict analysis) was conducted by the same person; one of the projects CSO implementing partners (Lakou Lape) also participated in the CVR project, and frequent meetings (at least ten, according to KIs) were held between the two projects at the beginning. Coordination efforts between the two projects have, however, faded later on due to COVID, the difficulties of the context, and differences in timing, target groups and approaches of the two projects. Furthermore, there was no real strategic discussion about the methodological approach of these two projects nor with the CSO partners of the Semences de Paix project, although one of them was also involved to some extent in the CVR project.

The interministerial CVR taskforce supported by BINUH and including UN and other international partners has since 2022 enhanced efforts for coordination of approaches and interventions specifically on CVR. This coordination includes PBF and non-PBF projects. At the end of the project, synergies with new PBF projects were being explored also beyond CVR, notably in projects on mental health and peace infrastructures, strengthening its nexus approach and seeking to capitalize on the work already undertaken with the JAPs and the CBOs. Although the CVR taskforce does not include CS representatives, it has occasionally involved CSOs in the discussions of the taskforce and facilitated their contact with other donors like the European Union.

The project was also complementary to the IPs other projects in the targeted locations. In the case of Concern, the Semences de paix project added the peacebuilding dimension and the work with youth groups and CBOs to its mainly humanitarian and development work in the project locations.

2.6. Conflict sensitivity

> EQ6. How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?

The presence of the IPs in the project locations and their experience of working with the communities enabled a good understanding of the sensitivities and risks of the context.

The violence that flared up as elections approached did not come as a surprise to the IPs. With the help of the network of youth and community members, the IPs closely monitored the evolution of the context and conflict dynamics and took measures to minimize the risks to staff and participants. Notwithstanding, the project was not without risks to participants given the very context where the project was implemented.

The project risk management assessment was updated in the first NCE to take account of the displacement of populations from the communities covered by the project and to reassess jointly with the communities the risks, given the new dynamics of conflict, and together identify ways to ensure the safe participation of project participants and to strengthen the local peace-building processes. As per the project design and throughout implementation, the project involved youth participants, CBOs, and community leaders in the monitoring of the context, the analysis of the conflict, in the identification of risks to youth (and notably women/girls) participation, and in decisions on mitigation measures and adaptation of activities.

Given the risk of acts of violence by the armed groups, the project engaged armed groups' leadership for the protection of participants, to ensure their safe movement and protection of women across neighborhoods, while ensuring not to value their role. Some activities were organized outside the targeted neighborhoods because of the insecurity. While youth from across dividing lines were able to meet and work together without major incidents, two young participants were killed by stray bullets although this seems to have been unrelated to project activities. There was also a case of serious violence between young participants during project activities.

Interviewed stakeholders mentioned the latter case as an example of how sensitization and IPs accompaniment has helped break the cycle of revenge.

2.7. Catalytic effect

EQ7. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?

The project had both financial and non-financial catalytic effects.

Concern secured donor funding from Irish Aid (425,500 USD) for a 5-year project that will integrate elements of the current project and was applying for additional UN PBF funding, which could build on and consolidate youth capacities and processes initiated by the Semences de Paix project.

Significant non-financial catalytic effects were reported and confirmed by KIs in terms of:

- Contributing to renewing the social fabric between youth and with communities, and promoting a culture of values and peace, both of which have been eroded in the Haitian society by structural violence. KIs confirmed these efforts were continuing by the initiative of the targeted young people/CBOs and with the support of IPs, notably of Concern through other funding.
- The establishment of the CCJ as a consultative structure to guide and inform project implementation is a **good practice** that has been taken up in other UN PBF projects and by other partners – five additional CCJs were set up with other funding within Concern, according to the project final report.
- In addition, institutional links were being established between the MSJAC and OPC with youth structures (JAP, CCJ). Some young people in the network of JAPs were designated as focal points for these institutions. The CCJ has participated in meetings with the Ministry and the setup of a National Youth Council was under discussion, although the ET could not triangulate this information as it could not get an interview with institutional/government representatives involved in the project.

This acknowledgement of the need to hear the voices of young people and creating opportunities for them to engage in strategic and policy processes can potentially contribute to promoting youth civic responsibility and responsiveness of donor interventions and national peacebuilding strategies and policies in Haiti. New PBF projects on CVR in Haiti are bringing together the institutional approach of the CVR1 project and community approach of the *Semence de Paix* project.

2.8. Innovation

EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?

The project focus on peacebuilding at community level was presented in the ProDoc as filling a gap in Haiti, as peacebuilding processes had until then centered mostly at higher political level, although the project was not the only nor the first project on community violence reduction. In fact, CVR was born in Haiti in mid-2000 (see box on CVR). The project seems however 'novel' in the Haiti context in how it provided space for youth to engage across dividing lines imposed by the armed groups, and in the leadership model of the CCJ.

> **Community Violence Reduction**
> Originally introduced in Haiti in 2006, CVR refers to programmes aimed at preventing and reducing armed violence at the community level, creating space for peace, and helping to build a secure environment conducive to sustainable peace, recovery and development. Unlike Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, CVR works directly with target communities to contribute to conflict de-escalation, build resilience and develop community capacities for peace. It explicitly targets youth at risk of recruitment by armed groups in addition to armed elements, trying to engage them in a way that shifts their interest away from armed struggle, preventing (re-)recruitment or improving the capacities of communities to absorb ex-combatants and associated groups.[213]

The CCJ is a small group of committed young people (4 young women and 6 young men aged between 16 and 30) from the different project locations. It's role was to advise on the project's strategy and interventions, to participate in assessments and impact analysis related to the project approach and activities, and provide a space

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[213] Sources: UN, Preventative role of DDR/CVR; UN/DPO, DDR/CVR - *Creating space for peace.*

for young people (notably young women) to express themselves. The CCJ was thus involved in several core project activities and processes, like context and risk analysis, project strategic and operational decisions, institutional dialogues (e.g. with the MJSAC), meetings with international partners (e.g. in the CVR taskforce), and community dialogues (e.g. the forums on local governance). With the support of the project, the CCJ produced communication pieces voicing youth views on their situation and of the communities, calling for social accountability. It gave young people the opportunity to be actors, and not just recipients, while giving them a positive visibility in their comunities and in national fora.

Building on the experience of this project, the CCJ model is now being taken up in other PBF projects to ensure projects are youth-sensitive and -responsive, while also promoting youth responsibility.

3. Good Practice / Lessons Learned

The ET identified several good practices in the project:
- The inclusive and participatory design of the project as a co-creation of the three implementing partners, their knowledge and experience in the project locations, and the localized consultations conducted during the design stage with youth from different age groups and other members of the community ensured the relevance of the project approach and the buy-in of the local stakeholders.
- The anchoring in the communities and the involvement of youth and community members in the monitoring, analysis and decision-making in the project promoted ownership and enabled the project to adapt to context changes, while remaining responsive to the needs and interests of the targeted groups (e.g. adaptation of the economic empowerment activities preferred by the targeted youth)
- The strengthening of youth and CBOs capacities, notably through the comprehensive trainings combining life skills, trauma healing and technical capacities, including the professional training over a sustained period (6 months) and the RGAs.
- The establishment of the CCJ as a consultative structure to inform youth-sensitive analysis and implementation of the project, which promoted youth to a lead role.
- The mainstreaming of gender throughout the activities.

Lessons drawn by IPs are the need to engage younger youth for mentality change and to engage on a longer-term basis.

4. Conclusions

Overall, the project was very relevant to the context and the constraints faced by youth in the targeted locations, even if it had no evident visible effects in terms of community violence reduction as the situation continued to deteriorate throughout the project period. Its anchoring in the communities enabled it to continue engaging with the youth beneficiaries even in the most difficult periods of violence and displacement and was critical to its ability to adapt and the manage the risks, although participants still faced risks. The project focus on youth as agents of peace and social cohesion, bringing together youth from neighborhoods separated by violence and fear has triggered significant changes for youth beneficiaries, although its effects in terms of peace and youth participation may not be always perceptible, and remain fragile in the face of the constant pressure and disruptive effect of violence.

5. Recommendations

- To ensure more sustainable effects in terms of youth empowerment, UN PBF and partners should consider longer-term complementary approaches to youth empowerment and leadership. PBF and the IPs are already building on the youth capacities strengthened by the project, connecting other projects and donors to JAPs, supported CBOs and the CCJ, and integrated the CCJ into other UN PBF projects. Transforming mentalities and integrating youth into community and national processes will require sustained investment and accompaniment.
- Scale up the project approach to other areas beyond Port-au-Prince that are facing the pressure of displacement and the violence of armed gangs who are expanding their control into rural areas that had remained more peaceful until recently.
- Beef up the dimension of youth dialogue with community leaders and institutional actors to build confidence and ensure youth voices are taken into account in local and national processes.

- Promote a wider debate on root causes of violence in Haiti (including the use of violence by political and economic actors).

6. *Annexes*

6.1. *Methodology note*

In addition to the main evaluation methods used for the whole cohort evaluation (documentary review and Key Informant Interviews), other tools like the Most Significant Change and Interaction analysis were integrated into the methodology for this exercise. The ET relied on the documentation available in the MPTFO Gateway and additional documents provided by the lead NUNO, as well as additional information on complementary projects on CVR in Haiti. Complementary online sources on the country context and thematic analyzes from recognized sources were also consulted for triangulation.

Data collection was guided by the same evaluation criteria and questions defined for the entire cohort evaluation exercise, with the difference being that interviews were focused on sub-questions under workstream 2, duly adapted to this specific project and context. The ET interviewed the UN PBF Secretariat in Haiti, UN staff from the Integrated UN Office in Haiti (BINUH) engaged in the CVR Taskforce, the project implementing partners (the Fund Recipient and CSO partners), youth and CBO beneficiaries from the different project locations, and a community leader.

The project evaluation had some limitations, mainly the short duration and remote nature of the exercise (although a mission in presence would have also posed significant challenges). The project was also just coming to an end and no final report or endline were available yet; it was not possible to get an interview with government officials; and many beneficiaries spoke only creole (and not French) (although Concern's staff supported with translations when needed).

6.2. *List of stakeholders interviewed*

KI category	Name	Position	Organization
UN PBF Secretariat	M. Mamadou Bamba	Coordinator	UN PBF Secretariat
	M. Tony Kouemo	M&E specialist	UN PBF Secretariat
	Diane Sheinberg	Peace & Development Adviser	RC Office, UNCT
NUNOs	Kwanli Kladstrup	Country Director	Concern Worldwide
	Beatriz Armada	Project Manager	
CSO Partners	Louis-Henri Mars	Executive director	Lakou Lapè
	Jean Marie Samuel	Program Manager	
	Jean Paul Felder	Executive director	SAKALA- The Community Centre for Peaceful Alternatives
Beneficiaries	4 youth (2M; 2F)		CCJ-Youth Consultative Committee

	4 youth representing 4 CBOs		CBOs
	4 youth		JAP-Jeunes Agents de Paix
Community leaders	Woman CBO leader	CBO leader	Women organisation in Cité Soleil
NUNO		Young member of the community	Local staff member of Concern
UNCT/BINUH (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti) [for context analysis, triangulation and coordination with other UN PBF CVR projects]	Aimee Faye	Coordinator of the Task Force on Community Violence Reduction (CVR)	BINUH
	Louise Bosetti	Task Force CVR	
	Juvigny Jacques	UNDP	Engaged in UN PBF CVR.1 project (PNUD-UNFPA-UNOPS in partnership with UNICEF).
	Eric Charles Calpas	Former UNFPA staff working on CVR1 projet	A présent avec UNICEF/projet CVR2.
	Joseph Foerster Louis-Jean		

6.3. *List of References*

Project Documents

- ProDoc; NCE1 (June 2022); NCE 2 (December 2022);
- Project reports: semi-annual and annual narrative and financial reports 2021 and 2022; semi-annual draft report (May 2023); final narrative and financial report (September 2023); report on barriers and opportunities for peace (by Lakou Lapè, 2023).
- ToR for Capacity-building of targeted CBOs and youth groups in Cité Soleil, Bel Air and Saint-Martin.
- Communication pieces (brochures presenting the project and baseline; CCJ letter, videos, and photo exhibition – some available online)

Context and thematic sources

BINUH and OHCHR. *Sexual violence in Port-au-Prince: a weapon used by gangs to instill fear*. Report. October 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/sexual-violence-port-au-prince-weapon-used-gangs-instill-fear

United Nations. Analyse commune de pays – Haïti. July 2022. https://haiti.un.org/fr/189058-haïti-analyze-commune-de-pays-juillet-2022

United Nations. Preventive role of Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/Community Violence Reduction. Peacebuilding Review architecture; thematic paper. (not dated) https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/pb_review_thematic_paper_orolsi_ddrs_-_preventative_role_of_ddr_and_cvr-final.pdf

United Nations. *Community Violence Reduction. Creating space for Peace*. Department of Peace Operations (DPO)/DDR Section. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr-and-cvr-creating-space-for-peace.pdf

"Building peace, preventing violence, and supporting community resilience in Haiti" in UN News, 18 September 2022.

Human Rights Watch (2023). *"Living a nightmare": Haiti Needs an Urgent Rights-Based Response to Escalating Crisis*, August 2023: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2023/08/haiti0823web.pdf.

Relief web, *Haiti: Humanitarian Response Overview*, Situation Report – August 2023 https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-response-overview-situation-report-august-2023

Annex 5. Online Survey results

Fund Recipient Survey

In total there were 18 fund recipient respondents. The survey was anonymous, thus details on specific geographic or programmatic coverage is not possible. It is expected that these respondents represent at least 12 unique projects.[214] Responses represented a relatively equal percent of projects by initiative and thematic focus with a slightly higher representation of respondents from YPI projects (58%) thematic representation of women and youth leadership (61%, see Figure 1).

TABLE 1 FUND RECIPIENT INITIATIVE AND THEMATIC FOCUS CROSSTAB

	GPI		YPI		Grand Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Promoting human rights and protection of women and youth peacebuilders and human rights defenders	3	43%	3	27%	6	33%
Supporting women and youth leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements	4	57%	7	64%	11	61%
Skipped	0	0%	1	9%	1	6%
Grand Total	7	100%	11	100%	18	100%
% of total	39%		61%			

In the online survey, fund recipients were asked whether they found the **partnership with UN PBF useful**. All 15 that answered were positive about the partnership. The primary reason for appreciation was the window's focus on peacebuilding as a needed area of support. Respondents particularly emphasized the **multi-sectoral approach to peacebuilding** allowing entities to **form important partnerships and approach peacebuilding through various programmatic lenses**. A few fund recipients also noted the support UN PBF provided in ensuring strong programmatic design in peacebuilding strategies.

- Yes, has been very useful, especially considering the efforts of the UN PBF Secretariat in making their implementing partners more responsive to peace which align with the work our organization is also carrying out.-Fund Recipient, YPI, supporting youth/gender
- The UN PBF resources were very important in terms of guiding and orienting our implementation. Communication guidelines in particular were useful to have a solid presence, as well as a unified image of all the members of the project. Peacebuilding materials were also illuminating for the creation of all project materials, adapted to our local reality.-Fund recipient, YPI, promoting human rights

TABLE 2 FIRST INVOLVEMENT OF CSO PARTNERS

When did you first involve CSO partners in the project?	Responses	
I don't know/prefer not to answer	0%	0
CSO partners were involved as of the concept note/proposal stage	65%	11
CSO partners were involved in the project design (after the concept note/proposal stage)	12%	2
CSO partners were involved at the implementation phase	24%	4

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[214] While the survey was anonymous, one question was asked only for the lead RUNO/NUNO in the project. Out of the 18 responses, only 12 answered this question. It is possible that there is greater coverage in case a lead RUNO/NUNO did not answer the survey.

CSO partners were involved for monitoring	0%	0
	Answered	**17**
	Skipped	**2**

TABLE 3 MAIN ADVANTAGES OF CSO PARTNERSHIPS

What were the main advantages of partnering with the CSO(s)? Select all that apply	Responses	
There were no advantages to local partnerships	0%	0
Access to remote locations	69%	11
Easier entry point to local stakeholders/community trust/collaboration.	88%	14
Local context knowledge	100%	16
Respond timely to local peacebuilding	63%	10
Value for money	6%	1
I don't know/prefer not to answer	0%	0
Other (please specify)		2
	Answered	**16**
	Skipped	**3**

Respondents could select more than one option.

FIGURE 5 MAIN ADVANTAGES OF CSO PARTNERSHIPS

*3 respondents skipped the question. Respondents could select more than one option.

TABLE 4 MAIN DISADVANTAGES/RISKS OF CSO PARTNERSHIPS

What were the main disadvantages or risks of partnering with the CSO(s)?	Responses	
There were no disadvantages/risks	25%	4
Politicization	25%	4
CSOs' poor management/financial capacity	38%	6

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Lack of CSO's thematic expertise	31%	5
Lack of inclusivity within CSOs	6%	1
Dependency on external inputs/resources	38%	6
I don't know/prefer not to answer	0%	0
Other (please specify)		3
	Answered	**15**
	Skipped	**4**

Respondents could select more than one option.

FIGURE 6 MAIN DISADVANTAGES/RISKS OF CSO PARTNERSHIPS

*4 respondents skipped the question. Respondents could select more than one option.

TABLE 5 ABILITY TO ADAPT TO CONTEXT CHANGES

In case there were context changes that impacted project implementation, how well did the project adapt?	Responses	
No major changes in context requiring adaptation of activities	22%	4
Could not adapt at all	0%	0
Adapted somewhat	11%	2
Adapted very well	67%	12
I don't know/Prefer not to answer	0%	0
	Answered	**18**
	Skipped	**1**

*The two respondents who said they were could 'adapt somewhat' were asked why. Both selected 'don't know/prefer not to answer'.

FIGURE 7 PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS IN ACHIEVING INTENDED RESULTS/OUTCOMES

How effective was the project in achieving intended results/outcomes?

- Somewhat effective, 27%
- Highly effective, 73%

- ■ Not at all effective
- ■ Not very effective
- ■ Somewhat effective
- ■ Highly effective
- ■ I don't know/prefer not to answer

*4 respondents skipped the question.

TABLE 6 SUSTAINABILITY OF KEY ACTIVITIES

How sustainable do you feel key results or activities will be?	Responses	
It was not designed to be sustainable	6%	1
Not at all sustainable	0%	0
Minimally sustainable	0%	0
Somewhat sustainable	75%	12
Highly sustainable	19%	3
I don't know/Prefer not to answer	0%	0
	Answered	**16**
	Skipped	**3**

FIGURE 8 GENERAL FACTORS DETERMINING SUSTAINABILITY

In general, which key factors determine the future sustainability of results/outcomes?

- Government commitment: 82%
- Local partners' ownership: 82%
- Local partners thematic expertise: 35%
- Availability of funding: 29%
- National/local context: 59%
- Other (please specify): 18%

*2 respondents skipped the question. Respondents could select more than one option.

FIGURE 9 ADDED VALUE OF UN PBF FUNDING THROUGH GYPI

What is the added value of UN PBF funding through GYPI compared to other financing sources?

*2 respondents skipped the question; Respondents could select more than one option.

TABLE 7 ABILITY TO ALIGN/ENHANCE OTHER PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS

How well did this project build on or align with other peacebuilding projects in the country?	Responses	
There were no other peace building projects to build on/align with	18%	3
Not at all	0%	0
Not very well	6%	1
Somewhat well	18%	3
Very well	47%	8
I don't know/Prefer not to answer	12%	2
	Answered	**17**
	Skipped	**2**

FIGURE 10 CATALYTIC EFFECT

To what extent did the project influence or leverage additional attention or funding to the issues it focused on?

Not at all · Not much · Some · Significantly · No response

*2 respondents skipped the question.

CSO Survey

In total there were eight fund recipient respondents of which seven responded to the majority of questions. The survey was anonymous, thus details on specific geographic or programmatic coverage is not possible. Based on feedback from the PBSO, CSO respondent questions were phrased differently than fund recipients; wording does not correspond to terminology used in the GYPI funding window. CSO respondents were not asked whether they were part of the GPI/YPI initiative, instead they were asked which population groups they focused on to try and understand this. Of the eight respondents, all reported to reach women, while six of the eight specifically sought to reach youth. Other included population groups included LBGTQI+ (n=1), men (n=3), elderly (n=1) and women human rights defenders (n=1). Thematically, half of CSO respondents said their project included both thematics while the remaining responses were split between supporting women and youth leadership and promoting human rights and protection of peacebuilders.

TABLE 8 THEMES ADDRESSED

Which of the following theme/s did your project address?	Responses	
I don't know/Prefer not to answer	0%	0
Supporting women and youth leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements	75%	6
Promoting human rights and protection of women and youth peacebuilders and human rights defenders	75%	6
	Answered	**8**
	Skipped	**0**

FIGURE 11 INTENDED PROJECT BENEFICIARY GROUPS

Respondents could select multiple options.

FIGURE 12 RELEVANCE TO PEACEBUILDING NEEDS OF PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

How relevant do you feel the project was to the peacebuilding needs of the groups you mentioned in the previous question?

43%

57%

■ Not at all relevant ■ Not so relevant ■ Partially relevant ■ Relevant ■ Highly relevant

*1 respondent skipped this question.

TABLE 10 INVOLVEMENT OF CSO ACTORS

When was your organization first involved in the project?	Responses	
I don't know/prefer not to answer	0%	0
Involved as of the concept note/proposal stage	75%	6
Involved in the project design (after the concept note/proposal stage)	0%	0
Involved at the implementation phase	25%	2
Involved for monitoring	0%	0
	Answered	**8**
	Skipped	**0**

FIGURE 13 CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEBUILDING NEEDS

How well did the project results contribute to addressing the identified peacebuilding needs of the target groups?

25%

75%

■ Not at all ■ Not much

■ To some extent ■ Well

■ Very well ■ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

FIGURE 14 RECEIPT OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT/GUIDANCE

Did your organization receive technical support or guidance from the main partner (direct UN PBF Fund recipient) during this project?

14%

86%

■ Yes ■ No

*1 respondent skipped this question.

FIGURE 15 USEFULNESS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT/GUIDANCE

How useful was the technical support or guidance you received from the main partner (direct UN PBF Fund recipient) during this project?

17%

83%

■ Not at all useful ■ Not very useful ■ Somewhat useful ■ Useful ■ Highly useful

Answers of the 6 respondents that had received guidance.

TABLE 11 SUSTAINABILITY OF CSO ACTIVITIES

Now that the funding to this project has ended, has your organization been able to continue activities or results of this project?	Responses	
Yes, thanks to new funding	0%	0
Yes, without new funding	29%	2
No, because we did not get new funding	57%	4
No, We did not plan to continue after the project ended	0%	0
I don't know/Prefer not to answer	0%	0
Other (please specify)	14%	1
	Answered	**7**

FIGURE 16 CURRENT SUPPORT FROM STATE/LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Do you currently see active support from state or local authorities to the peacebuilding results or initiatives supported by the project?

- No support at all — 29%
- Very little — 29%
- Some — 0%
- A lot — 29%
- I don't know/prefer not to answer — 14%

*1 respondent skipped this question.

FIGURE 17 UNINTENDED OUTCOMES

Did the project result in any unintended outcomes (positive or negative)?

- Yes — 86%
- No — 0%
- I don't know/Prefer not to answer — 14%

*1 respondent skipped this question.

*All respondents said that their organization benefitted as a result of partnerships.

Annex 6. List of 2020 GYPI projects

#	Country	Theme	GPI/YPI	Project Number	Project Name	Start Date	End Date	Total $ Amount Approved	Fund Recipients
1	Burkina Faso	Human rights	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-386	Projet d'appui à la promotion, à la protection des jeunes défenseurs des droits de la personne des Régions du Sahel, du Nord et de l'Est.	27-Jan-21	27-Dec-22	$ 1,500,000.00	UNDP UNFPA UNICEF
2	Cameroon	Human rights	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-387	Renforcement de la participation des mécanismes communautaires et du rôle des défenseures des droits humains au processus de consolidation de la paix dans les Régions du Nord-ouest et du Sud-ouest Cameroun	22-Jan-21	20-Jul-22	$ 1,500,000.00	UNDP UNFPA UN Women
3	Central African Republic	Human rights	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-413	Défenseuses des droits humains, actrices de la consolidation de la paix	15-Feb-21	12-Aug-22	$ 1,500,000.00	UNDP Avocats Sans Frontières Belgium
4	Chad	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-388	Projet de prévention de la féminisation des modes opératoires des groupes extrémistes au Tchad	22-Jan-21	20-Jan-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNDP UNICEF
5	Colombia	Human rights	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-400	"Allanando el camino": Women and LGBT people paving a path from justice and memory toward sustaining peace in Colombia	11-Feb-21	9-Nov-22	$ 1,100,000.00	Christian Aid Ireland
6	Colombia	Human rights	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-401	Young and female peacebuilders in northern Cauca. Tradition meets innovation in community-led approaches	11-Feb-21	23-Feb-23	$ 1,500,000.00	Norwegian Refugee Council
7	Congo, Democratic Republic of	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-404	Promouvoir la participation des femmes à la consolidation de la paix grâce aux paillottes de paix	12-Feb-21	10-Aug-22	$ 400,000.00	Fund for Congolese Women
8	Congo, Democratic Republic	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-405	Renforcer la justice, la cohésion sociale et la réinsertion socioéconomique pour et par les jeunes femmes et hommes déplacés, rapatriés et de la communauté hôte	4-Mar-21	4-Sep-22	$ 1,500,000.00	UNHCR OHCHR World Vision International

					au Grand Kasaï				
9	Côte d'Ivoire	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-402	Initiative des Jeunes Leaders (Hommes et Femmes) Engagés pour la Consolidation de la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire	11-Feb-21	28-Feb-23	$1,252,602.00	Care International UK
10	Côte d'Ivoire	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-403	Contribution à la construction d'une élite politique responsable à travers la gestion pacifique des crises dans l'espace universitaire en vue d'une paix durable en Côte d'ivoire	12-Feb-21	10-Feb-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNFPA UNDP Interpeace
11	El Salvador	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-414	Juventudes salvadoreñas construyendo paz y resiliencia: Derecho a ciudadanía participativa e incidencia en los municipios de Jiquilisco y Tecoluca	17-Feb-21	15-Aug-22	$ 1,499,530.10	UNFPA UNESCO NIMD
12	El Salvador	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-381	MOVEO-Jóvenes en acción: hacia la diversidad sin violencia forjando alianzas para la construcción de paz y justicia en El Salvador	20-Jan-21	20-Jan-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNODC IOM
13	Guinea	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-380	Action concertée des jeunes (femmes et hommes) leaders communautaires pour le renforcement de la cohésion sociale et la consolidation de la paix en Guinée Forestière	20-Jan-21	19-Jul-22	$ 1,427,915.00	IOM OHCHR UNFPA
14	Guinea-Bissau	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-406	No Ianda Djuntu-Drawing the pathway together: new leadership for meaningful participation, peace and stability in Guinea Bissau	12-Feb-21	10-Aug-22	$ 341,000.00	Interpeace
15	Haiti	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-407	Semences de paix : une jeunesse haïtienne engagée pour construire une société meilleure	16-Feb-21	14-Dec-22	$ 1,500,000.00	Concern Worldwide
16	Honduras	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-418	Juventudes desplazadas por la violencia en Honduras: protagonistas resilientes hacia nuevos paradigmas de desarrollo sostenible desde la diversidad y el territorio	25-Feb-21	22-Aug-22	$ 1,500,000.00	UNESCO, ILO and Red de Instituciones por

									los Derechos de la Niñez
17	Honduras	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-410	Comunidades constructoras de paz e igualdad (CONPAZ)	12-Feb-21	30-Nov-22	$ 1,496,521.26	UNICEF and Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo de Honduras
18	Liberia	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-411	Protection and Support of Enabling Environment for Women Human Rights Defenders and LGBTQI Rights Defenders in Liberia	12-Feb-21	10-Aug-22	$ 495,000.00	Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation
19	Liberia	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-412	Sustainable and inclusive peace in Liberia through promoting women leadership and participation in civic and political life and their strengthened role in conflict resolution	19-Feb-21	31-Aug-22	$ 1,289,614.83	Stichting ZOA
20	Madagascar	Human rights	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-382	Soutien à la Protection des Jeunes Défenseurs des Droits de l'Homme et Consolidateurs de la Paix, Gage de la paix sociale et de la cohésion communautaire	20-Jan-21	21-Jan-23	$ 1,250,000.00	OHCHR UNESCO
21	Madagascar	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-416	OBS-MADA : Observatoire des jeunes citoyens engagés pour une gouvernance plus inclusive, efficace et apaisé	23-Feb-21	22-Feb-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNDP MSIS-TATAO
22	Madagascar	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-415	Renforcer la participation des femmes aux processus politiques et à la consolidation de la paix pour promouvoir une résolution pacifique et inclusive des conflits à Madagascar	18-Feb-21	16-Aug-22	$ 300,000.00	EISA
23	Mali	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-408	Les jeunes engagés pour une paix durable : Appui à la participation des jeunes aux processus de réconciliation au Mali	16-Feb-21	16-Feb-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNICEF, UNDP and Avocats sans frontières Canada

24	Mauritania	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-389	Prévention de l'extrémisme violent à travers le renforcement du leadership des femmes à Nouakchott et dans les zones frontalières à risque (Trarza, Hodh El Gharbi, Hodh El Chargui et Guidimakha)	22-Jan-21	20-Jul-22	$ 999,328.64	UNODC UNESCO
25	Sierra Leone	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-417	Inclusive peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone	19-Feb-21	18-Aug-22	$ 1,359,999.96	Stichting Cordaid
26	Solomon Islands	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-383	Gender Responsive Peacebuilding in Extractive Industries in Solomon Islands Isabel Province	22-Jan-21	21-Jan-23	$ 1,500,000.00	IOM UNFPA
27	Sri Lanka	Leadership	YPI	UN PBF/IRF-384	Engaging Young Leaders to Promote Healthy Settings for building Cohesive Communities in Post-COVID Sri Lanka	25-Jan-21	20-Jul-23	$ 1,499,998.65	WHO UNDP
28	Sri Lanka	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-385	Protecting the Rights Space to foster peace in Sri Lanka	25-Jan-21	5-Feb-23	$ 1,500,000.00	UNOPS UNODC
29	Sudan	Leadership	GPI	UN PBF/IRF-409	Strengthening the Political and Peacebuilding Role of Women in Sudan's Transition	17-Feb-21	17-Feb-23	$ 899,287.58	Search for Common Ground

Annex 7. Stakeholder mapping

Stakeholder	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation	Who
Internal stakeholders			
UN PBF Advisory Group	As the advisory body responsible for supporting the speed and appropriateness of fund allocations, the Advisory Group will be interested to understand Fund performance.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the UN PBF website.	n.a.
The Peacebuilding Support Office	Findings will inform the PBSO in setting Fund direction, guiding the use of resources. The cohort evaluation falls under their responsibility for monitoring and reporting on activities. Findings can support the PBSO in evaluating requests for support made by the Resident Coordinator in consultation with the government for decisions on approval.	Primary stakeholders: The evaluation team will involve key stakeholders in key informant interviews for direct input into evaluation findings.	Gender and Peacebuilding Officer, Associate Expert, Programme Officers, Associate Programme Officers, Gender Advisor, Human Rights Advisor, YPS Advisor, Chief, Financing for Peacebuilding Branch, Human Rights Advisor
Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office	As the Fiduciary Agent for the Fund, the MPTF has an interest in understanding how efficiently and effectively funds are spent.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated.	n.a.
UN PBF Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E) team	The DM&E team holds primary responsibility for quality assurance and approval of deliverables and regular communication with the Consulting Firm.	Primary stakeholder: The DM&E team, who commissioned this cohort evaluation, will review and comment on the draft ER. They will brief the evaluation team during the inception phase and be interviewed as key informants during the main data collection phase. They will participate in the debriefing at the end of the evaluation mission and provide comments on the evaluation report	Senior Advisor M&E, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Knowledge Management Officer, Peacebuilding Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Expert,
External stakeholders			
The Peacebuilding Commission	Findings will support the Peacebuilding Commission to develop integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and inform their provision of strategic advice to countries under its purview.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the UN PBF website	n.a.

Target groups	As the ultimate recipients of UN PBF assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in UN PBF determining whether its assistance is relevant, appropriate and effective.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the PBSO Gateway.	Targeted youth, women, marginalized groups.
National government	The Government stakeholders drive national policy, strategy and operations, which in turn directly impacts how UN PBF operates and engages in the country. UN PBF programming can provide useful lessons and should enable national policy makers to identify opportunities to support national strategies; and ensure that UN PBF's future interventions are aligned with national needs and policy. In general, programme applications cannot be submitted without the endorsement of the national government.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the PBSO Gateway.	National governments involved in peacebuilding within countries where GYPI projects are implemented.
UN country teams	PBSO works closely with other United Nations agencies. Some UN Agencies are fund recipients (listed above).Under the 2020 GYPI Call for Proposals UNCTs in eligible countries were able to submit a maximum of two GPI and two YPI proposals with up to three recipient UN agencies per project or joint UN-CSO proposals with up to three recipient organizations per project (maximum two UN organizations and one CSO) The UN country team (UNCT)'s coordinated action should contribute to the realization of the government peacebuilding objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that PBSO programmes are effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. UN stakeholders will be interested in how PBSO GYPI-funded projects function within countries where they work and their performance more generally. Findings can help inform agencies of how to better engage with PBSO in the future.	Secondary stakeholders: the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the PBSO Gateway.	N.a.

Contributors	Fund activities are supported by contributors who have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if the GYPI-funded projects are effective in promoting inclusive and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding and whether the work has contributed to their own strategies and programmes.	Secondary stakeholders the findings of the evaluation will be circulated and published on the PBSO Gateway.	MPTF contributors
Fund recipients	PBSO accepts applications for GYPI funding from UN agencies, funds and programmes and CSOs. Fund recipients are responsible for implementation of GYPI programming in country. Findings and recommendations of the evaluation may be of interest to these stakeholders for their future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships, and to enable enhancement for partnerships between UN PBF and other actors.	Primary stakeholders: fund recipients of projects selected for the four light-touch evaluations will be involved in KIIs and FGDs for the Burkina Faso IRF 386, Colombia IRF 400, Haiti IRF 407 and Mali IRF 408 projects. Secondary stakeholders: fund recipients in countries not involved in the individual interviews will be secondary stakeholders interested in evaluation findings to inform future programming and proposals in subsequent GYPI funding windows.	RUNOs and NUNOs leading the projects and directly responsible for the funding received.
Local government	Local government, as part of the institutional structure within countries, have an interest in identifying how UN PBF-funded programming aligns with and responds to local priorities. UN PBF programming can provide useful lessons and should enable local governments to ensure that UN PBF's future interventions are aligned with local needs and policy. Some local governments are also implementing partners. Implementing partners have an interest in programme effectiveness, results and sustainability through continuous ownership of initiatives, strong political support at various levels, and flow of resources.	Primary stakeholders: local governments implementing activities in the projects selected for the four light-touch evaluations will be involved in KIIs for the Burkina Faso IRF 386, Colombia IRF 400, Haiti IRF 407 and Mali IRF 408 projects. Secondary stakeholders: local governments in countries not involved in the individual interviews may be interested in evaluation findings to inform their approaches to the themes covered by GYPI.	Local governments involved in peacebuilding within countries where GYPI projects are implemented.

Implementing partner CSOs	Implementing partner CSOs have an interest in programme effectiveness, results and sustainability through continuous ownership of initiatives, strong political support at various levels, and flow of resources. Some local implementing partners are also fund recipients.	Primary stakeholders: local implementing agencies for the four light-touch evaluations will be involved in KIIs and FGDs for the four projects selected for light touch evaluations. Secondary stakeholders: implementing partners in countries not involved in the individual interviews will be secondary stakeholders interested in evaluation findings to inform implementation efforts.	National and local CSO partnering with Fund recipients in project implementation

Annex 8.   Data collection tool templates

Stakeholders' Questionnaire Guides

Evaluation Criteria	Main Evaluation Questions: For all WS2 questions, please check the judgement criteria in the EM to ensure how you will analyze is clear.				
Relevance: Is the intervention doing the right things? The extent to which the intervention's objectives and design respond to beneficiaries' global, country and partner/institution needs, policies and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.	***Meta Question EQ.1*** *To what extent did the 2020 GYPI themes and the projects' intended outcomes address peacebuilding needs of women and youth targeted, and peace and conflict factors identified in the conflict analysis, remaining relevant and responsive throughout the course of the project?*				
	WS2.EQ 1.5: Do local stakeholders agree with the analysis on the conflict and peace factors in the conflict analysis underpinning the project?				
	WS2.EQ 1.6: To what extent the ToC and the project approach were clear and appropriate from the local stakeholders' perspective, and consistent with their expectations?				
	WS2 1.7: If during project implementation, conflict sensitivity risks or opportunities to leverage peace effects of activities emerged/were identified, were the projects able to adapt and react timely (and if so, how)?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**
	Are you aware of the conflict analysis that informed this project design? How relevant do you think it was to the context where the project was implemented?	What were the main challenges this project was trying to address? How relevant were these considering the peacebuilding priorities of the communities targeted by this project?	Are you aware of the conflict analysis that informed this project design? How relevant do you think it was to the context where the project was implemented?	What were the main challenges this project was trying to address? How relevant were these considering the peacebuilding priorities of your community?	This project worked to address x,y,z in x locations. How relevant do you think this was considering the peacebuilding needs of these stakeholders and the country?
	(If explicit) The theory of change (ToC) of the project states xyz (or show diagram) - how appropriate do you think it is, considering the local context? How does this align with local stakeholder	Summarize the key project logic and main assumptions. How relevant is this considering what you just shared regarding the peacebuilding priorities of the community?	(If explicit) The theory of change (ToC) of the project states xyz (or show diagram) - how appropriate do you think it is, considering the local context?	This project did x and achieved y over the timeframe x to y. Did this project meet your expectations? Why or why not?	(If explicit) The theory of change (ToC) of the project states xyz (or show diagram) - how appropriate do you think it is, considering the local context?

	expectations? How do you know?				
	Did the project have to be modified during implementation, either due to risks or new opportunities to leverage peace? If yes, please describe. Was it able to adapt efficiently and effectively? Why or why not.	Thinking back to the period x until y (i.e. Feb 2021 - November 2022 for Columbia), were there any instances of significant risk or even of good opportunity to further leverage peace? Please describe. Were you able to adjust the project implementation accordingly?	Reflecting on the period x until y (Feb 2021 until November 2022 in the case of Columbia), were there any major conflict risks or peacebuilding opportunities (macro level) in the country? Please describe. How flexible of a donor is UN PBF/MPTFO to take advantage of such opportunities or to mitigate unforeseen risks.	Did you make any suggestions to improve the activities or how the project was being managed during implementation? If not, if you did have feedback during the project, how would you give feedback? Please describe.	NA?

Efficiency - How well are resources being used? The extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way.	**Meta Question EQ.2:** To what extent did GYPI projects use the available resources efficient and deliver the stated objectives in a timely way?				
	WS2.EQ2.4 To what extent did communication and support (including technical guidance) between the UN PBF HQ/Secretariat in-country, fund recipients and local implementing partners contribute to project efficiency and the realization of outcomes?				
	WS2 EQ2.5 To what extent local partners/CSOs were involved in project planning, steering and implementation of the projects, including on budgeting, staffing and operational choices. How efficient were these processes?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**

	What support and technical guidance, if any, did you receive from PBSO in-country or HQ (NY); if none, what support and guidance did you receive from MPTFO in-country or the UN Res Coord Office. Please describe.	What support or technical guidance did you receive from your main partner (name the directly funded partner). Please describe. How easy was it for you to communicate with the main partner? How often did you communicate. What could have made it better?	Did you support the fund recipient or local CSOs in this project at all (e.g. technical support, coordination etc.). Please describe. Did you rely on/use any UN PBF technical materials in this regard? Please describe. Was it useful?	NA	NA
	How did you involve the implementing partners and other stakeholders in the project design, planning, management and implementation? Please describe. Were they involved in decision-making on budgeting, staffing or other operational matters? Please describe. What could have made these processes more efficient. Validate what percentage of the budget ended up being implemented by the local CSO partners (in total).	(confirm when they started with the organization and project). Were you or your organization involved in the design of the project? What about decision-making regarding operational matters (Staffing, budgeting etc). Please describe. What could have made your involvement more efficient? What project activities could have been more efficient or relevant? Please describe.	NA	NA	NA

Effectiveness: Is the intervention achieving its objectives? The extent to which the intervention	
	Meta Question EQ.3: To what extent did the GYPI projects achieve (or are likely to achieve) the intended peacebuilding results or outcomes?
	WS2 EQ3.5 What do in-country stakeholders consider are the most significant changes achieved as a direct or indirect contribution of the projects?
	WS2 EQ3.6 What are the main good practices and learning to be extracted from these projects, from the in-country stakeholders' viewpoint?

achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives and its results, including any differential results across groups.	Fund-Recipients	Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)	PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO	Project Beneficiaries	Other State and Non-State Actors
	What impact did this project have? Can you provide some examples? Any notable indirect impacts? Please describe?	What project results are you most proud of? Why? What do you think is the biggest impact this project has had?	Are you familiar with any significant results or impacts of this project? Please describe. What about indirect impacts? Any knock-on effects on other programs that you are aware of? Please describe.	Thinking back to the timeframe of this project (x to y), what were the most important results? What changes did you see in your community as a result Please describe.	Do you think this project has had any impacts? What are some of the most important ones?
	Have any lessons or good practices been identified as a result of this project? Please explain. Are these documented? Where?	Have any lessons or good practices been identified as a result of this project? Please explain.	Are you aware of any good practices or lessons learned coming from this project? How do you capture and use these across the different partners you support?	What lessons did you or your colleagues learn during this project? What do you think the CSO should have learned and why?	Are you aware of any good practices or lessons learned coming from this project? How do you capture and use these across the different partners you work with?
Sustainability & Ownership	**Meta Question EQ.4** To what extent have the projects' beneficiaries/local stakeholders taken ownership of peacebuilding results/benefits, and these have continued (or are likely to continue) beyond termination of the projects?				
	WS2 EQ4.3 Have women/youth led CSOs and other local stakeholders' taken ownership of the projects and continue to engage/promote peacebuilding efforts?				
	WS2 EQ4.4 Have the project's results with regard to women/youth empowerment led to meaningful participation and/or rights promotion/protection that continue to be sustained?				
	WS2 EQ4.5 To what extent did the GYPI projects contribute to broader strategic outcomes identified in nationally owned strategic plans, UN PBF eligibility packages, or annual strategic reports of UN Resident Coordinators?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**

	Are there any examples of sustainability stemming from this project? Describe. (can prompt for examples of women or youth led ownership, continued promotion of PB efforts or human rights protections).	How has your organization's capacity been strengthened as a result of this project? What about other local partners that you have worked with? Please give some concrete examples. Now that the project is over, will your organization be able to continue any activities or sustain any key results?	Are you aware of any sustained activities or behaviors as a result of this project? What about in other projects that you have funded? What types of things tend to be continued even after project funding has ended?	What changed practices or new things you have learned do you think you will be able to continue into the future if any? Please describe.	What activities, practices or behaviors will your agency continue now that project funding has ended. If none, what is the primary reason for that?
	Are there any examples of this project contributing to broader strategic outcomes in this country - please describe.	Has your organization been able to establish any other partnership or raise new monies to continue to be involved in peace-building activities (whether related to this project or not). Please describe.	Are there any results from this project that have contributed to broader strategic outcomes in your overall PB portfolio? Have any of these resulted in new policies, strategy direction or otherwise have been integrated into other UN partners plans? What are some examples if any?	NA	Are there any results from this project that have contributed to broader national plans or policies or contributed to the work of other partners? Please describe.
Coherence & Coordination Coherence: How well does the intervention fit? The compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.	**Meta Question EQ5.** To what extent were GYPI projects aligned, complementary and coordinated with the overall UN PBF and wider UN-system strategy and support in-country?				
	WS2 EQ5.3 To what extent did UN-CSOs partnerships and direct support to local CSOS promoted by UN PBF/GYPI add value to existing peacebuilding support in-country? What lessons can be learned?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**
	Did you have UN PBF funding in this country prior to this project? Did this project build on the previous projects in	Did you have UN PBF funding in this country prior to this project? Did this project build	How complementary was this project to other UN PBF supported interventions?	NA	

	any way? If yes, please describe.	on the previous projects in any way? If yes, please describe.	What gaps did this project address?		
	In thinking about other PB efforts in this country, what would you say was the main value-added of this project?	What do you think was the main value-add of this project? Or what key gaps do you think this project addressed compared to other PB-type projects?	In thinking about other PB efforts in this country, what would you say was the main value-added of this project if any that you are aware of?	NA	What do you think was the main value-add of this project? Or what key gaps do you think this project addressed compared to other PB-type projects?
Conflict Sensitivity	**Meta Question EQ6.** How well was conflict-sensitivity mainstreamed in design and throughout the duration of the project (incl. implementation of activities, monitoring, communication, reporting)?				
	WS2 EQ6.2 Did the Fund recipients and the local partners have the required capacities to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach?				
	WS2 EQ6.3 What is the local stakeholder's assessment of the conflict-sensitivity risks and opportunities, and of how they were managed/seized by the projects?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**
	Do you think your organization had sufficient capacity overseeing this project to ensure a conflict sensitive approach? What were the biggest strengths? What are some examples of that? What additional capacity would have been useful?	Do you think your organization had sufficient capacity overseeing this project to ensure a conflict sensitive approach? What were the biggest strengths? What are some examples of that? What additional capacity would have been useful? Any lessons learned in this regard?	What main gaps do you see in NUNOs/RUNOs and local CSOs in terms of ensuring conflict sensitive approaches? Any reflections on the partners in this project?		

	Do you think the main implementing partners you funded had sufficient capacity to ensure a conflict sensitive approach? What additional capacities could have been useful?				
Catalytic - UN PBF definition - 1) Financial: Did the project help leverage additional investments in related areas of intervention? 2) Did the project help raise awareness and interest in peacebuilding programming and specifically youth or women-focused peacebuilding programming.	**Meta Question EQ7**. To what extent did GYPI projects help leverage additional peacebuilding funding or new WPS/YPS focused programs?				
	WS2 EQ7.3 To what extent local partners/CSO/CBOs gained visibility and/or credibility as a result of their engagement with GYPI projects?				
	WS2 EQ7.4 Did fund recipients and local partners secure funding (by the UN or other sources) continuing a similar focus and approach after the GYPI project?				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**
	What visibility did the implementing CSO partners gain as a result of their involvement in this project that you are aware of? Please explain	Did your organization increase their visibility as a result of involvement in this project? Did you raise any new monies from other donors or partners to continue work in PB/GYPI or related areas?	Do you think this project helped raise awareness in PB, specifically in the importance of the role of women and youth? Please explain	Do you or your community have any new awareness regarding peacebuilding or the role of women and youth in the PB process? What's one important example?	Do you think this project helped raise awareness in PB, specifically in the importance of the role of women and youth? Please explain
	Did the CSOs involvement result in them securing any new funding from other donors or UN partners that you are aware of (in PB, GYPI)?	Are there any other examples of how this project may have helped raise awareness or interest in PB programming, specifically those focused on youth or women? Please describe.			

	Did your organization secure any new funding to continue work in the PB/GYPI realm since concluding this UN PBF project?				
	Are there any other examples of how this project may have helped raise awareness or interest in PB programming, specifically those focused on youth or women? Please describe.				
Innovation	Meta Question EQ8. How novel or innovative were the GYPI projects approach to advancing WPS/YPS?				
	WS2 EQ8.3 Local stakeholders' perspective on any novel or innovative elements in the project approach, and their contribution to peacebuilding/positive change.				
	Fund-Recipients	**Local Implementing Partners (CSOs)**	**PBSO Secretariat/MPTFO**	**Project Beneficiaries**	**Other State and Non-State Actors**
	If not already identified, did any innovative or promising approaches emerge from this project? Please describe.	If not already identified, did any innovative or promising approaches emerge from this project? Please describe.	Are you aware of any innovative or promising approaches that emerged from this project? Please describe.	NA	Are you aware of any innovative or promising approaches that emerged from this project? Please describe.
	Has anything from this project been replicated elsewhere (or are there plans to do so)?	Has anything from this project been replicated elsewhere (or are there plans to do so)?	Are you aware of any approaches from this project being replicated elsewhere? Please describe.		Is there anything else you would like to share regarding lessons learned or good practices?

[Interaction analysis template](#)

Areas of Analysis/Questions	Project/Context Interaction	Project Response/Adaptation	
		Strengths/Opportunities[215]	Weaknesses/Gaps
Which aspects/activities of the projects had a negative effect on the peace and conflict factors, conflict-sensitivity risks and/or stakeholders' dynamics?			
Which aspects/activities of the projects had a positive effect on peace and conflict factors, conflict-sensitivity risks and/or stakeholders' needs and dynamics?			
Was project implementation negatively impacted by the context (e.g., conflict, pandemic, etc.)? If so, in what ways? Did projects adapt and how (or why not)?			
Did the assumptions and causality pathways of the projects' ToC prove valid? Were any key assumptions or steps missing in the ToC?			

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[215] It may include strong conflict analysis, planning, human resource capacities, monitoring systems to identify and address/mitigate timely and effectively potential negative effects and conflict-sensitivity risks; valid assumptions in the ToC. It may also include flexibility and timely adaptation to seize unexpected peacebuilding opportunities

Online surveys

Fund Recipients

1. What initiative did you project address (gender or youth)?
   - ○ GPI: Gender Promotion Initiative
   - ○ YPI: Youth Promotion Initiative
   - ○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

2. Which theme of the 2020 GYPI Call did your project address?
   - ○ Supporting women and youth leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements
   - ○ Promoting human rights and protection of women and youth peacebuilders and human rights defenders
   - ○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

3. When did you first involve CSO partners in the project?
   - ○ CSO partners were involved as of the concept note/proposal stage
   - ○ CSO partners were involved in the project design (after the concept note/proposal stage)
   - ○ CSO partners were involved at the implementation phase
   - ○ CSO partners were involved for monitoring
   - ○ I don't know/prefer not to answer

4. In case there were context changes that impacted project implementation, how well did the project adapt?
   - ○ No major changes in context requiring adaptation of activities
   - ○ Could not adapt at all
   - ○ Adapted somewhat
   - ○ Adapted very well
   - ○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

5. If you could not adapt, why? Select all that apply
   - ☐ PBF procedures did not allow us to adapt/further adapt
   - ☐ My organisation did not allow us to adapt/further adapt
   - ☐ I don't know/prefer not to answer

   Other (please specify)
   [   ]

6. What were the main advantages of partnering with the CSO(s)? Select all that apply
   - ☐ Access to remote locations
   - ☐ Easier entry point to local stakeholders/community trust/collaboration.
   - ☐ Local context knowledge
   - ☐ Respond timely to local peacebuilding
   - ☐ Value for money
   - ☐ I don't know/prefer not to answer
   - ☐ There were no advantages to local partnerships

   Other (please specify)
   [   ]

7. What were the main disadvantages or risks of partnering with the CSO(s)?
   - ☐ Politicization
   - ☐ CSOs' poor management/financial capacity
   - ☐ Lack of CSO's thematic expertise
   - ☐ Lack of inclusivity within CSOs
   - ☐ Dependency on external inputs/resources
   - ☐ I don't know/prefer not to answer
   - ☐ There were no disadvantages/risks

   Other (please specify)
   [   ]

8. How effective was the project in achieving intended results/outcomes

Not at all effective	Not very effective	Somewhat effective	Highly effective	I don't know/prefer not to answer
★	★	★	★	○

9. How sustainable do you feel key results or activities will be?
   [   ]

10. In general, which key factors determine the future sustainability of results/outcomes?
   - ☐ Government commitment
   - ☐ Local partners' ownership
   - ☐ Local partners thematic expertise
   - ☐ Availability of funding
   - ☐ National/local context (political stability; space for civic engagement; ...).
   - ☐ I don't know/prefer not to answer

   Other (please specify)
   [   ]

11. How well did this project build on or align with other peacebuilding projects in the country?

○ There were no other peace building projects to build on/align with
○ Not at all
○ Not very well
○ Somewhat well
○ Very well
○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

12. What is the added value of PBF funding through GYPI compared to other financing sources (PBF regular programming, other UN donors, other bilateral or multilateral donors)?

☐ Thematic focus   ☐ Flexibility
☐ Specific targeting of women/youth   ☐ I don't know/prefer not to answer
☐ Requirement to channel support to local CSOs ☐ No specific added value

Other (please specify)

[   ]

13. To what extent did the project influence or leverage additional attention or funding to the issues it focused on?

○ Not at all
○ Not much
○ Some
○ Significantly
○ I don't know/prefer not to answer

14. Can you provide an example of this influence or leverage of additional attention or funding in the country to the issues the project focused on?

[   ]

15. In your opinion, what has been the most significant change this project contributed to so far, notably with regard to thematic issues it focused on?

[   ]

16. Looking back, did the project result in any unintended outcomes (positive or negative, direct or indirect)?

[   ]

17. Are there any good practices, innovation or learning from the project for future interventions in the same thematic area that you can mention?

[   ]

18. Did you find the partnership with PBF useful? Please explain

[   ]

19. Do you have any recommendations to PBF for improving future GYPI calls?

[   ]

20. If you are the lead RUNO/ NUNO in the project, please indicate the number of CSO implementing partners with whom you have shared the link to the GYPI Cohort Evaluation Survey for CSO implementing partners?

You are responsible for passing on the link to the CSO implementing partners. In case you haven't sent it yet, we would be grateful if you could do so at your earliest convenience: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/PBF_GYPI_ImplementingPartner

If you have not sent the link yet please indicate the number of CSO implementing partners you **will** send it to. Thank you!

[   ]

CSO

Thank you for participating in this survey for CSO Implementing Partners of the 2020 PBF Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI). The survey will take approximately 20-30 minutes. All questions include a 'prefer not to answer' option though we hope you will provide the most complete feedback possible.

Your responses remain anonymous and you will not be asked to provide your name, position or organization. This survey platform does not collect information concerning your IP location or from which email responses were received. Direct quotes may be used in the final evaluation report but will not be attributed to any country or organization.

1. Which of the following theme/s did your project address?

☐ Supporting women and youth leadership, representation and participation in peacebuilding processes and implementation of peace agreements

☐ Promoting human rights and protection of women and youth peacebuilders and human rights defenders

☐ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

2. Which groups of people did this project try and reach?

☐ Women ☐ Youth
☐ Men ☐ Elderly
☐ LGBTQI+ ☐ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

Other (please specify)

3. How relevant do you feel the project was to the peacebuilding needs of the groups you mentioned in the previous question?

Not at all relevant	Not so relevant	Partially relevant	Relevant	Highly relevant	I don't know/prefer not to answer
★	★	★	★	★	○

4. When was your organization first involved in the project?

○ Involved as of the concept note/proposal stage   ○ Involved for monitoring

○ Involved in the project design (after the concept note/proposal stage)   ○ I don't know/prefer not to answer

○ Involved at the implementation phase

5. In your view, how well did the project results contribute to addressing the identified peacebuilding needs of the target groups?

6. What is one peacebuilding need the project especially contributed to?

7. Did your organization improve in any way as a result of this partnership?

○ Yes

○ No

○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

8. What are the most significant examples of that improvement to your organization?

9. What are some ways the partnership could be improved or strengthened in the future?

10. Did your organization receive technical support or guidance from the main partner (direct PBF Fund recipient) during this project?

○ Yes

○ No

○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

11. How useful was the technical support or guidance you received from the main partner (direct PBF Fund recipient) during this project?

Not at all useful	Not very useful	Somewhat useful	Useful	Highly useful	I don't know/prefer not to answer
★	★	★	★	★	○

12. Now that the funding to this project has ended, has your organization been able to continue activities or results of this project?

○ Yes, thanks to new funding

○ Yes, without new funding

○ No, because we did not get new funding

○ Other (please specify)

[   ]

○ No, We did not plan to continue after the project ended

○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

13. Do you currently see active support from state or local authorities to the peacebuilding results or initiatives supported by the project?

No support at all	Very little	Some	A lot	I don't know/prefer not to answer
★	★	★	★	○

14. What do you think was the most significant change this project contributed to?

[   ]

15. Looking back, did the project result in any unintended outcomes (positive or negative)?

○ Yes

○ No

○ I don't know/Prefer not to answer

16. What were the unintended outcomes?

[   ]

17. Was there any innovation learning or good practices from the project that you would like to share?

[   ]

18. Anything else you would like to share regarding your experience with this project?

[   ]

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Annex 9.   Evaluation team profile

Team Leader, Fernanda Faria has over 20 years of experience on peace, security and development policy research and analysis. Since 2013, she has led and participated in several monitoring and evaluations missions in fragile or conflict-affected contexts, notably for the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, the EU and the OECD. **Ms. Faria has previously engaged in UN PBF evaluations with KonTerra-(a) as Team Leader for the Peacebuilding Fund Portfolio Evaluation-Cote d'Ivoire (2019), and (b) as a Senior Evaluator for the Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (UN PBF) Project Portfolio in Kyrgyzstan (2017).** She has experience on global thematic and instrument-level evaluations, as well as country-level support and programme/project evaluations, **with a focus on peacebuilding themes, including women and youth empowerment and participation in peace and security processes**. She has conducted field work in about half of the countries in the project portfolio of the GYPI cohort evaluation. She is familiar with the UN system, having conducted UN PBF evaluations and engaged with UN agencies in those and other evaluations. and is in the expert rosters of UNDP (ExpRes) and of Interpeace (Peace Responsiveness). Ms. Faria is experienced in the use of mixed methods approaches, with a focus on qualitative data collection and analysis, as well as of participatory conflict- and gender-sensitive approaches. Ms. Faria holds a (4-year) diploma in International Relations and is **fluent in Portuguese, English, French and Spanish**, which allowed her to provide a comprehensive overview ensuring the quality of the data collection process and outputs across the different languages of the portfolio of projects.

With over 25 years' experience in the international humanitarian and development aid sector, **Senior Evaluator, Margaret Stansberry** has strong strategic planning, monitoring, evaluation, and leadership skills. She has focused on sectors including **peacebuilding**, disaster risk reduction, response readiness, food security, community-based health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. Ms. Stansberry has undertaken numerous evaluations, including a **UNICEF Global Evaluability Assessment for a peacebuilding, education, and advocacy (PBEA) program in 14 countries (2013)**, and Care International's **Education for Peace and Tolerance** Program in Kosovo (2005). Ms. Stansberry has designed and conducted surveys and facilitated dozens of focus group discussions and key informant interviews for both primary data collection for evaluations and strategic planning processes. She holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Political Science from the State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo and a Bachelor of Arts (BA) in Political Science from SUNY at Buffalo and is a **native English speaker**.

Data Analyst, Jane Burke brings over 10 years of progressively senior data collection and analysis experience in humanitarian contexts with international organizations. Jane has designed participatory data collection tools, trained local enumerators, adapted tools for local contexts, as well as ensured quality control of data for evaluations with UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, Oxfam, and NRC. She holds a MA in International Development, with a specialization in Monitoring and Evaluation from American University in Washington, DC, and a BA in Political Science from North Carolina State University. Jane is a **native English speaker with professional level Spanish speaking and reading skills**.

Local consultants proposed for the two in-country sample project evaluations:

Hafizou Boncana is an independent consultant who conducted the in-person evaluation for Mali IRF-408. Mr. Boncana brings a wealth of experience and excellent knowledge of the context in Mali having conducted several assignments in the country including relevant assignments on peace and security. He is highly experienced in leading key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Recent assignments include positions as a National Consultant conducting Interviews and FGDs in Mali for the Evaluation of the World Food Programme's Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Policies, Researcher supporting Caritas in a Gender and Land Rights Study in Mali, and Consultant for the evaluation of GIZ's "Support to the Stabilization and Peace Process in Mali (PASP) and expert trainer in pedagogical preparation of the training program for Mali's Ministry of National Reconciliation and PASP for GIZ. He speaks excellent French, Bambara and Songhay. He holds a master's degree in law and international and Comparative Environmental Law.

Mario Fernando Guerrero: is an independent consultant who conducted the in-person evaluation for Colombia IRF 400. Dr Guerrero is an adjunct professor of comparative politics and conflict analysis at the National University of Colombia with strong knowledge of the country context. He is an experienced researcher skilled in leading the design and implementation of research in Colombia. Recent relevant

assignments include leading the Communication, Education, ICTs, and Contemporary Conflicts Research Group at the Colombia Ministry of Science, as well as a recent role as researcher at the Communication, Culture and Citizenship Research Group, at the National University of Colombia. Dr Guerrero is fluent in English, Spanish, and French and holds a PhD in Media, ICTs, Communication, and Culture Studies.

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Project-related documents

Project Number	Pro Doc	NCE1	NCE2	2021				2022				Final		Other (write in)
				Semi		Annual		Semi		Annual				
				Rep.	Fin	Rep.	Fin	Rep.	Fin	Rep.	Fin	Rep.	Eval.	
Guinea IRF 380	X	--	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	--
El Salvador IRF 381El Salvador IRF El Salvador IRF 381	X	X	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	Comms piece
IRF 382	X	NA	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	--
IRF 383	X	X	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	X	--
IRF 384	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NCE3
IRF 385	X	X	X	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	TOR/IR for final evaluation
Burkina Faso IRF 386BURKINA FASO IRF Burkina Faso IRF 386	X	X	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	Communications piece(s) CSO mapping reports Meeting reports of the "Cadre de Concertation" (February and November 2021) Annual Action Plans 2021 and 2022
Cameroon IRF 387	X	--	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Draft only	--

Chad IRF 388CHA D IRF Chad IRF 388	X	X	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	--
IRF 389	X		--	X	NA	X	X	X	X	X	X	Draft only	X	--
Colombi a IRF 400	X	X	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	Draft only	NA	Baseline assessment
Colombi a IRF 401COL OMBIA IRF Colombi a IRF 401	X	X	--	X	NA	NA	NA	X	NA	X	X	X	Draft only	--
Côte d'Ivoire IRF 402	X	X	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	Draft only	--
Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403Côte d'Ivoire IRF Côte d'Ivoire IRF 403	X	X	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	NA	Draft only	--
DRC IRF 404DRC IRF DRC IRF 404	X	--	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	NA	NA	X	X	--
DRC IRF 405DRC IRF DRC IRF 405	X	--	--	NA	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	--

														Notes
Guinea-Bissau IRF 406	X	--	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	X	Mid-term evaluation
IRF 407	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	NA	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	Baseline key data; project presentation brochure; CCJ (youth) letter. ToR for Capacity-building of CBOs and youth groups in project locations. Semi-annual report 2023 (draft)
IRF 408	X	X	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	NA	NA	Draft only	NA	Communication of the Mali Council of Ministers (on the transitional plan), June 2021 Complementary information note to UN PBF, August 2021 « Jeunes et Justice Transitionnelle au Mali », report of research study prepared by AND-Mali for the project (June 2022) Endline study (draft), May 2023
IRF 409	X	X	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	X	NA	--
IRF 410	X	--	--	X	X	NA	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	X	X	--
IRF 411	X	--	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	X	X	Protection workshop report
IRF 412	X	--	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	NA	X	NA	Communication piece(s) Gender police for the NBC, baseline study, Training report
Central African Republic IRF 413	X	--	--	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	X	X	--
El Salvador IRF 414 El Salvador IRF El Salvador IRF 414	X	--	--	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	X	X	--
IRF 415	X		--	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	NA	NA	NA	Draft only	--
IRF 416	X	X	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA	--

IRF 417	X	--	--	X	NA	X	NA	X	NA	NA	X	X	Draft only	--
IRF 418	X	NA	--	NA	NA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	--

*X: reviewed; N/A: not available; --: not applicable

Annex 11. List of persons interviewed

Cohort Evaluation

UN PBF HQ and in-country		
First Name	**Last Name**	**Position**
Emmanuelle	Bernard	Programme Officer: Southern and Central Africa, Great Lakes, Horn of Africa
Sara	Bottin	Programme Officer: Niger, Nigeria, Chad
Aicha	Bouslama	Associate Expert: Disability Inclusion
Nicolas	Gonzalez	Programme Officer: Central and South America, South and Central Asia
Tim	Heine	Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
Stephanie	Magalage	Associate Programme Officer
Ylva	Skondal	Gender and Youth Promotion Initiatives
Shaza	Suleiman	Gender Advisor
Jelena	Zelenovic	Programme Officer: West Africa, the Pacific, Western Balkans
Ana	Mesquita	Former Human Rights Advisor for PBSO
Marie	Douchey	Former YPS Advisor for PBSO
Diane	Sheinberg	Programme Officer: The Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, North Africa; Peace and development Adviser in Haiti
Ayeditin Alexandre	Yessoufou	M&E Officer, UN PBF Secretariat Mauritania
Annie	Bipendu	Programme Officer/Acting Coordinator, UN PBF Secretariat in DRC
Tony	Kouemo	M&E Officer, UN PBF Secretariat Haiti
Kissima	Sylla	UN PBF Secretariat Mali
Aitana	Constans	UN PBF Secretariat Mali
Erica	Gaston	UNU Centre for Policy Research. Team Leader of the UN PBF Human Rights and Peacebuilding Thematic Review
Raphael	Bodewig	UNU Centre for Policy Research. Team member of the UN PBF Human Rights and Peacebuilding Thematic Review
Melissa	Nader	MPTF Office in Colombia
Alice	Beccaro	Coordinator, MPTF Office in Colombia

Light touch evaluations

Stakeholder category	Haiti	Burkina Faso	Mali	Colombia	Total
UN PBF Secretariat	3	1	2	0	6

Fund recipients	3 (NUNO)	7 (RUNO)	5 (2 RUNO, 3 NUNO)	4 (NUNO)	19
Partner CSOs	3	5	13	4	25
Government actors/partner	0	3	2	0	5
Beneficiaries/local CSO/CBOs	13	0	0	7	20
Other	5	3	2	2	12
Total	27	19	24	17	87